USB support for sm7150-xiaomi-sweet #2

kprasadvnsi · 2022-08-21T09:05:18Z

No description provided.

Configure and enable the nodes for USB.

Petr Machata says: ==================== mlxsw: Fixes for PTP support This set fixes several issues in mlxsw PTP code. - Patch #1 fixes compilation warnings. - Patch #2 adjusts the order of operation during cleanup, thereby closing the window after PTP state was already cleaned in the ASIC for the given port, but before the port is removed, when the user could still in theory make changes to the configuration. - Patch #3 protects the PTP configuration with a custom mutex, instead of relying on RTNL, which is not held in all access paths. - Patch #4 forbids enablement of PTP only in RX or only in TX. The driver implicitly assumed this would be the case, but neglected to sanitize the configuration. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

We have been hitting the following lockdep splat with btrfs/187 recently WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.19.0-rc8+ torvalds#775 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ btrfs/752500 is trying to acquire lock: ffff97e1875a97b8 (btrfs-treloc-02#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110 but task is already holding lock: ffff97e1875a9278 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{3:3}: down_write_nested+0x41/0x80 __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110 btrfs_init_new_buffer+0x7d/0x2c0 btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x120/0x3b0 __btrfs_cow_block+0x136/0x600 btrfs_cow_block+0x10b/0x230 btrfs_search_slot+0x53b/0xb70 btrfs_lookup_inode+0x2a/0xa0 __btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x5f/0x280 btrfs_async_run_delayed_root+0x24c/0x290 btrfs_work_helper+0xf2/0x3e0 process_one_work+0x271/0x590 worker_thread+0x52/0x3b0 kthread+0xf0/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #1 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{3:3}: down_write_nested+0x41/0x80 __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110 btrfs_search_slot+0x3c3/0xb70 do_relocation+0x10c/0x6b0 relocate_tree_blocks+0x317/0x6d0 relocate_block_group+0x1f1/0x560 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x23e/0x400 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x4c/0x140 btrfs_balance+0x755/0xe40 btrfs_ioctl+0x1ea2/0x2c90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd -> #0 (btrfs-treloc-02#2){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1122/0x1e10 lock_acquire+0xc2/0x2d0 down_write_nested+0x41/0x80 __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110 btrfs_lock_root_node+0x31/0x50 btrfs_search_slot+0x1cb/0xb70 replace_path+0x541/0x9f0 merge_reloc_root+0x1d6/0x610 merge_reloc_roots+0xe2/0x260 relocate_block_group+0x2c8/0x560 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x23e/0x400 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x4c/0x140 btrfs_balance+0x755/0xe40 btrfs_ioctl+0x1ea2/0x2c90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: btrfs-treloc-02#2 --> btrfs-tree-01 --> btrfs-tree-01/1 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-tree-01/1); lock(btrfs-tree-01); lock(btrfs-tree-01/1); lock(btrfs-treloc-02#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 7 locks held by btrfs/752500: #0: ffff97e292fdf460 (sb_writers#12){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x208/0x2c90 #1: ffff97e284c02050 (&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_balance+0x55f/0xe40 #2: ffff97e284c00878 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x236/0x400 #3: ffff97e292fdf650 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: merge_reloc_root+0xef/0x610 #4: ffff97e284c02378 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x1a8/0x5a0 #5: ffff97e284c023a0 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x1a8/0x5a0 #6: ffff97e1875a9278 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 752500 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8+ torvalds#775 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x73 check_noncircular+0xd6/0x100 ? lock_is_held_type+0xe2/0x140 __lock_acquire+0x1122/0x1e10 lock_acquire+0xc2/0x2d0 ? __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110 down_write_nested+0x41/0x80 ? __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110 __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x110 btrfs_lock_root_node+0x31/0x50 btrfs_search_slot+0x1cb/0xb70 ? lock_release+0x137/0x2d0 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50 ? release_extent_buffer+0x128/0x180 replace_path+0x541/0x9f0 merge_reloc_root+0x1d6/0x610 merge_reloc_roots+0xe2/0x260 relocate_block_group+0x2c8/0x560 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x23e/0x400 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x4c/0x140 btrfs_balance+0x755/0xe40 btrfs_ioctl+0x1ea2/0x2c90 ? lock_is_held_type+0xe2/0x140 ? lock_is_held_type+0xe2/0x140 ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd This isn't necessarily new, it's just tricky to hit in practice. There are two competing things going on here. With relocation we create a snapshot of every fs tree with a reloc tree. Any extent buffers that get initialized here are initialized with the reloc root lockdep key. However since it is a snapshot, any blocks that are currently in cache that originally belonged to the fs tree will have the normal tree lockdep key set. This creates the lock dependency of reloc tree -> normal tree for the extent buffer locking during the first phase of the relocation as we walk down the reloc root to relocate blocks. However this is problematic because the final phase of the relocation is merging the reloc root into the original fs root. This involves searching down to any keys that exist in the original fs root and then swapping the relocated block and the original fs root block. We have to search down to the fs root first, and then go search the reloc root for the block we need to replace. This creates the dependency of normal tree -> reloc tree which is why lockdep complains. Additionally even if we were to fix this particular mismatch with a different nesting for the merge case, we're still slotting in a block that has a owner of the reloc root objectid into a normal tree, so that block will have its lockdep key set to the tree reloc root, and create a lockdep splat later on when we wander into that block from the fs root. Unfortunately the only solution here is to make sure we do not set the lockdep key to the reloc tree lockdep key normally, and then reset any blocks we wander into from the reloc root when we're doing the merged. This solves the problem of having mixed tree reloc keys intermixed with normal tree keys, and then allows us to make sure in the merge case we maintain the lock order of normal tree -> reloc tree We handle this by setting a bit on the reloc root when we do the search for the block we want to relocate, and any block we search into or COW at that point gets set to the reloc tree key. This works correctly because we only ever COW down to the parent node, so we aren't resetting the key for the block we're linking into the fs root. With this patch we no longer have the lockdep splat in btrfs/187. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

bpf_sk_reuseport_detach() calls __rcu_dereference_sk_user_data_with_flags() to obtain the value of sk->sk_user_data, but that function is only usable if the RCU read lock is held, and neither that function nor any of its callers hold it. Fix this by adding a new helper, __locked_read_sk_user_data_with_flags() that checks to see if sk->sk_callback_lock() is held and use that here instead. Alternatively, making __rcu_dereference_sk_user_data_with_flags() use rcu_dereference_checked() might suffice. Without this, the following warning can be occasionally observed: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.0.0-rc1-build2+ torvalds#563 Not tainted ----------------------------- include/net/sock.h:592 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 5 locks held by locktest/29873: #0: ffff88812734b550 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __sock_release+0x77/0x121 #1: ffff88812f5621b0 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: tcp_close+0x1c/0x70 #2: ffff88810312f5c8 (&h->lhash2[i].lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: inet_unhash+0x76/0x1c0 #3: ffffffff83768bb8 (reuseport_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: reuseport_detach_sock+0x18/0xdd #4: ffff88812f562438 (clock-AF_INET){++..}-{2:2}, at: bpf_sk_reuseport_detach+0x24/0xa4 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 29873 Comm: locktest Not tainted 6.0.0-rc1-build2+ torvalds#563 Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x5f bpf_sk_reuseport_detach+0x6d/0xa4 reuseport_detach_sock+0x75/0xdd inet_unhash+0xa5/0x1c0 tcp_set_state+0x169/0x20f ? lockdep_sock_is_held+0x3a/0x3a ? __lock_release.isra.0+0x13e/0x220 ? reacquire_held_locks+0x1bb/0x1bb ? hlock_class+0x31/0x96 ? mark_lock+0x9e/0x1af __tcp_close+0x50/0x4b6 tcp_close+0x28/0x70 inet_release+0x8e/0xa7 __sock_release+0x95/0x121 sock_close+0x14/0x17 __fput+0x20f/0x36a task_work_run+0xa3/0xcc exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x9c/0x14d syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x44 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Fixes: cf8c1e9 ("net: refactor bpf_sk_reuseport_detach()") Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> cc: Hawkins Jiawei <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166064248071.3502205.10036394558814861778.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Prior to commit 4149be7, sys_flock() would allocate the file_lock struct it was going to use to pass parameters, call ->flock() and then call locks_free_lock() to get rid of it - which had the side effect of calling locks_release_private() and thus ->fl_release_private(). With commit 4149be7, however, this is no longer the case: the struct is now allocated on the stack, and locks_free_lock() is no longer called - and thus any remaining private data doesn't get cleaned up either. This causes afs flock to cause oops. Kasan catches this as a UAF by the list_del_init() in afs_fl_release_private() for the file_lock record produced by afs_fl_copy_lock() as the original record didn't get delisted. It can be reproduced using the generic/504 xfstest. Fix this by reinstating the locks_release_private() call in sys_flock(). I'm not sure if this would affect any other filesystems. If not, then the release could be done in afs_flock() instead. Changes ======= ver #2) - Don't need to call ->fl_release_private() after calling the security hook, only after calling ->flock(). Fixes: 4149be7 ("fs/lock: Don't allocate file_lock in flock_make_lock().") cc: Chuck Lever <[email protected]> cc: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> cc: Marc Dionne <[email protected]> cc: [email protected] cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166075758809.3532462.13307935588777587536.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1 Acked-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>

The lag_lock is taken from both process and softirq contexts which results lockdep warning[0] about potential deadlock. However, just disabling softirqs by using *_bh spinlock API is not enough since it will cause warning in some contexts where the lock is obtained with hard irqs disabled. To fix the issue save current irq state, disable them before obtaining the lock an re-enable irqs from saved state after releasing it. [0]: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ================================ [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] WARNING: inconsistent lock state [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] 5.19.0_for_upstream_debug_2022_08_04_16_06 #1 Not tainted [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] -------------------------------- [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage. [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] swapper/0/0 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ffffffffa06dc0d8 (lag_lock){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: mlx5_lag_is_shared_fdb+0x1f/0x120 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x550 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] _raw_spin_lock+0x2c/0x40 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5_lag_add_netdev+0x13b/0x480 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5e_nic_enable+0x114/0x470 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5e_attach_netdev+0x30e/0x6a0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5e_resume+0x105/0x160 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5e_probe+0xac3/0x14f0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x9d/0xe0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] really_probe+0x1e0/0xaa0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __driver_probe_device+0x219/0x480 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x130 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __driver_attach+0x1e4/0x4d0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] bus_for_each_dev+0x11e/0x1a0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] bus_add_driver+0x3f4/0x5a0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] driver_register+0x20f/0x390 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __auxiliary_driver_register+0x14e/0x260 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5e_init+0x38/0x90 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] vhost_iotlb_itree_augment_rotate+0xcb/0x180 [vhost_iotlb] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] do_one_initcall+0xc4/0x400 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] do_init_module+0x18a/0x620 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] load_module+0x563a/0x7040 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __do_sys_finit_module+0x122/0x1d0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] irq event stamp: 3596508 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] hardirqs last enabled at (3596508): [<ffffffff813687c2>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa2/0x100 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] hardirqs last disabled at (3596507): [<ffffffff813687da>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0xba/0x100 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] softirqs last enabled at (3596488): [<ffffffff81368a2a>] irq_exit_rcu+0x11a/0x170 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] softirqs last disabled at (3596495): [<ffffffff81368a2a>] irq_exit_rcu+0x11a/0x170 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] other info that might help us debug this: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] CPU0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ---- [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] lock(lag_lock); [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] <Interrupt> [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] lock(lag_lock); [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] *** DEADLOCK *** [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] 4 locks held by swapper/0/0: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] #0: ffffffff84643260 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: mlx5e_napi_poll+0x43/0x20a0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] #1: ffffffff84643260 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x2d7/0xd60 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] #2: ffff888144a18b58 (&br->hash_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: br_fdb_update+0x301/0x570 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] #3: ffffffff84643260 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x5/0x1d0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] stack backtrace: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0_for_upstream_debug_2022_08_04_16_06 #1 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] Call Trace: [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] <IRQ> [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mark_lock.part.0.cold+0x5f/0x92 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? unwind_next_frame+0x1c4/0x1b50 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xcd/0xdb [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5e_napi_poll+0x4e9/0x20a0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5e_napi_poll+0x4e9/0x20a0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? stack_access_ok+0x1d0/0x1d0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? start_kernel+0x3a7/0x3c5 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __lock_acquire+0x1260/0x6720 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? register_lock_class+0x1880/0x1880 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mark_lock.part.0+0xed/0x3060 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? stack_trace_save+0x91/0xc0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x550 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5_lag_is_shared_fdb+0x1f/0x120 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? __lock_acquire+0xd6f/0x6720 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] _raw_spin_lock+0x2c/0x40 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5_lag_is_shared_fdb+0x1f/0x120 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5_lag_is_shared_fdb+0x1f/0x120 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5_esw_bridge_rep_vport_num_vhca_id_get+0x1a0/0x600 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5_esw_bridge_update_work+0x90/0x90 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x550 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5_esw_bridge_switchdev_event+0x185/0x8f0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5_esw_bridge_port_obj_attr_set+0x3e0/0x3e0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? check_chain_key+0x24a/0x580 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xd7/0x1d0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_switchdev_fdb_notify+0xea/0x100 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_switchdev_set_port_flag+0x310/0x310 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] fdb_notify+0x11b/0x150 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_fdb_update+0x34c/0x570 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_fdb_add_local+0x50/0x50 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_allowed_ingress+0x5f/0x1070 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? check_chain_key+0x24a/0x580 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_handle_frame_finish+0x786/0x18e0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? check_chain_key+0x24a/0x580 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? __lock_acquire+0xd6f/0x6720 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? sctp_inet_bind_verify+0x4d/0x190 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? xlog_unpack_data+0x2e0/0x310 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_nf_hook_thresh+0x227/0x380 [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? setup_pre_routing+0x460/0x460 [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_nf_pre_routing_ipv6+0x48b/0x69c [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_nf_pre_routing_finish_ipv6+0x5c2/0xbf0 [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_nf_pre_routing_ipv6+0x4c6/0x69c [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_validate_ipv6+0x9e0/0x9e0 [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_nf_forward_arp+0xb70/0xb70 [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_nf_pre_routing+0xacf/0x1160 [br_netfilter] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] br_handle_frame+0x8a9/0x1270 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x18e0/0x18e0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? register_lock_class+0x1880/0x1880 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x20/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? bond_handle_frame+0xf9/0xac0 [bonding] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x18e0/0x18e0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x7c0/0x2c70 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? check_chain_key+0x24a/0x580 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? generic_xdp_tx+0x5b0/0x5b0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? __lock_acquire+0xd6f/0x6720 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? register_lock_class+0x1880/0x1880 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? check_chain_key+0x24a/0x580 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x2d7/0x8a0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x550 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? process_backlog+0x960/0x960 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x129/0x400 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x5f4/0xd60 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? do_xdp_generic+0x150/0x150 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5e_poll_rx_cq+0xf6b/0x2960 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? mlx5e_poll_ico_cq+0x3d/0x1590 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] napi_complete_done+0x188/0x710 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] mlx5e_napi_poll+0x4e9/0x20a0 [mlx5_core] [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? __queue_work+0x53c/0xeb0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __napi_poll+0x9f/0x540 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] net_rx_action+0x420/0xb70 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? napi_threaded_poll+0x470/0x470 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? __common_interrupt+0x79/0x1a0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] __do_softirq+0x271/0x92c [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] irq_exit_rcu+0x11a/0x170 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] common_interrupt+0x7d/0xa0 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] </IRQ> [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] <TASK> [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] RIP: 0010:default_idle+0x42/0x60 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] Code: c1 83 e0 07 48 c1 e9 03 83 c0 03 0f b6 14 11 38 d0 7c 04 84 d2 75 14 8b 05 6b f1 22 02 85 c0 7e 07 0f 00 2d 80 3b 4a 00 fb f4 <c3> 48 c7 c7 e0 07 7e 85 e8 21 bd 40 fe eb de 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] RSP: 0018:ffffffff84407e18 EFLAGS: 00000242 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff84ec4a68 RCX: 1ffffffff0afc0fc [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff835b1fac [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8884d2c44ac3 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] R10: ffffed109a588958 R11: 00000000ffffffff R12: 0000000000000000 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] R13: ffffffff84efac20 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dffffc0000000000 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? default_idle_call+0xcc/0x460 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] default_idle_call+0xec/0x460 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] do_idle+0x394/0x450 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] ? arch_cpu_idle_exit+0x40/0x40 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] rest_init+0x156/0x250 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] arch_call_rest_init+0xf/0x15 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] start_kernel+0x3a7/0x3c5 [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xcd/0xdb [Sun Aug 7 13:12:29 2022] </TASK> Fixes: ff9b752 ("net/mlx5: Bridge, support LAG") Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>

Add a lock_class_key per mlx5 device to avoid a false positive "possible circular locking dependency" warning by lockdep, on flows which lock more than one mlx5 device, such as adding SF. kernel log: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.19.0-rc8+ #2 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/u20:0/8 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88812dfe0d98 (&dev->intf_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_init_one+0x2e/0x490 [mlx5_core] but task is already holding lock: ffff888101aa7898 (&(&notifier->n_head)->rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x5a/0x130 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&(&notifier->n_head)->rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: down_write+0x90/0x150 blocking_notifier_chain_register+0x53/0xa0 mlx5_sf_table_init+0x369/0x4a0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_init_one+0x261/0x490 [mlx5_core] probe_one+0x430/0x680 [mlx5_core] local_pci_probe+0xd6/0x170 work_for_cpu_fn+0x4e/0xa0 process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1340 worker_thread+0x6f6/0xec0 kthread+0x28f/0x330 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 (&dev->intf_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x2fc7/0x6720 lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x550 __mutex_lock+0x12c/0x14b0 mlx5_init_one+0x2e/0x490 [mlx5_core] mlx5_sf_dev_probe+0x29c/0x370 [mlx5_core] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x9d/0xe0 really_probe+0x1e0/0xaa0 __driver_probe_device+0x219/0x480 driver_probe_device+0x49/0x130 __device_attach_driver+0x1b8/0x280 bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0 __device_attach+0x1a3/0x460 bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260 device_add+0x9b1/0x1b40 __auxiliary_device_add+0x88/0xc0 mlx5_sf_dev_state_change_handler+0x67e/0x9d0 [mlx5_core] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0xd5/0x130 mlx5_vhca_state_work_handler+0x2b0/0x3f0 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1340 worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0 kthread+0x28f/0x330 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&(&notifier->n_head)->rwsem); lock(&dev->intf_state_mutex); lock(&(&notifier->n_head)->rwsem); lock(&dev->intf_state_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by kworker/u20:0/8: #0: ffff888150612938 ((wq_completion)mlx5_events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x6e2/0x1340 #1: ffff888100cafdb8 ((work_completion)(&work->work)#3){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x70f/0x1340 #2: ffff888101aa7898 (&(&notifier->n_head)->rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x5a/0x130 #3: ffff88813682d0e8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at:__device_attach+0x76/0x460 stack backtrace: CPU: 6 PID: 8 Comm: kworker/u20:0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8+ Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: mlx5_events mlx5_vhca_state_work_handler [mlx5_core] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d check_noncircular+0x278/0x300 ? print_circular_bug+0x460/0x460 ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 ? register_lock_class+0x1880/0x1880 __lock_acquire+0x2fc7/0x6720 ? register_lock_class+0x1880/0x1880 ? register_lock_class+0x1880/0x1880 lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x550 ? mlx5_init_one+0x2e/0x490 [mlx5_core] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 __mutex_lock+0x12c/0x14b0 ? mlx5_init_one+0x2e/0x490 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5_init_one+0x2e/0x490 [mlx5_core] ? _raw_read_unlock+0x1f/0x30 ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1320/0x1320 ? __ioremap_caller.constprop.0+0x306/0x490 ? mlx5_sf_dev_probe+0x269/0x370 [mlx5_core] ? iounmap+0x160/0x160 mlx5_init_one+0x2e/0x490 [mlx5_core] mlx5_sf_dev_probe+0x29c/0x370 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5_sf_dev_remove+0x130/0x130 [mlx5_core] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x9d/0xe0 really_probe+0x1e0/0xaa0 __driver_probe_device+0x219/0x480 ? auxiliary_match_id+0xe9/0x140 driver_probe_device+0x49/0x130 __device_attach_driver+0x1b8/0x280 ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x140/0x140 bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0 ? bus_for_each_dev+0x1a0/0x1a0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x286/0x400 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x2d/0x100 __device_attach+0x1a3/0x460 ? device_driver_attach+0x1e0/0x1e0 ? kobject_uevent_env+0x22d/0xf10 bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260 device_add+0x9b1/0x1b40 ? dev_set_name+0xab/0xe0 ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x260/0x260 ? memset+0x20/0x40 ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x21a/0x7d0 __auxiliary_device_add+0x88/0xc0 ? auxiliary_device_init+0x86/0xa0 mlx5_sf_dev_state_change_handler+0x67e/0x9d0 [mlx5_core] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0xd5/0x130 mlx5_vhca_state_work_handler+0x2b0/0x3f0 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5_vhca_event_arm+0x100/0x100 [mlx5_core] ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x286/0x400 process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1340 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x230/0x230 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0 ? process_one_work+0x1340/0x1340 kthread+0x28f/0x330 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Fixes: 6a32732 ("net/mlx5: SF, Port function state change support") Signed-off-by: Moshe Shemesh <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shay Drory <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>

To clear the flow table on flow table free, the following sequence normally happens in order: 1) gc_step work is stopped to disable any further stats/del requests. 2) All flow table entries are set to teardown state. 3) Run gc_step which will queue HW del work for each flow table entry. 4) Waiting for the above del work to finish (flush). 5) Run gc_step again, deleting all entries from the flow table. 6) Flow table is freed. But if a flow table entry already has pending HW stats or HW add work step 3 will not queue HW del work (it will be skipped), step 4 will wait for the pending add/stats to finish, and step 5 will queue HW del work which might execute after freeing of the flow table. To fix the above, this patch flushes the pending work, then it sets the teardown flag to all flows in the flowtable and it forces a garbage collector run to queue work to remove the flows from hardware, then it flushes this new pending work and (finally) it forces another garbage collector run to remove the entry from the software flowtable. Stack trace: [47773.882335] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in down_read+0x99/0x460 [47773.883634] Write of size 8 at addr ffff888103b45aa8 by task kworker/u20:6/543704 [47773.885634] CPU: 3 PID: 543704 Comm: kworker/u20:6 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc7+ #2 [47773.886745] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009) [47773.888438] Workqueue: nf_ft_offload_del flow_offload_work_handler [nf_flow_table] [47773.889727] Call Trace: [47773.890214] dump_stack+0xbb/0x107 [47773.890818] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x140 [47773.892990] kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 [47773.894459] kasan_check_range+0x145/0x1a0 [47773.895174] down_read+0x99/0x460 [47773.899706] nf_flow_offload_tuple+0x24f/0x3c0 [nf_flow_table] [47773.907137] flow_offload_work_handler+0x72d/0xbe0 [nf_flow_table] [47773.913372] process_one_work+0x8ac/0x14e0 [47773.921325] [47773.921325] Allocated by task 592159: [47773.922031] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [47773.922730] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7a/0x90 [47773.923411] tcf_ct_flow_table_get+0x3cb/0x1230 [act_ct] [47773.924363] tcf_ct_init+0x71c/0x1156 [act_ct] [47773.925207] tcf_action_init_1+0x45b/0x700 [47773.925987] tcf_action_init+0x453/0x6b0 [47773.926692] tcf_exts_validate+0x3d0/0x600 [47773.927419] fl_change+0x757/0x4a51 [cls_flower] [47773.928227] tc_new_tfilter+0x89a/0x2070 [47773.936652] [47773.936652] Freed by task 543704: [47773.937303] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [47773.938039] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 [47773.938731] kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 [47773.939467] __kasan_slab_free+0xe7/0x120 [47773.940194] slab_free_freelist_hook+0x86/0x190 [47773.941038] kfree+0xce/0x3a0 [47773.941644] tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work Original patch description and stack trace by Paul Blakey. Fixes: c29f74e ("netfilter: nf_flow_table: hardware offload support") Reported-by: Paul Blakey <[email protected]> Tested-by: Paul Blakey <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>

Yu Zhao reported a bug after the commit "mm/swap: Add swp_offset_pfn() to fetch PFN from swap entry" added a check in swp_offset_pfn() for swap type [1]: kernel BUG at include/linux/swapops.h:117! CPU: 46 PID: 5245 Comm: EventManager_De Tainted: G S O L 6.0.0-dbg-DEV #2 RIP: 0010:pfn_swap_entry_to_page+0x72/0xf0 Code: c6 48 8b 36 48 83 fe ff 74 53 48 01 d1 48 83 c1 08 48 8b 09 f6 c1 01 75 7b 66 90 48 89 c1 48 8b 09 f6 c1 01 74 74 5d c3 eb 9e <0f> 0b 48 ba ff ff ff ff 03 00 00 00 eb ae a9 ff 0f 00 00 75 13 48 RSP: 0018:ffffa59e73fabb80 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 00000000ffffffe8 RBX: 0c00000000000000 RCX: ffffcd5440000000 RDX: 1ffffffffff7a80a RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0c0000000000042b RBP: ffffa59e73fabb80 R08: ffff9965ca6e8bb8 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffffffa5a2f62d R11: 0000030b372e9fff R12: ffff997b79db5738 R13: 000000000000042b R14: 0c0000000000042b R15: 1ffffffffff7a80a FS: 00007f549d1bb700(0000) GS:ffff99d3cf680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000440d035b3180 CR3: 0000002243176004 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> change_pte_range+0x36e/0x880 change_p4d_range+0x2e8/0x670 change_protection_range+0x14e/0x2c0 mprotect_fixup+0x1ee/0x330 do_mprotect_pkey+0x34c/0x440 __x64_sys_mprotect+0x1d/0x30 It triggers because pfn_swap_entry_to_page() could be called upon e.g. a genuine swap entry. Fix it by only calling it when it's a write migration entry where the page* is used. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAOUHufaVC2Za-p8m0aiHw6YkheDcrO-C3wRGixwDS32VTS+k1w@mail.gmail.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 6c28760 ("mm: remember exclusively mapped anonymous pages with PG_anon_exclusive") Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]> Reported-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]> Tested-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Cc: "Huang, Ying" <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

Syzkaller reports the following problem: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/printk/printk.c:2347 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 1105, name: syz-executor423 3 locks held by syz-executor423/1105: #0: ffff8881468b9098 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}-{0:0}, at: tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x22/0x90 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:266 #1: ffff8881468b9130 (&tty->atomic_write_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: tty_write_lock drivers/tty/tty_io.c:952 [inline] #1: ffff8881468b9130 (&tty->atomic_write_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: do_tty_write drivers/tty/tty_io.c:975 [inline] #1: ffff8881468b9130 (&tty->atomic_write_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: file_tty_write.constprop.0+0x2a8/0x8e0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1118 #2: ffff88801b06c398 (&gsm->tx_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: gsmld_write+0x5e/0x150 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:2717 irq event stamp: 3482 hardirqs last enabled at (3481): [<ffffffff81d13343>] __get_reqs_available+0x143/0x2f0 fs/aio.c:946 hardirqs last disabled at (3482): [<ffffffff87d39722>] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:108 [inline] hardirqs last disabled at (3482): [<ffffffff87d39722>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x52/0x60 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159 softirqs last enabled at (3408): [<ffffffff87e01002>] asm_call_irq_on_stack+0x12/0x20 softirqs last disabled at (3401): [<ffffffff87e01002>] asm_call_irq_on_stack+0x12/0x20 Preemption disabled at: [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 CPU: 2 PID: 1105 Comm: syz-executor423 Not tainted 5.10.137-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x107/0x167 lib/dump_stack.c:118 ___might_sleep.cold+0x1e8/0x22e kernel/sched/core.c:7304 console_lock+0x19/0x80 kernel/printk/printk.c:2347 do_con_write+0x113/0x1de0 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:2909 con_write+0x22/0xc0 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3296 gsmld_write+0xd0/0x150 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:2720 do_tty_write drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1028 [inline] file_tty_write.constprop.0+0x502/0x8e0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1118 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1903 [inline] aio_write+0x355/0x7b0 fs/aio.c:1580 __io_submit_one fs/aio.c:1952 [inline] io_submit_one+0xf45/0x1a90 fs/aio.c:1999 __do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2058 [inline] __se_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2028 [inline] __x64_sys_io_submit+0x18c/0x2f0 fs/aio.c:2028 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 The problem happens in the following control flow: gsmld_write(...) spin_lock_irqsave(&gsm->tx_lock, flags) // taken a spinlock on TX data con_write(...) do_con_write(...) console_lock() might_sleep() // -> bug As far as console_lock() might sleep it should not be called with spinlock held. The patch replaces tx_lock spinlock with mutex in order to avoid the problem. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Fixes: 32dd59f ("tty: n_gsm: fix race condition in gsmld_write()") Cc: stable <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

A recent commit expanding the scope of the udc_lock mutex in the gadget core managed to cause an obscure and slightly bizarre lockdep violation. In abbreviated form: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.19.0-rc7+ #12510 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ udevadm/312 is trying to acquire lock: ffff80000aae1058 (udc_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: usb_udc_uevent+0x54/0xe0 but task is already holding lock: ffff000002277548 (kn->active#4){++++}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_seq_start+0x34/0xe0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (kn->active#4){++++}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0x68/0x84 __kernfs_remove+0x268/0x380 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x58/0xac sysfs_remove_file_ns+0x18/0x24 device_del+0x15c/0x440 -> #2 (device_links_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0x68/0x84 __mutex_lock+0x9c/0x430 mutex_lock_nested+0x38/0x64 device_link_remove+0x3c/0xa0 _regulator_put.part.0+0x168/0x190 regulator_put+0x3c/0x54 devm_regulator_release+0x14/0x20 -> #1 (regulator_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0x68/0x84 __mutex_lock+0x9c/0x430 mutex_lock_nested+0x38/0x64 regulator_lock_dependent+0x54/0x284 regulator_enable+0x34/0x80 phy_power_on+0x24/0x130 __dwc2_lowlevel_hw_enable+0x100/0x130 dwc2_lowlevel_hw_enable+0x18/0x40 dwc2_hsotg_udc_start+0x6c/0x2f0 gadget_bind_driver+0x124/0x1f4 -> #0 (udc_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1298/0x20cc lock_acquire.part.0+0xe0/0x230 lock_acquire+0x68/0x84 __mutex_lock+0x9c/0x430 mutex_lock_nested+0x38/0x64 usb_udc_uevent+0x54/0xe0 Evidently this was caused by the scope of udc_mutex being too large. The mutex is only meant to protect udc->driver along with a few other things. As far as I can tell, there's no reason for the mutex to be held while the gadget core calls a gadget driver's ->bind or ->unbind routine, or while a UDC is being started or stopped. (This accounts for link #1 in the chain above, where the mutex is held while the dwc2_hsotg_udc is started as part of driver probing.) Gadget drivers' ->disconnect callbacks are problematic. Even though usb_gadget_disconnect() will now acquire the udc_mutex, there's a window in usb_gadget_bind_driver() between the times when the mutex is released and the ->bind callback is invoked. If a disconnect occurred during that window, we could call the driver's ->disconnect routine before its ->bind routine. To prevent this from happening, it will be necessary to prevent a UDC from connecting while it has no gadget driver. This should be done already but it doesn't seem to be; currently usb_gadget_connect() has no check for this. Such a check will have to be added later. Some degree of mutual exclusion is required in soft_connect_store(), which can dereference udc->driver at arbitrary times since it is a sysfs callback. The solution here is to acquire the gadget's device lock rather than the udc_mutex. Since the driver core guarantees that the device lock is always held during driver binding and unbinding, this will make the accesses in soft_connect_store() mutually exclusive with any changes to udc->driver. Lastly, it turns out there is one place which should hold the udc_mutex but currently does not: The function_show() routine needs protection while it dereferences udc->driver. The missing lock and unlock calls are added. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Fixes: 2191c00 ("USB: gadget: Fix use-after-free Read in usb_udc_uevent()") Cc: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]> Tested-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YwkfhdxA/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Because rxrpc pretends to be a tunnel on top of a UDP/UDP6 socket, allowing it to siphon off UDP packets early in the handling of received UDP packets thereby avoiding the packet going through the UDP receive queue, it doesn't get ICMP packets through the UDP ->sk_error_report() callback. In fact, it doesn't appear that there's any usable option for getting hold of ICMP packets. Fix this by adding a new UDP encap hook to distribute error messages for UDP tunnels. If the hook is set, then the tunnel driver will be able to see ICMP packets. The hook provides the offset into the packet of the UDP header of the original packet that caused the notification. An alternative would be to call the ->error_handler() hook - but that requires that the skbuff be cloned (as ip_icmp_error() or ipv6_cmp_error() do, though isn't really necessary or desirable in rxrpc's case is we want to parse them there and then, not queue them). Changes ======= ver #3) - Fixed an uninitialised variable. ver #2) - Fixed some missing CONFIG_AF_RXRPC_IPV6 conditionals. Fixes: 5271953 ("rxrpc: Use the UDP encap_rcv hook") Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>

The driver incorrectly frees client instance and subsequent i40e module removal leads to kernel crash. Reproducer: 1. Do ethtool offline test followed immediately by another one host# ethtool -t eth0 offline; ethtool -t eth0 offline 2. Remove recursively irdma module that also removes i40e module host# modprobe -r irdma Result: [ 8675.035651] i40e 0000:3d:00.0 eno1: offline testing starting [ 8675.193774] i40e 0000:3d:00.0 eno1: testing finished [ 8675.201316] i40e 0000:3d:00.0 eno1: offline testing starting [ 8675.358921] i40e 0000:3d:00.0 eno1: testing finished [ 8675.496921] i40e 0000:3d:00.0: IRDMA hardware initialization FAILED init_state=2 status=-110 [ 8686.188955] i40e 0000:3d:00.1: i40e_ptp_stop: removed PHC on eno2 [ 8686.943890] i40e 0000:3d:00.1: Deleted LAN device PF1 bus=0x3d dev=0x00 func=0x01 [ 8686.952669] i40e 0000:3d:00.0: i40e_ptp_stop: removed PHC on eno1 [ 8687.761787] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030 [ 8687.768755] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 8687.773895] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 8687.779034] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 8687.781575] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 8687.785935] CPU: 51 PID: 172891 Comm: rmmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W I 5.19.0+ #2 [ 8687.794800] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFD/S2600WFD, BIOS SE5C620.86B.0X.02.0001.051420190324 05/14/2019 [ 8687.805222] RIP: 0010:i40e_lan_del_device+0x13/0xb0 [i40e] [ 8687.810719] Code: d4 84 c0 0f 84 b8 25 01 00 e9 9c 25 01 00 41 bc f4 ff ff ff eb 91 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 53 48 8b 87 58 08 00 00 48 89 fb <48> 8b 68 30 48 89 ef e8 21 8a 0f d5 48 89 ef e8 a9 78 0f d5 48 8b [ 8687.829462] RSP: 0018:ffffa604072efce0 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 8687.834689] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8f43833b2000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 8687.841821] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8f4b0545b298 RDI: ffff8f43833b2000 [ 8687.848955] RBP: ffff8f43833b2000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 8687.856086] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 000ffffffffff000 R12: ffff8f43833b2ef0 [ 8687.863218] R13: ffff8f43833b2ef0 R14: ffff915103966000 R15: ffff8f43833b2008 [ 8687.870342] FS: 00007f79501c3740(0000) GS:ffff8f4adffc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 8687.878427] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 8687.884174] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 000000014276e004 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [ 8687.891306] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 8687.898441] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 8687.905572] PKRU: 55555554 [ 8687.908286] Call Trace: [ 8687.910737] <TASK> [ 8687.912843] i40e_remove+0x2c0/0x330 [i40e] [ 8687.917040] pci_device_remove+0x33/0xa0 [ 8687.920962] device_release_driver_internal+0x1aa/0x230 [ 8687.926188] driver_detach+0x44/0x90 [ 8687.929770] bus_remove_driver+0x55/0xe0 [ 8687.933693] pci_unregister_driver+0x2a/0xb0 [ 8687.937967] i40e_exit_module+0xc/0xf48 [i40e] Two offline tests cause IRDMA driver failure (ETIMEDOUT) and this failure is indicated back to i40e_client_subtask() that calls i40e_client_del_instance() to free client instance referenced by pf->cinst and sets this pointer to NULL. During the module removal i40e_remove() calls i40e_lan_del_device() that dereferences pf->cinst that is NULL -> crash. Do not remove client instance when client open callbacks fails and just clear __I40E_CLIENT_INSTANCE_OPENED bit. The driver also needs to take care about this situation (when netdev is up and client is NOT opened) in i40e_notify_client_of_netdev_close() and calls client close callback only when __I40E_CLIENT_INSTANCE_OPENED is set. Fixes: 0ef2d5a ("i40e: KISS the client interface") Signed-off-by: Ivan Vecera <[email protected]> Tested-by: Helena Anna Dubel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>

The SRv6 layer allows defining HMAC data that can later be used to sign IPv6 Segment Routing Headers. This configuration is realised via netlink through four attributes: SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID, SEG6_ATTR_SECRET, SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN and SEG6_ATTR_ALGID. Because the SECRETLEN attribute is decoupled from the actual length of the SECRET attribute, it is possible to provide invalid combinations (e.g., secret = "", secretlen = 64). This case is not checked in the code and with an appropriately crafted netlink message, an out-of-bounds read of up to 64 bytes (max secret length) can occur past the skb end pointer and into skb_shared_info: Breakpoint 1, seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 208 memcpy(hinfo->secret, secret, slen); (gdb) bt #0 seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 #1 0xffffffff81e012e9 in genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=nlh@entry=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=extack@entry=0xffffc90000ba7af0, ops=ops@entry=0xffffc90000ba7a80, hdrlen=4, net=0xffffffff84237580 <init_net>, family=<optimized out>, family=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:731 #2 0xffffffff81e01435 in genl_family_rcv_msg (extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, family=0xffffffff82fef6c0 <seg6_genl_family>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:775 #3 genl_rcv_msg (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:792 #4 0xffffffff81dfffc3 in netlink_rcv_skb (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, cb=cb@entry=0xffffffff81e01350 <genl_rcv_msg>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501 #5 0xffffffff81e00919 in genl_rcv (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:803 #6 0xffffffff81dff6ae in netlink_unicast_kernel (ssk=0xffff888010eec800, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, sk=0xffff888004aed000) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 #7 netlink_unicast (ssk=ssk@entry=0xffff888010eec800, skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, portid=portid@entry=0, nonblock=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 #8 0xffffffff81dff9a4 in netlink_sendmsg (sock=<optimized out>, msg=0xffffc90000ba7e48, len=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 ... (gdb) p/x ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->head + ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->end $1 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p/x secret $2 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p slen $3 = 64 '@' The OOB data can then be read back from userspace by dumping HMAC state. This commit fixes this by ensuring SECRETLEN cannot exceed the actual length of SECRET. Reported-by: Lucas Leong <[email protected]> Tested: verified that EINVAL is correctly returned when secretlen > len(secret) Fixes: 4f4853d ("ipv6: sr: implement API to control SR HMAC structure") Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

In the IDC callback that is accessed when the aux drivers request a reset, the function to unplug the aux devices is called. This function is also called in the ice_prepare_for_reset function. This double call is causing a "scheduling while atomic" BUG. [ 662.676430] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: cqp opcode = 0x1 maj_err_code = 0xffff min_err_code = 0x8003 [ 662.676609] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: [Modify QP Cmd Error][op_code=8] status=-29 waiting=1 completion_err=1 maj=0xffff min=0x8003 [ 662.815006] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: ICE OICR event notification: oicr = 0x10000003 [ 662.815014] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: critical PE Error, GLPE_CRITERR=0x00011424 [ 662.815017] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: Requesting a reset [ 662.815475] BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/37/0/0x00010002 [ 662.815475] BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/37/0/0x00010002 [ 662.815477] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs rfkill 8021q garp mrp stp llc vfat fat rpcrdma intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common sunrpc i10nm_edac rdma_ucm nfit ib_srpt libnvdimm ib_isert iscsi_target_mod x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp target_core_mod snd_hda_intel ib_iser snd_intel_dspcfg libiscsi snd_intel_sdw_acpi scsi_transport_iscsi kvm_intel iTCO_wdt rdma_cm snd_hda_codec kvm iw_cm ipmi_ssif iTCO_vendor_support snd_hda_core irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device rapl snd_pcm snd_timer isst_if_mbox_pci pcspkr isst_if_mmio irdma intel_uncore idxd acpi_ipmi joydev isst_if_common snd mei_me idxd_bus ipmi_si soundcore i2c_i801 mei ipmi_devintf i2c_smbus i2c_ismt ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_pad rv(OE) ib_uverbs ib_cm ib_core xfs libcrc32c ast i2c_algo_bit drm_vram_helper drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm_ttm_helpe r ttm [ 662.815546] nvme nvme_core ice drm crc32c_intel i40e t10_pi wmi pinctrl_emmitsburg dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse [ 662.815557] Preemption disabled at: [ 662.815558] [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 [ 662.815563] CPU: 37 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/37 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S OE 5.17.1 #2 [ 662.815566] Hardware name: Intel Corporation D50DNP/D50DNP, BIOS SE5C6301.86B.6624.D18.2111021741 11/02/2021 [ 662.815568] Call Trace: [ 662.815572] <IRQ> [ 662.815574] dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x42 [ 662.815581] __schedule_bug.cold.147+0x7d/0x8a [ 662.815588] __schedule+0x798/0x990 [ 662.815595] schedule+0x44/0xc0 [ 662.815597] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x14/0x20 [ 662.815600] __mutex_lock.isra.11+0x46c/0x490 [ 662.815603] ? __ibdev_printk+0x76/0xc0 [ib_core] [ 662.815633] device_del+0x37/0x3d0 [ 662.815639] ice_unplug_aux_dev+0x1a/0x40 [ice] [ 662.815674] ice_schedule_reset+0x3c/0xd0 [ice] [ 662.815693] irdma_iidc_event_handler.cold.7+0xb6/0xd3 [irdma] [ 662.815712] ? bitmap_find_next_zero_area_off+0x45/0xa0 [ 662.815719] ice_send_event_to_aux+0x54/0x70 [ice] [ 662.815741] ice_misc_intr+0x21d/0x2d0 [ice] [ 662.815756] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4c/0x180 [ 662.815762] handle_irq_event_percpu+0xf/0x40 [ 662.815764] handle_irq_event+0x34/0x60 [ 662.815766] handle_edge_irq+0x9a/0x1c0 [ 662.815770] __common_interrupt+0x62/0x100 [ 662.815774] common_interrupt+0xb4/0xd0 [ 662.815779] </IRQ> [ 662.815780] <TASK> [ 662.815780] asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40 [ 662.815785] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xd6/0x380 [ 662.815789] Code: 49 89 c4 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 ff e8 65 d7 95 ff 45 84 ff 74 12 9c 58 f6 c4 02 0f 85 64 02 00 00 31 ff e8 ae c5 9c ff fb 45 85 f6 <0f> 88 12 01 00 00 49 63 d6 4c 2b 24 24 48 8d 04 52 48 8d 04 82 49 [ 662.815791] RSP: 0018:ff2c2c4f18edbe80 EFLAGS: 00000202 [ 662.815793] RAX: ff280805df140000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000001f [ 662.815795] RDX: 0000009a52da2d08 RSI: ffffffff93f8240b RDI: ffffffff93f53ee7 [ 662.815796] RBP: ff5e2bd11ff41928 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000002f8c0 [ 662.815797] R10: 0000010c3f18e2cf R11: 000000000000000f R12: 0000009a52da2d08 [ 662.815798] R13: ffffffff94ad7e20 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 662.815801] cpuidle_enter+0x29/0x40 [ 662.815803] do_idle+0x261/0x2b0 [ 662.815807] cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20 [ 662.815809] start_secondary+0x114/0x150 [ 662.815813] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xd5/0xdb [ 662.815818] </TASK> [ 662.815846] bad: scheduling from the idle thread! [ 662.815849] CPU: 37 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/37 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S W OE 5.17.1 #2 [ 662.815852] Hardware name: Intel Corporation D50DNP/D50DNP, BIOS SE5C6301.86B.6624.D18.2111021741 11/02/2021 [ 662.815853] Call Trace: [ 662.815855] <IRQ> [ 662.815856] dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x42 [ 662.815860] dequeue_task_idle+0x20/0x30 [ 662.815863] __schedule+0x1c3/0x990 [ 662.815868] schedule+0x44/0xc0 [ 662.815871] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x14/0x20 [ 662.815873] __mutex_lock.isra.11+0x3a8/0x490 [ 662.815876] ? __ibdev_printk+0x76/0xc0 [ib_core] [ 662.815904] device_del+0x37/0x3d0 [ 662.815909] ice_unplug_aux_dev+0x1a/0x40 [ice] [ 662.815937] ice_schedule_reset+0x3c/0xd0 [ice] [ 662.815961] irdma_iidc_event_handler.cold.7+0xb6/0xd3 [irdma] [ 662.815979] ? bitmap_find_next_zero_area_off+0x45/0xa0 [ 662.815985] ice_send_event_to_aux+0x54/0x70 [ice] [ 662.816011] ice_misc_intr+0x21d/0x2d0 [ice] [ 662.816033] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4c/0x180 [ 662.816037] handle_irq_event_percpu+0xf/0x40 [ 662.816039] handle_irq_event+0x34/0x60 [ 662.816042] handle_edge_irq+0x9a/0x1c0 [ 662.816045] __common_interrupt+0x62/0x100 [ 662.816048] common_interrupt+0xb4/0xd0 [ 662.816052] </IRQ> [ 662.816053] <TASK> [ 662.816054] asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40 [ 662.816057] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xd6/0x380 [ 662.816060] Code: 49 89 c4 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 ff e8 65 d7 95 ff 45 84 ff 74 12 9c 58 f6 c4 02 0f 85 64 02 00 00 31 ff e8 ae c5 9c ff fb 45 85 f6 <0f> 88 12 01 00 00 49 63 d6 4c 2b 24 24 48 8d 04 52 48 8d 04 82 49 [ 662.816063] RSP: 0018:ff2c2c4f18edbe80 EFLAGS: 00000202 [ 662.816065] RAX: ff280805df140000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000001f [ 662.816067] RDX: 0000009a52da2d08 RSI: ffffffff93f8240b RDI: ffffffff93f53ee7 [ 662.816068] RBP: ff5e2bd11ff41928 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000002f8c0 [ 662.816070] R10: 0000010c3f18e2cf R11: 000000000000000f R12: 0000009a52da2d08 [ 662.816071] R13: ffffffff94ad7e20 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 662.816075] cpuidle_enter+0x29/0x40 [ 662.816077] do_idle+0x261/0x2b0 [ 662.816080] cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20 [ 662.816083] start_secondary+0x114/0x150 [ 662.816087] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xd5/0xdb [ 662.816091] </TASK> [ 662.816169] bad: scheduling from the idle thread! The correct place to unplug the aux devices for a reset is in the prepare_for_reset function, as this is a common place for all reset flows. It also has built in protection from being called twice in a single reset instance before the aux devices are replugged. Fixes: f9f5301 ("ice: Register auxiliary device to provide RDMA") Signed-off-by: Dave Ertman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Helena Anna Dubel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>

…kernel/git/at91/linux into arm/fixes AT91 fixes for 6.0 #2 It contains a fix for LAN966 SoCs that corrects the interrupt number for internal PHYs. * tag 'at91-fixes-6.0-2' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/at91/linux: ARM: dts: lan966x: Fix the interrupt number for internal PHYs Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

…itical-section' Ido Schimmel says: ==================== ipmr: Always call ip{,6}_mr_forward() from RCU read-side critical section Patch #1 fixes a bug in ipmr code. Patch #2 adds corresponding test cases. ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.0, take #2 - Fix kmemleak usage in Protected KVM (again)

netfslib has a number of places in which it performs iteration of an xarray whilst being under the RCU read lock. It *should* call xas_retry() as the first thing inside of the loop and do "continue" if it returns true in case the xarray walker passed out a special value indicating that the walk needs to be redone from the root[*]. Fix this by adding the missing retry checks. [*] I wonder if this should be done inside xas_find(), xas_next_node() and suchlike, but I'm told that's not an simple change to effect. This can cause an oops like that below. Note the faulting address - this is an internal value (|0x2) returned from xarray. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000402 ... RIP: 0010:netfs_rreq_unlock+0xef/0x380 [netfs] ... Call Trace: netfs_rreq_assess+0xa6/0x240 [netfs] netfs_readpage+0x173/0x3b0 [netfs] ? init_wait_var_entry+0x50/0x50 filemap_read_page+0x33/0xf0 filemap_get_pages+0x2f2/0x3f0 filemap_read+0xaa/0x320 ? do_filp_open+0xb2/0x150 ? rmqueue+0x3be/0xe10 ceph_read_iter+0x1fe/0x680 [ceph] ? new_sync_read+0x115/0x1a0 new_sync_read+0x115/0x1a0 vfs_read+0xf3/0x180 ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Changes: ======== ver #2) - Changed an unsigned int to a size_t to reduce the likelihood of an overflow as per Willy's suggestion. - Added an additional patch to fix the maths. Fixes: 3d3c950 ("netfs: Provide readahead and readpage netfs helpers") Reported-by: George Law <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jingbo Xu <[email protected]> cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]> cc: [email protected] cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166749229733.107206.17482609105741691452.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166757987929.950645.12595273010425381286.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2

Syzbot reported the following lockdep splat ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.0.0-rc7-syzkaller-18095-gbbed346d5a96 #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor307/3029 is trying to acquire lock: ffff0000c02525d8 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: __might_fault+0x54/0xb4 mm/memory.c:5576 but task is already holding lock: ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:134 [inline] ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:140 [inline] ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x13c/0x1c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:279 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}: down_read_nested+0x64/0x84 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1624 __btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:134 [inline] btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:140 [inline] btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x13c/0x1c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:279 btrfs_search_slot_get_root+0x74/0x338 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1637 btrfs_search_slot+0x1b0/0xfd8 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1944 btrfs_update_root+0x6c/0x5a0 fs/btrfs/root-tree.c:132 commit_fs_roots+0x1f0/0x33c fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1459 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x89c/0x12d8 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2343 flush_space+0x66c/0x738 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:786 btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x43c/0x4e0 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1059 process_one_work+0x2d8/0x504 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x340/0x610 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x12c/0x158 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:860 -> #2 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common+0xd4/0xca8 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline] mutex_lock_nested+0x38/0x44 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799 btrfs_record_root_in_trans fs/btrfs/transaction.c:516 [inline] start_transaction+0x248/0x944 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:752 btrfs_start_transaction+0x34/0x44 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:781 btrfs_create_common+0xf0/0x1b4 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6651 btrfs_create+0x8c/0xb0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6697 lookup_open fs/namei.c:3413 [inline] open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3481 [inline] path_openat+0x804/0x11c4 fs/namei.c:3688 do_filp_open+0xdc/0x1b8 fs/namei.c:3718 do_sys_openat2+0xb8/0x22c fs/open.c:1313 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1329 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1345 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1340 [inline] __arm64_sys_openat+0xb0/0xe0 fs/open.c:1340 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline] el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206 el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654 el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581 -> #1 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}: percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline] __sb_start_write include/linux/fs.h:1826 [inline] sb_start_intwrite include/linux/fs.h:1948 [inline] start_transaction+0x360/0x944 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:683 btrfs_join_transaction+0x30/0x40 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:795 btrfs_dirty_inode+0x50/0x140 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6103 btrfs_update_time+0x1c0/0x1e8 fs/btrfs/inode.c:6145 inode_update_time fs/inode.c:1872 [inline] touch_atime+0x1f0/0x4a8 fs/inode.c:1945 file_accessed include/linux/fs.h:2516 [inline] btrfs_file_mmap+0x50/0x88 fs/btrfs/file.c:2407 call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:2192 [inline] mmap_region+0x7fc/0xc14 mm/mmap.c:1752 do_mmap+0x644/0x97c mm/mmap.c:1540 vm_mmap_pgoff+0xe8/0x1d0 mm/util.c:552 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x1cc/0x278 mm/mmap.c:1586 __do_sys_mmap arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c:28 [inline] __se_sys_mmap arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c:21 [inline] __arm64_sys_mmap+0x58/0x6c arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c:21 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline] el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206 el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654 el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581 -> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3095 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3214 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3829 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x1530/0x30a4 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5053 lock_acquire+0x100/0x1f8 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5666 __might_fault+0x7c/0xb4 mm/memory.c:5577 _copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:134 [inline] copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:160 [inline] btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_rootref+0x3a8/0x4bc fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3203 btrfs_ioctl+0xa08/0xa64 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:5556 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd0/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:856 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline] el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206 el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654 el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &mm->mmap_lock --> &fs_info->reloc_mutex --> btrfs-root-00 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-root-00); lock(&fs_info->reloc_mutex); lock(btrfs-root-00); lock(&mm->mmap_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor307/3029: #0: ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:134 [inline] #0: ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:140 [inline] #0: ffff0000c958a608 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x13c/0x1c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:279 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 3029 Comm: syz-executor307 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc7-syzkaller-18095-gbbed346d5a96 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/30/2022 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x1c4/0x1f0 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:156 show_stack+0x2c/0x54 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:163 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x104/0x16c lib/dump_stack.c:106 dump_stack+0x1c/0x58 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_circular_bug+0x2c4/0x2c8 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2053 check_noncircular+0x14c/0x154 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3095 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3214 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3829 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x1530/0x30a4 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5053 lock_acquire+0x100/0x1f8 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5666 __might_fault+0x7c/0xb4 mm/memory.c:5577 _copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:134 [inline] copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:160 [inline] btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_rootref+0x3a8/0x4bc fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3203 btrfs_ioctl+0xa08/0xa64 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:5556 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd0/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:856 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline] el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x164 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:206 el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:636 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:654 el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:581 We do generally the right thing here, copying the references into a temporary buffer, however we are still holding the path when we do copy_to_user from the temporary buffer. Fix this by freeing the path before we copy to user space. Reported-by: [email protected] CC: [email protected] # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Recent commit aa626da ("iavf: Detach device during reset task") removed netif_tx_stop_all_queues() with an assumption that Tx queues are already stopped by netif_device_detach() in the beginning of reset task. This assumption is incorrect because during reset task a potential link event can start Tx queues again. Revert this change to fix this issue. Reproducer: 1. Run some Tx traffic (e.g. iperf3) over iavf interface 2. Switch MTU of this interface in a loop [root@host ~]# cat repro.sh IF=enp2s0f0v0 iperf3 -c 192.168.0.1 -t 600 --logfile /dev/null & sleep 2 while :; do for i in 1280 1500 2000 900 ; do ip link set $IF mtu $i sleep 2 done done [root@host ~]# ./repro.sh Result: [ 306.199917] iavf 0000:02:02.0 enp2s0f0v0: NIC Link is Up Speed is 40 Gbps Full Duplex [ 308.205944] iavf 0000:02:02.0 enp2s0f0v0: NIC Link is Up Speed is 40 Gbps Full Duplex [ 310.103223] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 [ 310.110179] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 310.115396] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 310.120526] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 310.123057] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 310.127408] CPU: 24 PID: 183 Comm: kworker/u64:9 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.1.0-rc3+ #2 [ 310.135485] Hardware name: Abacus electric, s.r.o. - [email protected] Super Server/H12SSW-iN, BIOS 2.4 04/13/2022 [ 310.145728] Workqueue: iavf iavf_reset_task [iavf] [ 310.150520] RIP: 0010:iavf_xmit_frame_ring+0xd1/0xf70 [iavf] [ 310.156180] Code: d0 0f 86 da 00 00 00 83 e8 01 0f b7 fa 29 f8 01 c8 39 c6 0f 8f a0 08 00 00 48 8b 45 20 48 8d 14 92 bf 01 00 00 00 4c 8d 3c d0 <49> 89 5f 08 8b 43 70 66 41 89 7f 14 41 89 47 10 f6 83 82 00 00 00 [ 310.174918] RSP: 0018:ffffbb5f0082caa0 EFLAGS: 00010293 [ 310.180137] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff92345471a6e8 RCX: 0000000000000200 [ 310.187259] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000d RDI: 0000000000000001 [ 310.194385] RBP: ffff92341d249000 R08: ffff92434987fcac R09: 0000000000000001 [ 310.201509] R10: 0000000011f683b9 R11: 0000000011f50641 R12: 0000000000000008 [ 310.208631] R13: ffff923447500000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 310.215756] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92434ee00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 310.223835] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 310.229572] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 0000000fbc210004 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 [ 310.236696] PKRU: 55555554 [ 310.239399] Call Trace: [ 310.241844] <IRQ> [ 310.243855] ? dst_alloc+0x5b/0xb0 [ 310.247260] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x9e/0x1f0 [ 310.251439] sch_direct_xmit+0xa0/0x370 [ 310.255276] __qdisc_run+0x13e/0x580 [ 310.258848] __dev_queue_xmit+0x431/0xd00 [ 310.262851] ? selinux_ip_postroute+0x147/0x3f0 [ 310.267377] ip_finish_output2+0x26c/0x540 Fixes: aa626da ("iavf: Detach device during reset task") Cc: Jacob Keller <[email protected]> Cc: Patryk Piotrowski <[email protected]> Cc: SlawomirX Laba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ivan Vecera <[email protected]> Tested-by: Konrad Jankowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>

After commit aa626da ("iavf: Detach device during reset task") the device is detached during reset task and re-attached at its end. The problem occurs when reset task fails because Tx queues are restarted during device re-attach and this leads later to a crash. To resolve this issue properly close the net device in cause of failure in reset task to avoid restarting of tx queues at the end. Also replace the hacky manipulation with IFF_UP flag by device close that clears properly both IFF_UP and __LINK_STATE_START flags. In these case iavf_close() does not do anything because the adapter state is already __IAVF_DOWN. Reproducer: 1) Run some Tx traffic (e.g. iperf3) over iavf interface 2) Set VF trusted / untrusted in loop [root@host ~]# cat repro.sh PF=enp65s0f0 IF=${PF}v0 ip link set up $IF ip addr add 192.168.0.2/24 dev $IF sleep 1 iperf3 -c 192.168.0.1 -t 600 --logfile /dev/null & sleep 2 while :; do ip link set $PF vf 0 trust on ip link set $PF vf 0 trust off done [root@host ~]# ./repro.sh Result: [ 2006.650969] iavf 0000:41:01.0: Failed to init adminq: -53 [ 2006.675662] ice 0000:41:00.0: VF 0 is now trusted [ 2006.689997] iavf 0000:41:01.0: Reset task did not complete, VF disabled [ 2006.696611] iavf 0000:41:01.0: failed to allocate resources during reinit [ 2006.703209] ice 0000:41:00.0: VF 0 is now untrusted [ 2006.737011] ice 0000:41:00.0: VF 0 is now trusted [ 2006.764536] ice 0000:41:00.0: VF 0 is now untrusted [ 2006.768919] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000b4a [ 2006.776358] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 2006.781488] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 2006.786620] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 2006.789152] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 2006.792903] ice 0000:41:00.0: VF 0 is now trusted [ 2006.793501] CPU: 4 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.1.0-rc3+ #2 [ 2006.805668] Hardware name: Abacus electric, s.r.o. - [email protected] Super Server/H12SSW-iN, BIOS 2.4 04/13/2022 [ 2006.815915] RIP: 0010:iavf_xmit_frame_ring+0x96/0xf70 [iavf] [ 2006.821028] ice 0000:41:00.0: VF 0 is now untrusted [ 2006.821572] Code: 48 83 c1 04 48 c1 e1 04 48 01 f9 48 83 c0 10 6b 50 f8 55 c1 ea 14 45 8d 64 14 01 48 39 c8 75 eb 41 83 fc 07 0f 8f e9 08 00 00 <0f> b7 45 4a 0f b7 55 48 41 8d 74 24 05 31 c9 66 39 d0 0f 86 da 00 [ 2006.845181] RSP: 0018:ffffb253004bc9e8 EFLAGS: 00010293 [ 2006.850397] RAX: ffff9d154de45b00 RBX: ffff9d15497d52e8 RCX: ffff9d154de45b00 [ 2006.856327] ice 0000:41:00.0: VF 0 is now trusted [ 2006.857523] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000005a8 RDI: ffff9d154de45ac0 [ 2006.857525] RBP: 0000000000000b00 R08: ffff9d159cb010ac R09: 0000000000000001 [ 2006.857526] R10: ffff9d154de45940 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000002 [ 2006.883600] R13: ffff9d1770838dc0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffc07b8380 [ 2006.885840] ice 0000:41:00.0: VF 0 is now untrusted [ 2006.890725] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9d248e900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2006.890727] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2006.909419] CR2: 0000000000000b4a CR3: 0000000c39c10002 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 [ 2006.916543] PKRU: 55555554 [ 2006.918254] ice 0000:41:00.0: VF 0 is now trusted [ 2006.919248] Call Trace: [ 2006.919250] <IRQ> [ 2006.919252] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x9e/0x1f0 [ 2006.932587] sch_direct_xmit+0xa0/0x370 [ 2006.936424] __dev_queue_xmit+0x7af/0xd00 [ 2006.940429] ip_finish_output2+0x26c/0x540 [ 2006.944519] ip_output+0x71/0x110 [ 2006.947831] ? __ip_finish_output+0x2b0/0x2b0 [ 2006.952180] __ip_queue_xmit+0x16d/0x400 [ 2006.952721] ice 0000:41:00.0: VF 0 is now untrusted [ 2006.956098] __tcp_transmit_skb+0xa96/0xbf0 [ 2006.965148] __tcp_retransmit_skb+0x174/0x860 [ 2006.969499] ? cubictcp_cwnd_event+0x40/0x40 [ 2006.973769] tcp_retransmit_skb+0x14/0xb0 ... Fixes: aa626da ("iavf: Detach device during reset task") Cc: Jacob Keller <[email protected]> Cc: Patryk Piotrowski <[email protected]> Cc: SlawomirX Laba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ivan Vecera <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Tested-by: Konrad Jankowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>

…kernel/git/at91/linux into arm/fixes AT91 fixes for 6.1 #2 It contains: - fix UDC on at91sam9g20ek boards by adding vbus pin * tag 'at91-fixes-6.1-2' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/at91/linux: ARM: dts: at91: sam9g20ek: enable udc vbus gpio pinctrl Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

ldev->lock is used to serialize lag change operations. Since multiport eswtich functionality was added, we now change the mode dynamically. However, acquiring ldev->lock is not allowed as it could possibly lead to a deadlock as reported by the lockdep mechanism. [ 836.154963] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 836.155850] 5.19.0-rc5_net_56b7df2 #1 Not tainted [ 836.156549] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 836.157418] handler1/12198 is trying to acquire lock: [ 836.158178] ffff888187d52b58 (&ldev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_lag_do_mirred+0x3b/0x70 [mlx5_core] [ 836.159575] [ 836.159575] but task is already holding lock: [ 836.160474] ffff8881d4de2930 (&block->cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: tc_setup_cb_add+0x5b/0x200 [ 836.161669] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 836.162905] [ 836.162905] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 836.164008] -> #3 (&block->cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [ 836.164946] down_write+0x25/0x60 [ 836.165548] tcf_block_get_ext+0x1c6/0x5d0 [ 836.166253] ingress_init+0x74/0xa0 [sch_ingress] [ 836.167028] qdisc_create.constprop.0+0x130/0x5e0 [ 836.167805] tc_modify_qdisc+0x481/0x9f0 [ 836.168490] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x16e/0x5a0 [ 836.169189] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4e/0xf0 [ 836.169861] netlink_unicast+0x190/0x250 [ 836.170543] netlink_sendmsg+0x243/0x4b0 [ 836.171226] sock_sendmsg+0x33/0x40 [ 836.171860] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1d1/0x1f0 [ 836.172535] ___sys_sendmsg+0xab/0xf0 [ 836.173183] __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90 [ 836.173836] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [ 836.174471] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [ 836.175282] [ 836.175282] -> #2 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 836.176190] __mutex_lock+0x6b/0xf80 [ 836.176830] register_netdevice_notifier+0x21/0x120 [ 836.177631] rtnetlink_init+0x2d/0x1e9 [ 836.178289] netlink_proto_init+0x163/0x179 [ 836.178994] do_one_initcall+0x63/0x300 [ 836.179672] kernel_init_freeable+0x2cb/0x31b [ 836.180403] kernel_init+0x17/0x140 [ 836.181035] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 836.181687] -> #1 (pernet_ops_rwsem){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 836.182628] down_write+0x25/0x60 [ 836.183235] unregister_netdevice_notifier+0x1c/0xb0 [ 836.184029] mlx5_ib_roce_cleanup+0x94/0x120 [mlx5_ib] [ 836.184855] __mlx5_ib_remove+0x35/0x60 [mlx5_ib] [ 836.185637] mlx5_eswitch_unregister_vport_reps+0x22f/0x440 [mlx5_core] [ 836.186698] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x18/0x30 [ 836.187409] device_release_driver_internal+0x1f6/0x270 [ 836.188253] bus_remove_device+0xef/0x160 [ 836.188939] device_del+0x18b/0x3f0 [ 836.189562] mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked+0xd6/0x2d0 [mlx5_core] [ 836.190516] mlx5_lag_remove_devices+0x69/0xe0 [mlx5_core] [ 836.191414] mlx5_do_bond_work+0x441/0x620 [mlx5_core] [ 836.192278] process_one_work+0x25c/0x590 [ 836.192963] worker_thread+0x4f/0x3d0 [ 836.193609] kthread+0xcb/0xf0 [ 836.194189] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 836.194826] -> #0 (&ldev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 836.195734] __lock_acquire+0x15b8/0x2a10 [ 836.196426] lock_acquire+0xce/0x2d0 [ 836.197057] __mutex_lock+0x6b/0xf80 [ 836.197708] mlx5_lag_do_mirred+0x3b/0x70 [mlx5_core] [ 836.198575] tc_act_parse_mirred+0x25b/0x800 [mlx5_core] [ 836.199467] parse_tc_actions+0x168/0x5a0 [mlx5_core] [ 836.200340] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x263/0x480 [mlx5_core] [ 836.201241] mlx5e_configure_flower+0x8a0/0x1820 [mlx5_core] [ 836.202187] tc_setup_cb_add+0xd7/0x200 [ 836.202856] fl_hw_replace_filter+0x14c/0x1f0 [cls_flower] [ 836.203739] fl_change+0xbbe/0x1730 [cls_flower] [ 836.204501] tc_new_tfilter+0x407/0xd90 [ 836.205168] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x406/0x5a0 [ 836.205877] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4e/0xf0 [ 836.206535] netlink_unicast+0x190/0x250 [ 836.207217] netlink_sendmsg+0x243/0x4b0 [ 836.207915] sock_sendmsg+0x33/0x40 [ 836.208538] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1d1/0x1f0 [ 836.209219] ___sys_sendmsg+0xab/0xf0 [ 836.209878] __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90 [ 836.210510] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [ 836.211137] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [ 836.211954] other info that might help us debug this: [ 836.213174] Chain exists of: [ 836.213174] &ldev->lock --> rtnl_mutex --> &block->cb_lock 836.214650] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 836.214650] [ 836.215574] CPU0 CPU1 [ 836.216255] ---- ---- [ 836.216943] lock(&block->cb_lock); [ 836.217518] lock(rtnl_mutex); [ 836.218348] lock(&block->cb_lock); [ 836.219212] lock(&ldev->lock); [ 836.219758] [ 836.219758] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 836.219758] [ 836.220747] 2 locks held by handler1/12198: [ 836.221390] #0: ffff8881d4de2930 (&block->cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: tc_setup_cb_add+0x5b/0x200 [ 836.222646] #1: ffff88810c9a92c0 (&esw->mode_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_esw_hold+0x39/0x50 [mlx5_core] [ 836.224063] stack backtrace: [ 836.224799] CPU: 6 PID: 12198 Comm: handler1 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc5_net_56b7df2 #1 [ 836.225923] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 836.227476] Call Trace: [ 836.227929] <TASK> [ 836.228332] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d [ 836.228924] check_noncircular+0x104/0x120 [ 836.229562] __lock_acquire+0x15b8/0x2a10 [ 836.230201] lock_acquire+0xce/0x2d0 [ 836.230776] ? mlx5_lag_do_mirred+0x3b/0x70 [mlx5_core] [ 836.231614] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 836.232221] __mutex_lock+0x6b/0xf80 [ 836.232799] ? mlx5_lag_do_mirred+0x3b/0x70 [mlx5_core] [ 836.233636] ? mlx5_lag_do_mirred+0x3b/0x70 [mlx5_core] [ 836.234451] ? xa_load+0xc3/0x190 [ 836.234995] mlx5_lag_do_mirred+0x3b/0x70 [mlx5_core] [ 836.235803] tc_act_parse_mirred+0x25b/0x800 [mlx5_core] [ 836.236636] ? tc_act_can_offload_mirred+0x135/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 836.237550] parse_tc_actions+0x168/0x5a0 [mlx5_core] [ 836.238364] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x263/0x480 [mlx5_core] [ 836.239202] mlx5e_configure_flower+0x8a0/0x1820 [mlx5_core] [ 836.240076] ? lock_acquire+0xce/0x2d0 [ 836.240668] ? tc_setup_cb_add+0x5b/0x200 [ 836.241294] tc_setup_cb_add+0xd7/0x200 [ 836.241917] fl_hw_replace_filter+0x14c/0x1f0 [cls_flower] [ 836.242709] fl_change+0xbbe/0x1730 [cls_flower] [ 836.243408] tc_new_tfilter+0x407/0xd90 [ 836.244043] ? tc_del_tfilter+0x880/0x880 [ 836.244672] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x406/0x5a0 [ 836.245310] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x7a/0x4b0 [ 836.245991] ? if_nlmsg_stats_size+0x2b0/0x2b0 [ 836.246675] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4e/0xf0 [ 836.258046] netlink_unicast+0x190/0x250 [ 836.258669] netlink_sendmsg+0x243/0x4b0 [ 836.259288] sock_sendmsg+0x33/0x40 [ 836.259857] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1d1/0x1f0 [ 836.260473] ___sys_sendmsg+0xab/0xf0 [ 836.261064] ? lock_acquire+0xce/0x2d0 [ 836.261669] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 836.262272] ? __fget_files+0xb9/0x190 [ 836.262871] ? __fget_files+0xd3/0x190 [ 836.263462] __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90 [ 836.264064] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [ 836.264652] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [ 836.265425] RIP: 0033:0x7fdbe5e2677d [ 836.266012] Code: 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 ba ee ff ff 8b 54 24 1c 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 33 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 ee ee ff ff 48 [ 836.268485] RSP: 002b:00007fdbe48a75a0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [ 836.269598] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fdbe5e2677d [ 836.270576] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fdbe48a7640 RDI: 000000000000003c [ 836.271565] RBP: 00007fdbe48a8368 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 836.272546] R10: 00007fdbe48a84b0 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000557bd17dc860 [ 836.273527] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000557bd17dc860 R15: 00007fdbe48a7640 [ 836.274521] </TASK> To avoid using mode holding ldev->lock in the configure flow, we queue a work to the lag workqueue and cease wait on a completion object. In addition, we remove the lock from mlx5_lag_do_mirred() since it is not really protecting anything. It should be noted that an actual deadlock has not been observed. Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>

When logging an inode in full mode, or when logging xattrs or when logging the dir index items of a directory, we are modifying the log tree while holding a read lock on a leaf from the fs/subvolume tree. This can lead to a deadlock in rare circumstances, but it is a real possibility, and it was recently reported by syzbot with the following trace from lockdep: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.1.0-rc5-next-20221116-syzkaller #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor.1/16154 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88807e3084a0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0xa1/0xf30 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256 but task is already holding lock: ffff88807df33078 (btrfs-log-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x32/0x3d0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:197 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (btrfs-log-00){++++}-{3:3}: down_read_nested+0x9e/0x450 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1634 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x32/0x350 fs/btrfs/locking.c:135 btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:141 [inline] btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x82/0x3a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:280 btrfs_search_slot_get_root fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1678 [inline] btrfs_search_slot+0x3ca/0x2c70 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1998 btrfs_lookup_csum+0x116/0x3f0 fs/btrfs/file-item.c:209 btrfs_csum_file_blocks+0x40e/0x1370 fs/btrfs/file-item.c:1021 log_csums.isra.0+0x244/0x2d0 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4258 copy_items.isra.0+0xbfb/0xed0 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4403 copy_inode_items_to_log+0x13d6/0x1d90 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:5873 btrfs_log_inode+0xb19/0x4680 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6495 btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x890/0x2a20 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6982 btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x59/0x80 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7083 btrfs_sync_file+0xa41/0x13c0 fs/btrfs/file.c:1921 vfs_fsync_range+0x13e/0x230 fs/sync.c:188 generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2856 [inline] iomap_dio_complete+0x73a/0x920 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:128 btrfs_direct_write fs/btrfs/file.c:1536 [inline] btrfs_do_write_iter+0xba2/0x1470 fs/btrfs/file.c:1668 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2160 [inline] do_iter_readv_writev+0x20b/0x3b0 fs/read_write.c:735 do_iter_write+0x182/0x700 fs/read_write.c:861 vfs_iter_write+0x74/0xa0 fs/read_write.c:902 iter_file_splice_write+0x745/0xc90 fs/splice.c:686 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:764 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0x114/0x180 fs/splice.c:931 splice_direct_to_actor+0x335/0x8a0 fs/splice.c:886 do_splice_direct+0x1ab/0x280 fs/splice.c:974 do_sendfile+0xb19/0x1270 fs/read_write.c:1255 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1323 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1309 [inline] __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x259/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:1309 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd -> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5382 [inline] lock_release+0x371/0x810 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5688 up_write+0x2a/0x520 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1614 btrfs_tree_unlock_rw fs/btrfs/locking.h:189 [inline] btrfs_unlock_up_safe+0x1e3/0x290 fs/btrfs/locking.c:238 search_leaf fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1832 [inline] btrfs_search_slot+0x265e/0x2c70 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2074 btrfs_insert_empty_items+0xbd/0x1c0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4133 btrfs_insert_delayed_item+0x826/0xfa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:746 btrfs_insert_delayed_items fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:824 [inline] __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1111 [inline] __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x280/0x590 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1153 flush_space+0x147/0xe90 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:728 btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x541/0xc10 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1086 process_one_work+0x9bf/0x1710 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x669/0x1090 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x2e8/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308 -> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3097 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3216 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3831 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2a43/0x56d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5055 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5668 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5633 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x12f/0x1360 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0xa1/0xf30 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256 __btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:251 [inline] btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline] btrfs_remove_delayed_node+0x52/0x60 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1285 btrfs_evict_inode+0x511/0xf30 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5554 evict+0x2ed/0x6b0 fs/inode.c:664 dispose_list+0x117/0x1e0 fs/inode.c:697 prune_icache_sb+0xeb/0x150 fs/inode.c:896 super_cache_scan+0x391/0x590 fs/super.c:106 do_shrink_slab+0x464/0xce0 mm/vmscan.c:843 shrink_slab_memcg mm/vmscan.c:912 [inline] shrink_slab+0x388/0x660 mm/vmscan.c:991 shrink_node_memcgs mm/vmscan.c:6088 [inline] shrink_node+0x93d/0x1f30 mm/vmscan.c:6117 shrink_zones mm/vmscan.c:6355 [inline] do_try_to_free_pages+0x3b4/0x17a0 mm/vmscan.c:6417 try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages+0x3a4/0xa70 mm/vmscan.c:6732 reclaim_high.constprop.0+0x182/0x230 mm/memcontrol.c:2393 mem_cgroup_handle_over_high+0x190/0x520 mm/memcontrol.c:2578 try_charge_memcg+0xe0c/0x12f0 mm/memcontrol.c:2816 try_charge mm/memcontrol.c:2827 [inline] charge_memcg+0x90/0x3b0 mm/memcontrol.c:6889 __mem_cgroup_charge+0x2b/0x90 mm/memcontrol.c:6910 mem_cgroup_charge include/linux/memcontrol.h:667 [inline] __filemap_add_folio+0x615/0xf80 mm/filemap.c:852 filemap_add_folio+0xaf/0x1e0 mm/filemap.c:934 __filemap_get_folio+0x389/0xd80 mm/filemap.c:1976 pagecache_get_page+0x2e/0x280 mm/folio-compat.c:104 find_or_create_page include/linux/pagemap.h:612 [inline] alloc_extent_buffer+0x2b9/0x1580 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4588 btrfs_init_new_buffer fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4869 [inline] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x2e1/0x1320 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4988 __btrfs_cow_block+0x3b2/0x1420 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:440 btrfs_cow_block+0x2fa/0x950 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:595 btrfs_search_slot+0x11b0/0x2c70 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2038 btrfs_update_root+0xdb/0x630 fs/btrfs/root-tree.c:137 update_log_root fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:2841 [inline] btrfs_sync_log+0xbfb/0x2870 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:3064 btrfs_sync_file+0xdb9/0x13c0 fs/btrfs/file.c:1947 vfs_fsync_range+0x13e/0x230 fs/sync.c:188 generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2856 [inline] iomap_dio_complete+0x73a/0x920 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:128 btrfs_direct_write fs/btrfs/file.c:1536 [inline] btrfs_do_write_iter+0xba2/0x1470 fs/btrfs/file.c:1668 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2160 [inline] do_iter_readv_writev+0x20b/0x3b0 fs/read_write.c:735 do_iter_write+0x182/0x700 fs/read_write.c:861 vfs_iter_write+0x74/0xa0 fs/read_write.c:902 iter_file_splice_write+0x745/0xc90 fs/splice.c:686 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:764 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0x114/0x180 fs/splice.c:931 splice_direct_to_actor+0x335/0x8a0 fs/splice.c:886 do_splice_direct+0x1ab/0x280 fs/splice.c:974 do_sendfile+0xb19/0x1270 fs/read_write.c:1255 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1323 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1309 [inline] __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x259/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:1309 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &delayed_node->mutex --> btrfs-tree-00 --> btrfs-log-00 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-log-00); lock(btrfs-tree-00); lock(btrfs-log-00); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); Holding a read lock on a leaf from a fs/subvolume tree creates a nasty lock dependency when we are COWing extent buffers for the log tree and we have two tasks modifying the log tree, with each one in one of the following 2 scenarios: 1) Modifying the log tree triggers an extent buffer allocation while holding a write lock on a parent extent buffer from the log tree. Allocating the pages for an extent buffer, or the extent buffer struct, can trigger inode eviction and finally the inode eviction will trigger a release/remove of a delayed node, which requires taking the delayed node's mutex; 2) Allocating a metadata extent for a log tree can trigger the async reclaim thread and make us wait for it to release enough space and unblock our reservation ticket. The reclaim thread can start flushing delayed items, and that in turn results in the need to lock delayed node mutexes and in the need to write lock extent buffers of a subvolume tree - all this while holding a write lock on the parent extent buffer in the log tree. So one task in scenario 1) running in parallel with another task in scenario 2) could lead to a deadlock, one wanting to lock a delayed node mutex while having a read lock on a leaf from the subvolume, while the other is holding the delayed node's mutex and wants to write lock the same subvolume leaf for flushing delayed items. Fix this by cloning the leaf of the fs/subvolume tree, release/unlock the fs/subvolume leaf and use the clone leaf instead. Reported-by: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/ CC: [email protected] # 6.0+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

We shouldn't be calling runtime PM APIs from within the genpd enable/disable path for a couple reasons. First, this causes an AA lockdep splat[1] because genpd can call into genpd code again while holding the genpd lock. WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.19.0-rc2-lockdep+ #7 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- kworker/2:1/49 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffeea0370788 (&genpd->mlock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: genpd_lock_mtx+0x24/0x30 but task is already holding lock: ffffffeea03710a8 (&genpd->mlock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: genpd_lock_mtx+0x24/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&genpd->mlock); lock(&genpd->mlock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by kworker/2:1/49: #0: 74ffff80811a5748 ((wq_completion)pm){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x320/0x5fc #1: ffffffc008537cf8 ((work_completion)(&genpd->power_off_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x354/0x5fc #2: ffffffeea03710a8 (&genpd->mlock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: genpd_lock_mtx+0x24/0x30 stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 49 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2-lockdep+ #7 Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev3 - 8) with KB Backlight (DT) Workqueue: pm genpd_power_off_work_fn Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x1a0/0x200 show_stack+0x24/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x7c/0xa0 dump_stack+0x18/0x44 __lock_acquire+0xb38/0x3634 lock_acquire+0x180/0x2d4 __mutex_lock_common+0x118/0xe30 mutex_lock_nested+0x70/0x7c genpd_lock_mtx+0x24/0x30 genpd_runtime_suspend+0x2f0/0x414 __rpm_callback+0xdc/0x1b8 rpm_callback+0x4c/0xcc rpm_suspend+0x21c/0x5f0 rpm_idle+0x17c/0x1e0 __pm_runtime_idle+0x78/0xcc gdsc_disable+0x24c/0x26c _genpd_power_off+0xd4/0x1c4 genpd_power_off+0x2d8/0x41c genpd_power_off_work_fn+0x60/0x94 process_one_work+0x398/0x5fc worker_thread+0x42c/0x6c4 kthread+0x194/0x1b4 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Second, this confuses runtime PM on CoachZ for the camera devices by causing the camera clock controller's runtime PM usage_count to go negative after resuming from suspend. This is because runtime PM is being used on the clock controller while runtime PM is disabled for the device. The reason for the negative count is because a GDSC is represented as a genpd and each genpd that is attached to a device is resumed during the noirq phase of system wide suspend/resume (see the noirq suspend ops assignment in pm_genpd_init() for more details). The camera GDSCs are attached to camera devices with the 'power-domains' property in DT. Every device has runtime PM disabled in the late system suspend phase via __device_suspend_late(). Runtime PM is not usable until runtime PM is enabled in device_resume_early(). The noirq phases run after the 'late' and before the 'early' phase of suspend/resume. When the genpds are resumed in genpd_resume_noirq(), we call down into gdsc_enable() that calls pm_runtime_resume_and_get() and that returns -EACCES to indicate failure to resume because runtime PM is disabled for all devices. Upon closer inspection, calling runtime PM APIs like this in the GDSC driver doesn't make sense. It was intended to make sure the GDSC for the clock controller providing other GDSCs was enabled, specifically the MMCX GDSC for the display clk controller on SM8250 (sm8250-dispcc), so that GDSC register accesses succeeded. That will already happen because we make the 'dev->pm_domain' a parent domain of each GDSC we register in gdsc_register() via pm_genpd_add_subdomain(). When any of these GDSCs are accessed, we'll enable the parent domain (in this specific case MMCX). We also remove any getting of runtime PM during registration, because when a genpd is registered it increments the count on the parent if the genpd itself is already enabled. Cc: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]> Cc: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Cc: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]> Cc: Taniya Das <[email protected]> Cc: Satya Priya <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]> Tested-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]> Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <[email protected]> Reported-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAE-0n52xbZeJ66RaKwggeRB57fUAwjvxGxfFMKOKJMKVyFTe+w@mail.gmail.com [1] Fixes: 1b77183 ("clk: qcom: gdsc: enable optional power domain support") Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Tested-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>

test_bpf tail call tests end up as: test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 85 PASS test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 111 PASS test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 145 PASS test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 170 PASS test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 190 PASS test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xf1b4e000 Faulting instruction address: 0xbe86b710 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] BE PAGE_SIZE=4K MMU=Hash PowerMac Modules linked in: test_bpf(+) CPU: 0 PID: 97 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4+ torvalds#195 Hardware name: PowerMac3,1 750CL 0x87210 PowerMac NIP: be86b710 LR: be857e88 CTR: be86b704 REGS: f1b4df20 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.1.0-rc4+) MSR: 00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 28008242 XER: 00000000 DAR: f1b4e000 DSISR: 42000000 GPR00: 00000001 f1b4dfe c11d2280 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000002 00000000 GPR08: f1b4e000 be86b704 f1b4e000 00000000 00000000 100d816a f2440000 fe73baa8 GPR16: f2458000 00000000 c1941ae4 f1fe2248 00000045 c0de0000 f2458030 00000000 GPR24: 000003e8 0000000f f2458000 f1b4dc90 3e584b46 00000000 f24466a0 c1941a00 NIP [be86b710] 0xbe86b710 LR [be857e88] __run_one+0xec/0x264 [test_bpf] Call Trace: [f1b4dfe] [00000002] 0x2 (unreliable) Instruction dump: XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This is a tentative to write above the stack. The problem is encoutered with tests added by commit 38608ee ("bpf, tests: Add load store test case for tail call") This happens because tail call is done to a BPF prog with a different stack_depth. At the time being, the stack is kept as is when the caller tail calls its callee. But at exit, the callee restores the stack based on its own properties. Therefore here, at each run, r1 is erroneously increased by 32 - 16 = 16 bytes. This was done that way in order to pass the tail call count from caller to callee through the stack. As powerpc32 doesn't have a red zone in the stack, it was necessary the maintain the stack as is for the tail call. But it was not anticipated that the BPF frame size could be different. Let's take a new approach. Use register r4 to carry the tail call count during the tail call, and save it into the stack at function entry if required. This means the input parameter must be in r3, which is more correct as it is a 32 bits parameter, then tail call better match with normal BPF function entry, the down side being that we move that input parameter back and forth between r3 and r4. That can be optimised later. Doing that also has the advantage of maximising the common parts between tail calls and a normal function exit. With the fix, tail call tests are now successfull: test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 53 PASS test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 115 PASS test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 154 PASS test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 165 PASS test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 101 PASS test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 141 PASS test_bpf: #6 Tail call error path, max count reached jited:1 994 PASS test_bpf: #7 Tail call count preserved across function calls jited:1 140975 PASS test_bpf: #8 Tail call error path, NULL target jited:1 110 PASS test_bpf: #9 Tail call error path, index out of range jited:1 69 PASS test_bpf: test_tail_calls: Summary: 10 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [10/10 JIT'ed] Suggested-by: Naveen N. Rao <[email protected]> Fixes: 51c66ad ("powerpc/bpf: Implement extended BPF on PPC32") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]> Tested-by: Naveen N. Rao <[email protected] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/757acccb7fbfc78efa42dcf3c974b46678198905.1669278887.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu

…_tx_dequeue() The ieee80211 skb control block key (set when skb was queued) could have been removed before ieee80211_tx_dequeue() call. ieee80211_tx_dequeue() already called ieee80211_tx_h_select_key() to get the current key, but the latter do not update the key in skb control block in case it is NULL. Because some drivers actually use this key in their TX callbacks (e.g. ath1{1,2}k_mac_op_tx()) this could lead to the use after free below: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ath11k_mac_op_tx+0x590/0x61c Read of size 4 at addr ffffff803083c248 by task kworker/u16:4/1440 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 1440 Comm: kworker/u16:4 Not tainted 6.13.0-ge128f627f404 #2 Hardware name: HW (DT) Workqueue: bat_events batadv_send_outstanding_bcast_packet Call trace: show_stack+0x14/0x1c (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x74 print_report+0x164/0x4c0 kasan_report+0xac/0xe8 __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x1c/0x24 ath11k_mac_op_tx+0x590/0x61c ieee80211_handle_wake_tx_queue+0x12c/0x1c8 ieee80211_queue_skb+0xdcc/0x1b4c ieee80211_tx+0x1ec/0x2bc ieee80211_xmit+0x224/0x324 __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x85c/0xcf8 ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xc0/0xec4 dev_hard_start_xmit+0xf4/0x28c __dev_queue_xmit+0x6ac/0x318c batadv_send_skb_packet+0x38c/0x4b0 batadv_send_outstanding_bcast_packet+0x110/0x328 process_one_work+0x578/0xc10 worker_thread+0x4bc/0xc7c kthread+0x2f8/0x380 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Allocated by task 1906: kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x4c kasan_save_track+0x1c/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x3c/0x4c __kasan_kmalloc+0xac/0xb0 __kmalloc_noprof+0x1b4/0x380 ieee80211_key_alloc+0x3c/0xb64 ieee80211_add_key+0x1b4/0x71c nl80211_new_key+0x2b4/0x5d8 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x198/0x240 <...> Freed by task 1494: kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x4c kasan_save_track+0x1c/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x48/0x94 __kasan_slab_free+0x48/0x60 kfree+0xc8/0x31c kfree_sensitive+0x70/0x80 ieee80211_key_free_common+0x10c/0x174 ieee80211_free_keys+0x188/0x46c ieee80211_stop_mesh+0x70/0x2cc ieee80211_leave_mesh+0x1c/0x60 cfg80211_leave_mesh+0xe0/0x280 cfg80211_leave+0x1e0/0x244 <...> Reset SKB control block key before calling ieee80211_tx_h_select_key() to avoid that. Fixes: bb42f2d ("mac80211: Move reorder-sensitive TX handlers to after TXQ dequeue") Signed-off-by: Remi Pommarel <[email protected]>

The ieee80211 skb control block key (set when skb was queued) could have been removed before ieee80211_tx_dequeue() call. ieee80211_tx_dequeue() already called ieee80211_tx_h_select_key() to get the current key, but the latter do not update the key in skb control block in case it is NULL. Because some drivers actually use this key in their TX callbacks (e.g. ath1{1,2}k_mac_op_tx()) this could lead to the use after free below: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ath11k_mac_op_tx+0x590/0x61c Read of size 4 at addr ffffff803083c248 by task kworker/u16:4/1440 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 1440 Comm: kworker/u16:4 Not tainted 6.13.0-ge128f627f404 #2 Hardware name: HW (DT) Workqueue: bat_events batadv_send_outstanding_bcast_packet Call trace: show_stack+0x14/0x1c (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x74 print_report+0x164/0x4c0 kasan_report+0xac/0xe8 __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x1c/0x24 ath11k_mac_op_tx+0x590/0x61c ieee80211_handle_wake_tx_queue+0x12c/0x1c8 ieee80211_queue_skb+0xdcc/0x1b4c ieee80211_tx+0x1ec/0x2bc ieee80211_xmit+0x224/0x324 __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x85c/0xcf8 ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xc0/0xec4 dev_hard_start_xmit+0xf4/0x28c __dev_queue_xmit+0x6ac/0x318c batadv_send_skb_packet+0x38c/0x4b0 batadv_send_outstanding_bcast_packet+0x110/0x328 process_one_work+0x578/0xc10 worker_thread+0x4bc/0xc7c kthread+0x2f8/0x380 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Allocated by task 1906: kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x4c kasan_save_track+0x1c/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x3c/0x4c __kasan_kmalloc+0xac/0xb0 __kmalloc_noprof+0x1b4/0x380 ieee80211_key_alloc+0x3c/0xb64 ieee80211_add_key+0x1b4/0x71c nl80211_new_key+0x2b4/0x5d8 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x198/0x240 <...> Freed by task 1494: kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x4c kasan_save_track+0x1c/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x48/0x94 __kasan_slab_free+0x48/0x60 kfree+0xc8/0x31c kfree_sensitive+0x70/0x80 ieee80211_key_free_common+0x10c/0x174 ieee80211_free_keys+0x188/0x46c ieee80211_stop_mesh+0x70/0x2cc ieee80211_leave_mesh+0x1c/0x60 cfg80211_leave_mesh+0xe0/0x280 cfg80211_leave+0x1e0/0x244 <...> Reset SKB control block key before calling ieee80211_tx_h_select_key() to avoid that. Fixes: bb42f2d ("mac80211: Move reorder-sensitive TX handlers to after TXQ dequeue") Signed-off-by: Remi Pommarel <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/06aa507b853ca385ceded81c18b0a6dd0f081bc8.1742833382.git.repk@triplefau.lt Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>

SMC consists of two sockets: smc_sock and kernel TCP socket. Currently, there are two ways of creating the sockets, and syzbot reported a lockdep splat [0] for the newer way introduced by commit d25a92c ("net/smc: Introduce IPPROTO_SMC"). socket(AF_SMC , SOCK_STREAM, SMCPROTO_SMC or SMCPROTO_SMC6) socket(AF_INET or AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_SMC) When a socket is allocated, sock_lock_init() sets a lockdep lock class to sk->sk_lock.slock based on its protocol family. In the IPPROTO_SMC case, AF_INET or AF_INET6 lock class is assigned to smc_sock. The repro sets IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST for IPv6 UDP and SMC socket and exercises smc_switch_to_fallback() for IPPROTO_SMC. 1. smc_switch_to_fallback() is called under lock_sock() and holds smc->clcsock_release_lock. sk_lock-AF_INET6 -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock (sk_lock-AF_SMC) 2. Setting IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST to SMC holds smc->clcsock_release_lock and calls setsockopt() for the kernel TCP socket, which holds RTNL and the kernel socket's lock_sock(). &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex (-> k-sk_lock-AF_INET6) 3. Setting IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST to UDP holds RTNL and lock_sock(). rtnl_mutex -> sk_lock-AF_INET6 Then, lockdep detects a false-positive circular locking, .-> sk_lock-AF_INET6 -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex -. `-----------------------------------------------------------------' but IPPROTO_SMC should have the same locking rule as AF_SMC. sk_lock-AF_SMC -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex -> k-sk_lock-AF_INET6 Let's set the same lock class for smc_sock. Given AF_SMC uses the same lock class for SMCPROTO_SMC and SMCPROTO_SMC6, we do not need to separate the class for AF_INET and AF_INET6. [0]: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.14.0-rc3-syzkaller-00267-gff202c5028a1 #0 Not tainted syz.4.1528/11571 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8fef8de8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220 but task is already holding lock: ffff888027f596a8 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: smc_clcsock_release+0x75/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:30 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 smc_switch_to_fallback+0x2d/0xa00 net/smc/af_smc.c:903 smc_sendmsg+0x13d/0x520 net/smc/af_smc.c:2781 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:733 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0xaaf/0xc90 net/socket.c:2573 ___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2627 __sys_sendmsg+0x16e/0x220 net/socket.c:2659 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3645 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1624 [inline] sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1133 [inline] sockopt_lock_sock+0x54/0x70 net/core/sock.c:1124 do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x2160/0x4520 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:567 ipv6_setsockopt+0xcb/0x170 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:993 udpv6_setsockopt+0x7d/0xd0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1850 do_sock_setsockopt+0x222/0x480 net/socket.c:2303 __sys_setsockopt+0x1a0/0x230 net/socket.c:2328 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2334 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2331 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbd/0x160 net/socket.c:2331 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220 inet6_release+0x47/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:485 __sock_release net/socket.c:647 [inline] sock_release+0x8e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:675 smc_clcsock_release+0xb7/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:34 __smc_release+0x5c2/0x880 net/smc/af_smc.c:301 smc_release+0x1fc/0x5f0 net/smc/af_smc.c:344 __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:647 sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1398 __fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:464 task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27b/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: rtnl_mutex --> sk_lock-AF_INET6 --> &smc->clcsock_release_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); lock(sk_lock-AF_INET6); lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); lock(rtnl_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by syz.4.1528/11571: #0: ffff888077e88208 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#10){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:877 [inline] #0: ffff888077e88208 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#10){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __sock_release+0x86/0x270 net/socket.c:646 #1: ffff888027f596a8 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: smc_clcsock_release+0x75/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:30 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11571 Comm: syz.4.1528 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-syzkaller-00267-gff202c5028a1 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x490/0x760 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2076 check_noncircular+0x31a/0x400 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2208 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220 inet6_release+0x47/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:485 __sock_release net/socket.c:647 [inline] sock_release+0x8e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:675 smc_clcsock_release+0xb7/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:34 __smc_release+0x5c2/0x880 net/smc/af_smc.c:301 smc_release+0x1fc/0x5f0 net/smc/af_smc.c:344 __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:647 sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1398 __fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:464 task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27b/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f8b4b38d169 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffe4efd22d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001b4 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000000b14a3 RCX: 00007f8b4b38d169 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000001e RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f8b4b5a7ba0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000114efd25cf R10: 00007f8b4b200000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8b4b5a5fac R13: 00007f8b4b5a5fa0 R14: ffffffffffffffff R15: 00007ffe4efd23f0 </TASK> Fixes: d25a92c ("net/smc: Introduce IPPROTO_SMC") Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=be6f4b383534d88989f7 Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Ido Schimmel says: ==================== fib_rules: Fix iif / oif matching on L3 master device Patch #1 fixes a recently reported regression regarding FIB rules that match on iif / oif being a VRF device. Patch #2 adds test cases to the FIB rules selftest. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Communicating with the hypervisor using the shared GHCB page requires clearing the C bit in the mapping of that page. When executing in the context of the EFI boot services, the page tables are owned by the firmware, and this manipulation is not possible. So switch to a different API for accepting memory in SEV-SNP guests, one which is actually supported at the point during boot where the EFI stub may need to accept memory, but the SEV-SNP init code has not executed yet. For simplicity, also switch the memory acceptance carried out by the decompressor when not booting via EFI - this only involves the allocation for the decompressed kernel, and is generally only called after kexec, as normal boot will jump straight into the kernel from the EFI stub. Fixes: 6c32117 ("x86/sev: Add SNP-specific unaccepted memory support") Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <[email protected]> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <[email protected]> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] # discussion thread #1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] # discussion thread #2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] # final submission

There is a potential deadlock if we do report zones in an IO context, detailed in below lockdep report. When one process do a report zones and another process freezes the block device, the report zones side cannot allocate a tag because the freeze is already started. This can thus result in new block group creation to hang forever, blocking the write path. Thankfully, a new block group should be created on empty zones. So, reporting the zones is not necessary and we can set the write pointer = 0 and load the zone capacity from the block layer using bdev_zone_capacity() helper. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.14.0-rc1 torvalds#252 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ modprobe/1110 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888100ac83e0 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 but task is already holding lock: ffff8881205b6f20 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16){++++}-{0:0}, at: sd_remove+0x85/0x130 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16){++++}-{0:0}: blk_queue_enter+0x3d9/0x500 blk_mq_alloc_request+0x47d/0x8e0 scsi_execute_cmd+0x14f/0xb80 sd_zbc_do_report_zones+0x1c1/0x470 sd_zbc_report_zones+0x362/0xd60 blkdev_report_zones+0x1b1/0x2e0 btrfs_get_dev_zones+0x215/0x7e0 [btrfs] btrfs_load_block_group_zone_info+0x6d2/0x2c10 [btrfs] btrfs_make_block_group+0x36b/0x870 [btrfs] btrfs_create_chunk+0x147d/0x2320 [btrfs] btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x2ce/0xcf0 [btrfs] start_transaction+0xce6/0x1620 [btrfs] btrfs_uuid_scan_kthread+0x4ee/0x5b0 [btrfs] kthread+0x39d/0x750 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #2 (&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem){++++}-{4:4}: down_read+0x9b/0x470 btrfs_map_block+0x2ce/0x2ce0 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_chunk+0x2d4/0x16c0 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_bbio+0x16/0x30 [btrfs] btree_write_cache_pages+0xb5a/0xf90 [btrfs] do_writepages+0x17f/0x7b0 __writeback_single_inode+0x114/0xb00 writeback_sb_inodes+0x52b/0xe00 wb_writeback+0x1a7/0x800 wb_workfn+0x12a/0xbd0 process_one_work+0x85a/0x1460 worker_thread+0x5e2/0xfc0 kthread+0x39d/0x750 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 (&fs_info->zoned_meta_io_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x1aa/0x1360 btree_write_cache_pages+0x252/0xf90 [btrfs] do_writepages+0x17f/0x7b0 __writeback_single_inode+0x114/0xb00 writeback_sb_inodes+0x52b/0xe00 wb_writeback+0x1a7/0x800 wb_workfn+0x12a/0xbd0 process_one_work+0x85a/0x1460 worker_thread+0x5e2/0xfc0 kthread+0x39d/0x750 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x2f52/0x5ea0 lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x540 __flush_work+0x3ac/0xb60 wb_shutdown+0x15b/0x1f0 bdi_unregister+0x172/0x5b0 del_gendisk+0x841/0xa20 sd_remove+0x85/0x130 device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 __scsi_remove_device+0x272/0x340 scsi_forget_host+0xf7/0x170 scsi_remove_host+0xd2/0x2a0 sdebug_driver_remove+0x52/0x2f0 [scsi_debug] device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 device_unregister+0x13/0xa0 sdebug_do_remove_host+0x1fb/0x290 [scsi_debug] scsi_debug_exit+0x17/0x70 [scsi_debug] __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x321/0x520 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work) --> &fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem --> &q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16); lock(&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem); lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16); lock((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by modprobe/1110: #0: ffff88811f7bc108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8f/0x520 #1: ffff8881022ee0e0 (&shost->scan_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: scsi_remove_host+0x20/0x2a0 #2: ffff88811b4c4378 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8f/0x520 #3: ffff8881205b6f20 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16){++++}-{0:0}, at: sd_remove+0x85/0x130 #4: ffffffffa3284360 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __flush_work+0xda/0xb60 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1110 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.14.0-rc1 torvalds#252 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6a/0x90 print_circular_bug.cold+0x1e0/0x274 check_noncircular+0x306/0x3f0 ? __pfx_check_noncircular+0x10/0x10 ? mark_lock+0xf5/0x1650 ? __pfx_check_irq_usage+0x10/0x10 ? lockdep_lock+0xca/0x1c0 ? __pfx_lockdep_lock+0x10/0x10 __lock_acquire+0x2f52/0x5ea0 ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10 lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x540 ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0 ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 __flush_work+0x3ac/0xb60 ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___flush_work+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0 wb_shutdown+0x15b/0x1f0 bdi_unregister+0x172/0x5b0 ? __pfx_bdi_unregister+0x10/0x10 ? up_write+0x1ba/0x510 del_gendisk+0x841/0xa20 ? __pfx_del_gendisk+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x35/0x60 ? __pm_runtime_resume+0x79/0x110 sd_remove+0x85/0x130 device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 ? kobject_put+0x5d/0x4a0 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 ? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10 __scsi_remove_device+0x272/0x340 scsi_forget_host+0xf7/0x170 scsi_remove_host+0xd2/0x2a0 sdebug_driver_remove+0x52/0x2f0 [scsi_debug] ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xc0/0xf0 device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 ? kobject_put+0x5d/0x4a0 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 ? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x10/0x10 device_unregister+0x13/0xa0 sdebug_do_remove_host+0x1fb/0x290 [scsi_debug] scsi_debug_exit+0x17/0x70 [scsi_debug] __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x321/0x520 ? __pfx___do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0x10/0x10 ? kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x50 ? kasan_record_aux_stack+0xa3/0xb0 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0xc4/0xfb0 ? kmem_cache_free+0x3a0/0x590 ? __x64_sys_close+0x78/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 ? lock_is_held_type+0xd5/0x130 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x3c0/0xfb0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x3c0/0xfb0 ? __pfx___call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 ? kmem_cache_free+0x3a0/0x590 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f436712b68b RSP: 002b:00007ffe9f1a8658 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005559b367fd80 RCX: 00007f436712b68b RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 00005559b367fde8 RBP: 00007ffe9f1a8680 R08: 1999999999999999 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f43671a5fe0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffe9f1a86b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Reported-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]> CC: <[email protected]> # 6.13+ Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

…ux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.15, round #2 - Single fix for broken usage of 'multi-MIDR' infrastructure in PI code, adding an open-coded erratum check for everyone's favorite pile of sand: Cavium ThunderX

[BUG] There is a bug report that a syzbot reproducer can lead to the following busy inode at unmount time: BTRFS info (device loop1): last unmount of filesystem 1680000e-3c1e-4c46-84b6-56bd3909af50 VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of loop1 (btrfs) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/super.c:650! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 48168 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2-00471-g119009db2674 #2 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:generic_shutdown_super+0x2e9/0x390 fs/super.c:650 Call Trace: <TASK> kill_anon_super+0x3a/0x60 fs/super.c:1237 btrfs_kill_super+0x3b/0x50 fs/btrfs/super.c:2099 deactivate_locked_super+0xbe/0x1a0 fs/super.c:473 deactivate_super fs/super.c:506 [inline] deactivate_super+0xe2/0x100 fs/super.c:502 cleanup_mnt+0x21f/0x440 fs/namespace.c:1435 task_work_run+0x14d/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x269/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0xd4/0x250 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> [CAUSE] When btrfs_alloc_path() failed, btrfs_iget() directly returned without releasing the inode already allocated by btrfs_iget_locked(). This results the above busy inode and trigger the kernel BUG. [FIX] Fix it by calling iget_failed() if btrfs_alloc_path() failed. If we hit error inside btrfs_read_locked_inode(), it will properly call iget_failed(), so nothing to worry about. Although the iget_failed() cleanup inside btrfs_read_locked_inode() is a break of the normal error handling scheme, let's fix the obvious bug and backport first, then rework the error handling later. Reported-by: Penglei Jiang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/ Fixes: 7c855e1 ("btrfs: remove conditional path allocation in btrfs_read_locked_inode()") CC: [email protected] # 6.13+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Penglei Jiang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

…unload Kernel panic occurs when a devmem TCP socket is closed after NIC module is unloaded. This is Devmem TCP unregistration scenarios. number is an order. (a)netlink socket close (b)pp destroy (c)uninstall result 1 2 3 OK 1 3 2 (d)Impossible 2 1 3 OK 3 1 2 (e)Kernel panic 2 3 1 (d)Impossible 3 2 1 (d)Impossible (a) netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy() is called when devmem TCP socket is closed. (b) page_pool_destroy() is called when the interface is down. (c) mp_ops->uninstall() is called when an interface is unregistered. (d) There is no scenario in mp_ops->uninstall() is called before page_pool_destroy(). Because unregister_netdevice_many_notify() closes interfaces first and then calls mp_ops->uninstall(). (e) netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy() accesses struct net_device to acquire netdev_lock(). But if the interface module has already been removed, net_device pointer is invalid, so it causes kernel panic. In summary, there are only 3 possible scenarios. A. sk close -> pp destroy -> uninstall. B. pp destroy -> sk close -> uninstall. C. pp destroy -> uninstall -> sk close. Case C is a kernel panic scenario. In order to fix this problem, It makes mp_dmabuf_devmem_uninstall() set binding->dev to NULL. It indicates an bound net_device was unregistered. It makes netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy() do not acquire netdev_lock() if binding->dev is NULL. A new binding->lock is added to protect a dev of a binding. So, lock ordering is like below. priv->lock netdev_lock(dev) binding->lock Tests: Scenario A: ./ncdevmem -s 192.168.1.4 -c 192.168.1.2 -f $interface -l -p 8000 \ -v 7 -t 1 -q 1 & pid=$! sleep 10 kill $pid ip link set $interface down modprobe -rv $module Scenario B: ./ncdevmem -s 192.168.1.4 -c 192.168.1.2 -f $interface -l -p 8000 \ -v 7 -t 1 -q 1 & pid=$! sleep 10 ip link set $interface down kill $pid modprobe -rv $module Scenario C: ./ncdevmem -s 192.168.1.4 -c 192.168.1.2 -f $interface -l -p 8000 \ -v 7 -t 1 -q 1 & pid=$! sleep 10 modprobe -rv $module sleep 5 kill $pid Splat looks like: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc001fffa9f7: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x00000000fffd4fb8-0x00000000fffd4fbf] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2041 Comm: ncdevmem Tainted: G B W 6.15.0-rc1+ #2 PREEMPT(undef) 0947ec89efa0fd68838b78e36aa1617e97ff5d7f Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock (./include/linux/sched.h:2244 kernel/locking/mutex.c:400 kernel/locking/mutex.c:443 kernel/locking/mutex.c:605 kernel/locking/mutex.c:746) Code: ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 4f 13 00 00 49 8b 1e 48 83 e3 f8 74 6a 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 7b 34 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 f RSP: 0018:ffff88826f7ef730 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 00000000fffd4f88 RCX: ffffffffaa9bc811 RDX: 000000001fffa9f7 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 00000000fffd4fbc RBP: ffff88826f7ef8b0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed103e6aa1a4 R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffff88826f7ef442 R12: fffffbfff669f65e R13: ffff88812a830040 R14: ffff8881f3550d20 R15: 00000000fffd4f88 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888866c05000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000563bed0cb288 CR3: 00000001a7c98000 CR4: 00000000007506f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ... netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy (net/core/netdev-genl.c:953 (discriminator 3)) genl_release (net/netlink/genetlink.c:653 net/netlink/genetlink.c:694 net/netlink/genetlink.c:705) ... netlink_release (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:737) ... __sock_release (net/socket.c:647) sock_close (net/socket.c:1393) Fixes: 1d22d30 ("net: drop rtnl_lock for queue_mgmt operations") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

As-per the SBI specification, an SBI remote fence operation applies to the entire address space if either: 1) start_addr and size are both 0 2) size is equal to 2^XLEN-1 >From the above, only #1 is checked by SBI SFENCE calls so fix the size parameter check in SBI SFENCE calls to cover #2 as well. Fixes: 13acfec ("RISC-V: KVM: Add remote HFENCE functions based on VCPU requests") Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <[email protected]>

The WARN_ON_ONCE is introduced on truncate_folio_batch_exceptionals() to capture whether the filesystem has removed all DAX entries or not. And the fix has been applied on the filesystem xfs and ext4 by the commit 0e2f80a ("fs/dax: ensure all pages are idle prior to filesystem unmount"). Apply the missed fix on filesystem fuse to fix the runtime warning: [ 2.011450] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 2.011873] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 145 at mm/truncate.c:89 truncate_folio_batch_exceptionals+0x272/0x2b0 [ 2.012468] Modules linked in: [ 2.012718] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 145 Comm: weston Not tainted 6.16.0-rc2-WSL2-STABLE #2 PREEMPT(undef) [ 2.013292] RIP: 0010:truncate_folio_batch_exceptionals+0x272/0x2b0 [ 2.013704] Code: 48 63 d0 41 29 c5 48 8d 1c d5 00 00 00 00 4e 8d 6c 2a 01 49 c1 e5 03 eb 09 48 83 c3 08 49 39 dd 74 83 41 f6 44 1c 08 01 74 ef <0f> 0b 49 8b 34 1e 48 89 ef e8 10 a2 17 00 eb df 48 8b 7d 00 e8 35 [ 2.014845] RSP: 0018:ffffa47ec33f3b10 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 2.015279] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 2.015884] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffa47ec33f3ca0 RDI: ffff98aa44f3fa80 [ 2.016377] RBP: ffff98aa44f3fbf0 R08: ffffa47ec33f3ba8 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2.016942] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa47ec33f3ca0 [ 2.017437] R13: 0000000000000008 R14: ffffa47ec33f3ba8 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 2.017972] FS: 000079ce006afa40(0000) GS:ffff98aade441000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2.018510] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2.018987] CR2: 000079ce03e74000 CR3: 000000010784f006 CR4: 0000000000372eb0 [ 2.019518] Call Trace: [ 2.019729] <TASK> [ 2.019901] truncate_inode_pages_range+0xd8/0x400 [ 2.020280] ? timerqueue_add+0x66/0xb0 [ 2.020574] ? get_nohz_timer_target+0x2a/0x140 [ 2.020904] ? timerqueue_add+0x66/0xb0 [ 2.021231] ? timerqueue_del+0x2e/0x50 [ 2.021646] ? __remove_hrtimer+0x39/0x90 [ 2.022017] ? srso_alias_untrain_ret+0x1/0x10 [ 2.022497] ? psi_group_change+0x136/0x350 [ 2.023046] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x30 [ 2.023514] ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x8d/0x280 [ 2.024068] ? __schedule+0x532/0xbd0 [ 2.024551] fuse_evict_inode+0x29/0x190 [ 2.025131] evict+0x100/0x270 [ 2.025641] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x39/0x50 [ 2.026316] ? __pfx_generic_delete_inode+0x10/0x10 [ 2.026843] __dentry_kill+0x71/0x180 [ 2.027335] dput+0xeb/0x1b0 [ 2.027725] __fput+0x136/0x2b0 [ 2.028054] __x64_sys_close+0x3d/0x80 [ 2.028469] do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x1b0 [ 2.028832] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 [ 2.029182] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 [ 2.029533] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 [ 2.029902] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 2.030423] RIP: 0033:0x79ce03d0d067 [ 2.030820] Code: b8 ff ff ff ff e9 3e ff ff ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 c3 a7 f8 ff [ 2.032354] RSP: 002b:00007ffef0498948 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 [ 2.032939] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffef0498960 RCX: 000079ce03d0d067 [ 2.033612] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: 000000000000000d [ 2.034289] RBP: 00007ffef0498a30 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2.034944] R10: 00007ffef0498978 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 2.035610] R13: 00007ffef0498960 R14: 000079ce03e09ce0 R15: 0000000000000003 [ 2.036301] </TASK> [ 2.036532] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: bde708f ("fs/dax: always remove DAX page-cache entries when breaking layouts") Signed-off-by: Haiyue Wang <[email protected]> Cc: Alistair Popple <[email protected]> Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

Fix cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect() to take the correct lock order and prevent the following deadlock from happening ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.16.0-rc3-build2+ torvalds#1301 Tainted: G S W ------------------------------------------------------ cifsd/6055 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88810ad56038 (&tcp_ses->srv_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x134/0x200 but task is already holding lock: ffff888119c64330 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0xcf/0x200 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270 __lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780 lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0 _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 cifs_setup_session+0x81/0x4b0 cifs_get_smb_ses+0x771/0x900 cifs_mount_get_session+0x7e/0x170 cifs_mount+0x92/0x2d0 cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x161/0x460 smb3_get_tree+0x55/0x90 vfs_get_tree+0x46/0x180 do_new_mount+0x1b0/0x2e0 path_mount+0x6ee/0x740 do_mount+0x98/0xe0 __do_sys_mount+0x148/0x180 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (&ret_buf->ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270 __lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780 lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0 _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 cifs_match_super+0x101/0x320 sget+0xab/0x270 cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x1e0/0x460 smb3_get_tree+0x55/0x90 vfs_get_tree+0x46/0x180 do_new_mount+0x1b0/0x2e0 path_mount+0x6ee/0x740 do_mount+0x98/0xe0 __do_sys_mount+0x148/0x180 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (&tcp_ses->srv_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_noncircular+0x95/0xc0 check_prev_add+0x115/0x2f0 validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270 __lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780 lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0 _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x134/0x200 __cifs_reconnect+0x8f/0x500 cifs_handle_standard+0x112/0x280 cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x64d/0xbc0 kthread+0x2f7/0x310 ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x230 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &tcp_ses->srv_lock --> &ret_buf->ses_lock --> &ret_buf->chan_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&ret_buf->chan_lock); lock(&ret_buf->ses_lock); lock(&ret_buf->chan_lock); lock(&tcp_ses->srv_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by cifsd/6055: #0: ffffffff857de398 (&cifs_tcp_ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x7b/0x200 #1: ffff888119c64060 (&ret_buf->ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x9c/0x200 #2: ffff888119c64330 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0xcf/0x200 Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Fixes: d7d7a66 ("cifs: avoid use of global locks for high contention data") Reviewed-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Tested-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>

The issue arises when kzalloc() is invoked while holding umem_mutex or any other lock acquired under umem_mutex. This is problematic because kzalloc() can trigger fs_reclaim_aqcuire(), which may, in turn, invoke mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(). This function can lead to mlx5_ib_invalidate_range(), which attempts to acquire umem_mutex again, resulting in a deadlock. The problematic flow: CPU0 | CPU1 ---------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------ mlx5_ib_dereg_mr() | → revoke_mr() | → mutex_lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex) | | mlx5_mkey_cache_init() | → mutex_lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock) | → mlx5r_cache_create_ent_locked() | → kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL) | → fs_reclaim() | → mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start() | → mlx5_ib_invalidate_range() | → mutex_lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex) → cache_ent_find_and_store() | → mutex_lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock) | Additionally, when kzalloc() is called from within cache_ent_find_and_store(), we encounter the same deadlock due to re-acquisition of umem_mutex. Solve by releasing umem_mutex in dereg_mr() after umr_revoke_mr() and before acquiring rb_lock. This ensures that we don't hold umem_mutex while performing memory allocations that could trigger the reclaim path. This change prevents the deadlock by ensuring proper lock ordering and avoiding holding locks during memory allocation operations that could trigger the reclaim path. The following lockdep warning demonstrates the deadlock: python3/20557 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888387542128 (&umem_odp->umem_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: mlx5_ib_invalidate_range+0x5b/0x550 [mlx5_ib] but task is already holding lock: ffffffff82f6b840 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: unmap_vmas+0x7b/0x1a0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}: fs_reclaim_acquire+0x60/0xd0 mem_cgroup_css_alloc+0x6f/0x9b0 cgroup_init_subsys+0xa4/0x240 cgroup_init+0x1c8/0x510 start_kernel+0x747/0x760 x86_64_start_reservations+0x25/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0x73/0x80 common_startup_64+0x129/0x138 -> #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: fs_reclaim_acquire+0x91/0xd0 __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x4d/0x4c0 mlx5r_cache_create_ent_locked+0x75/0x620 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_mkey_cache_init+0x186/0x360 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_ib_stage_post_ib_reg_umr_init+0x3c/0x60 [mlx5_ib] __mlx5_ib_add+0x4b/0x190 [mlx5_ib] mlx5r_probe+0xd9/0x320 [mlx5_ib] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x42/0x70 really_probe+0xdb/0x360 __driver_probe_device+0x8f/0x130 driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xb0 __driver_attach+0xd4/0x1f0 bus_for_each_dev+0x79/0xd0 bus_add_driver+0xf0/0x200 driver_register+0x6e/0xc0 __auxiliary_driver_register+0x6a/0xc0 do_one_initcall+0x5e/0x390 do_init_module+0x88/0x240 init_module_from_file+0x85/0xc0 idempotent_init_module+0x104/0x300 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x68/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 -> #1 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x98/0xf10 __mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x6f2/0x890 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x21/0x110 [mlx5_ib] ib_dereg_mr_user+0x85/0x1f0 [ib_core] uverbs_free_mr+0x19/0x30 [ib_uverbs] destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x21/0x80 [ib_uverbs] uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x60/0x3d0 [ib_uverbs] uobj_destroy+0x57/0xa0 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x4d5/0x1210 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x129/0x230 [ib_uverbs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x596/0xaa0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 -> #0 (&umem_odp->umem_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x1826/0x2f00 lock_acquire+0xd3/0x2e0 __mutex_lock+0x98/0xf10 mlx5_ib_invalidate_range+0x5b/0x550 [mlx5_ib] __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x18e/0x1f0 unmap_vmas+0x182/0x1a0 exit_mmap+0xf3/0x4a0 mmput+0x3a/0x100 do_exit+0x2b9/0xa90 do_group_exit+0x32/0xa0 get_signal+0xc32/0xcb0 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x29/0x1d0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x105/0x1d0 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 Chain exists of: &dev->cache.rb_lock --> mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start --> &umem_odp->umem_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex); lock(mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start); lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex); lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** Fixes: abb604a ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix a race for an ODP MR which leads to CQE with error") Signed-off-by: Or Har-Toov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Michael Guralnik <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3c8f225a8a9fade647d19b014df1172544643e4a.1750061612.git.leon@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>

When I run the NVME over TCP test in virtme-ng, I get the following "suspicious RCU usage" warning in nvme_mpath_add_sysfs_link(): ''' [ 5.024557][ T44] nvmet: Created nvm controller 1 for subsystem nqn.2025-06.org.nvmexpress.mptcp for NQN nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress:uuid:f7f6b5e0-ff97-4894-98ac-c85309e0bc77. [ 5.027401][ T183] nvme nvme0: creating 2 I/O queues. [ 5.029017][ T183] nvme nvme0: mapped 2/0/0 default/read/poll queues. [ 5.032587][ T183] nvme nvme0: new ctrl: NQN "nqn.2025-06.org.nvmexpress.mptcp", addr 127.0.0.1:4420, hostnqn: nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress:uuid:f7f6b5e0-ff97-4894-98ac-c85309e0bc77 [ 5.042214][ T25] [ 5.042440][ T25] ============================= [ 5.042579][ T25] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 5.042705][ T25] 6.16.0-rc3+ #23 Not tainted [ 5.042812][ T25] ----------------------------- [ 5.042934][ T25] drivers/nvme/host/multipath.c:1203 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! [ 5.043111][ T25] [ 5.043111][ T25] other info that might help us debug this: [ 5.043111][ T25] [ 5.043341][ T25] [ 5.043341][ T25] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 5.043502][ T25] 3 locks held by kworker/u9:0/25: [ 5.043615][ T25] #0: ffff888008730948 ((wq_completion)async){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x7ed/0x1350 [ 5.043830][ T25] #1: ffffc900001afd40 ((work_completion)(&entry->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0xcf3/0x1350 [ 5.044084][ T25] #2: ffff888013ee0020 (&head->srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: nvme_mpath_add_sysfs_link.part.0+0xb4/0x3a0 [ 5.044300][ T25] [ 5.044300][ T25] stack backtrace: [ 5.044439][ T25] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 25 Comm: kworker/u9:0 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3+ #23 PREEMPT(full) [ 5.044441][ T25] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 5.044442][ T25] Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn [ 5.044445][ T25] Call Trace: [ 5.044446][ T25] <TASK> [ 5.044449][ T25] dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0 [ 5.044453][ T25] lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4f/0xb1 [ 5.044457][ T25] nvme_mpath_add_sysfs_link.part.0+0x2fb/0x3a0 [ 5.044459][ T25] ? queue_work_on+0x90/0xf0 [ 5.044461][ T25] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x110 [ 5.044466][ T25] nvme_mpath_set_live+0x1e9/0x4f0 [ 5.044470][ T25] nvme_mpath_add_disk+0x240/0x2f0 [ 5.044472][ T25] ? __pfx_nvme_mpath_add_disk+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044475][ T25] ? add_disk_fwnode+0x361/0x580 [ 5.044480][ T25] nvme_alloc_ns+0x81c/0x17c0 [ 5.044483][ T25] ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x104/0x240 [ 5.044487][ T25] ? __pfx_nvme_alloc_ns+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044495][ T25] ? __pfx_nvme_find_get_ns+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044496][ T25] ? rcu_read_lock_any_held+0x45/0xa0 [ 5.044498][ T25] ? validate_chain+0x232/0x4f0 [ 5.044503][ T25] nvme_scan_ns+0x4c8/0x810 [ 5.044506][ T25] ? __pfx_nvme_scan_ns+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044508][ T25] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 5.044512][ T25] ? ktime_get+0x16d/0x220 [ 5.044517][ T25] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x18/0x30 [ 5.044520][ T25] ? __pfx_nvme_scan_ns_async+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044522][ T25] async_run_entry_fn+0x97/0x560 [ 5.044523][ T25] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0 [ 5.044526][ T25] process_one_work+0xd3c/0x1350 [ 5.044532][ T25] ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044536][ T25] ? assign_work+0x16c/0x240 [ 5.044539][ T25] worker_thread+0x4da/0xd50 [ 5.044545][ T25] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044546][ T25] kthread+0x356/0x5c0 [ 5.044548][ T25] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044549][ T25] ? ret_from_fork+0x1b/0x2e0 [ 5.044552][ T25] ? __lock_release.isra.0+0x5d/0x180 [ 5.044553][ T25] ? ret_from_fork+0x1b/0x2e0 [ 5.044555][ T25] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0 [ 5.044557][ T25] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044559][ T25] ret_from_fork+0x218/0x2e0 [ 5.044561][ T25] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 5.044562][ T25] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 5.044570][ T25] </TASK> ''' This patch uses sleepable RCU version of helper list_for_each_entry_srcu() instead of list_for_each_entry_rcu() to fix it. Fixes: 4dbd2b2 ("nvme-multipath: Add visibility for round-robin io-policy") Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

With VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER enabled, the following warning is generated on module load: [ 324.701677] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:578 [ 324.701684] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1582, name: NetworkManager [ 324.701689] preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 [ 324.701693] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 [ 324.701697] 2 locks held by NetworkManager/1582: [ 324.701702] #0: ffffffff9f7be770 (rtnl_mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x791/0x21e0 [ 324.701730] #1: ff1100216c380368 (_xmit_ETHER){....}-{2:2}, at: __dev_open+0x3f0/0x870 [ 324.701749] Preemption disabled at: [ 324.701752] [<ffffffff9cd23b9d>] __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870 [ 324.701765] CPU: 30 UID: 0 PID: 1582 Comm: NetworkManager Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5+ #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 324.701771] Hardware name: Intel Corporation M50FCP2SBSTD/M50FCP2SBSTD, BIOS SE5C741.86B.01.01.0001.2211140926 11/14/2022 [ 324.701774] Call Trace: [ 324.701777] <TASK> [ 324.701779] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 [ 324.701788] ? __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870 [ 324.701793] __might_resched.cold+0x1ef/0x23d <..> [ 324.701818] __mutex_lock+0x113/0x1b80 <..> [ 324.701917] idpf_ctlq_clean_sq+0xad/0x4b0 [idpf] [ 324.701935] ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 324.701941] idpf_mb_clean+0x143/0x380 [idpf] <..> [ 324.701991] idpf_send_mb_msg+0x111/0x720 [idpf] [ 324.702009] idpf_vc_xn_exec+0x4cc/0x990 [idpf] [ 324.702021] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0 [ 324.702035] idpf_add_del_mac_filters+0x3ed/0xb50 [idpf] <..> [ 324.702122] __hw_addr_sync_dev+0x1cf/0x300 [ 324.702126] ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 [ 324.702134] idpf_set_rx_mode+0x317/0x390 [idpf] [ 324.702152] __dev_open+0x3f8/0x870 [ 324.702159] ? __pfx___dev_open+0x10/0x10 [ 324.702174] __dev_change_flags+0x443/0x650 <..> [ 324.702208] netif_change_flags+0x80/0x160 [ 324.702218] do_setlink.isra.0+0x16a0/0x3960 <..> [ 324.702349] rtnl_newlink+0x12fd/0x21e0 The sequence is as follows: rtnl_newlink()-> __dev_change_flags()-> __dev_open()-> dev_set_rx_mode() - > # disables BH and grabs "dev->addr_list_lock" idpf_set_rx_mode() -> # proceed only if VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER is ON __dev_uc_sync() -> idpf_add_mac_filter -> idpf_add_del_mac_filters -> idpf_send_mb_msg() -> idpf_mb_clean() -> idpf_ctlq_clean_sq() # mutex_lock(cq_lock) Fix by converting cq_lock to a spinlock. All operations under the new lock are safe except freeing the DMA memory, which may use vunmap(). Fix by requesting a contiguous physical memory for the DMA mapping. Fixes: a251eee ("idpf: add SRIOV support and other ndo_ops") Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ahmed Zaki <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Samuel Salin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>

If the PHY driver uses another PHY internally (e.g. in case of eUSB2, repeaters are represented as PHYs), then it would trigger the following lockdep splat because all PHYs use a single static lockdep key and thus lockdep can not identify whether there is a dependency or not and reports a false positive. Make PHY subsystem use dynamic lockdep keys, assigning each driver a separate key. This way lockdep can correctly identify dependency graph between mutexes. ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.15.0-rc7-next-20250522-12896-g3932f283970c #3455 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- kworker/u51:0/78 is trying to acquire lock: ffff0008116554f0 (&phy->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phy_init+0x4c/0x12c but task is already holding lock: ffff000813c10cf0 (&phy->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phy_init+0x4c/0x12c other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&phy->mutex); lock(&phy->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by kworker/u51:0/78: #0: ffff000800010948 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x18c/0x5ec #1: ffff80008036bdb0 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1b4/0x5ec #2: ffff0008094ac8f8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach+0x38/0x188 #3: ffff000813c10cf0 (&phy->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phy_init+0x4c/0x12c stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 78 Comm: kworker/u51:0 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-next-20250522-12896-g3932f283970c #3455 PREEMPT Hardware name: Qualcomm CRD, BIOS 6.0.240904.BOOT.MXF.2.4-00528.1-HAMOA-1 09/ 4/2024 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0xd0 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 print_deadlock_bug+0x258/0x348 __lock_acquire+0x10fc/0x1f84 lock_acquire+0x1c8/0x338 __mutex_lock+0xb8/0x59c mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30 phy_init+0x4c/0x12c snps_eusb2_hsphy_init+0x54/0x1a0 phy_init+0xe0/0x12c dwc3_core_init+0x450/0x10b4 dwc3_core_probe+0xce4/0x15fc dwc3_probe+0x64/0xb0 platform_probe+0x68/0xc4 really_probe+0xbc/0x298 __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x12c driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x160 __device_attach_driver+0xb8/0x138 bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xe0 __device_attach+0x9c/0x188 device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20 bus_probe_device+0xac/0xb0 deferred_probe_work_func+0x8c/0xc8 process_one_work+0x208/0x5ec worker_thread+0x1c0/0x368 kthread+0x14c/0x20c ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Fixes: 3584f63 ("phy: qcom: phy-qcom-snps-eusb2: Add support for eUSB2 repeater") Fixes: e246355 ("phy: amlogic: Add Amlogic AXG PCIE PHY Driver") Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Abel Vesa <[email protected]> Reported-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/ Reviewed-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Tested-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <[email protected]>

…-flight Reject migration of SEV{-ES} state if either the source or destination VM is actively creating a vCPU, i.e. if kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() is in the section between incrementing created_vcpus and online_vcpus. The bulk of vCPU creation runs _outside_ of kvm->lock to allow creating multiple vCPUs in parallel, and so sev_info.es_active can get toggled from false=>true in the destination VM after (or during) svm_vcpu_create(), resulting in an SEV{-ES} VM effectively having a non-SEV{-ES} vCPU. The issue manifests most visibly as a crash when trying to free a vCPU's NULL VMSA page in an SEV-ES VM, but any number of things can go wrong. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffebde00000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 227 UID: 0 PID: 64063 Comm: syz.5.60023 Tainted: G U O 6.15.0-smp-DEV #2 NONE Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.52.0-0 10/28/2024 RIP: 0010:constant_test_bit arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:206 [inline] RIP: 0010:arch_test_bit arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:238 [inline] RIP: 0010:_test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:142 [inline] RIP: 0010:PageHead include/linux/page-flags.h:866 [inline] RIP: 0010:___free_pages+0x3e/0x120 mm/page_alloc.c:5067 Code: <49> f7 06 40 00 00 00 75 05 45 31 ff eb 0c 66 90 4c 89 f0 4c 39 f0 RSP: 0018:ffff8984551978d0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000777f80000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff918aeb98 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffebde00000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffebde00000007 R09: 1ffffd7bc0000000 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff97bc0000001 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff8983e19751a8 R14: ffffebde00000000 R15: 1ffffd7bc0000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89ee661d3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffebde00000000 CR3: 000000793ceaa000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000b5f DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> sev_free_vcpu+0x413/0x630 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:3169 svm_vcpu_free+0x13a/0x2a0 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:1515 kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x6a/0x1d0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12396 kvm_vcpu_destroy virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:470 [inline] kvm_destroy_vcpus+0xd1/0x300 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:490 kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x636/0x820 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12895 kvm_put_kvm+0xb8e/0xfb0 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1310 kvm_vm_release+0x48/0x60 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1369 __fput+0x3e4/0x9e0 fs/file_table.c:465 task_work_run+0x1a9/0x220 kernel/task_work.c:227 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline] do_exit+0x7f0/0x25b0 kernel/exit.c:953 do_group_exit+0x203/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:1102 get_signal+0x1357/0x1480 kernel/signal.c:3034 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x40/0x690 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:111 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x67/0xb0 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0x7c/0x150 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f87a898e969 </TASK> Modules linked in: gq(O) gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03 CR2: ffffebde00000000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Deliberately don't check for a NULL VMSA when freeing the vCPU, as crashing the host is likely desirable due to the VMSA being consumed by hardware. E.g. if KVM manages to allow VMRUN on the vCPU, hardware may read/write a bogus VMSA page. Accessing PFN 0 is "fine"-ish now that it's sequestered away thanks to L1TF, but panicking in this scenario is preferable to potentially running with corrupted state. Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Fixes: 0b020f5 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV-ES intra host migration") Fixes: b566393 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration") Cc: [email protected] Cc: James Houghton <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Gonda <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <[email protected]> Tested-by: Liam Merwick <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: James Houghton <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

nbd grabs device lock nbd->config_lock for updating nr_hw_queues, this ways cause the following lock dependency: -> #2 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5871 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x448 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5828 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:602 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x166/0x1292 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 mutex_lock_nested+0x14/0x1c kernel/locking/mutex.c:799 __del_gendisk+0x132/0xac6 block/genhd.c:706 del_gendisk+0xf6/0x19a block/genhd.c:819 nbd_dev_remove+0x3c/0xf2 drivers/block/nbd.c:268 nbd_dev_remove_work+0x1c/0x26 drivers/block/nbd.c:284 process_one_work+0x96a/0x1f32 kernel/workqueue.c:3238 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3321 [inline] worker_thread+0x5ce/0xde8 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x39c/0x7d4 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork_kernel+0x2a/0xbb2 arch/riscv/kernel/process.c:214 ret_from_fork_kernel_asm+0x16/0x18 arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S:327 -> #1 (&set->update_nr_hwq_lock){++++}-{4:4}: lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5871 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x448 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5828 down_write+0x9c/0x19a kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1577 blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues+0x3e/0xb86 block/blk-mq.c:5041 nbd_start_device+0x140/0xb2c drivers/block/nbd.c:1476 nbd_genl_connect+0xae0/0x1b24 drivers/block/nbd.c:2201 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x206/0x2e6 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x514/0x78e net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210 netlink_rcv_skb+0x206/0x3be net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2534 genl_rcv+0x36/0x4c net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1313 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4f0/0x82c net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339 netlink_sendmsg+0x85e/0xdd6 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0xcc/0x160 net/socket.c:727 ____sys_sendmsg+0x63e/0x79c net/socket.c:2566 ___sys_sendmsg+0x144/0x1e6 net/socket.c:2620 __sys_sendmsg+0x188/0x246 net/socket.c:2652 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2657 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2655 [inline] __riscv_sys_sendmsg+0x70/0xa2 net/socket.c:2655 syscall_handler+0x94/0x118 arch/riscv/include/asm/syscall.h:112 do_trap_ecall_u+0x396/0x530 arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c:341 handle_exception+0x146/0x152 arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S:197 -> #0 (&nbd->config_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: check_noncircular+0x132/0x146 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2178 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3168 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3287 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3911 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x12b2/0x24ea kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5240 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5871 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x448 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5828 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:602 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x166/0x1292 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 mutex_lock_nested+0x14/0x1c kernel/locking/mutex.c:799 refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock+0x60/0xd8 lib/refcount.c:118 nbd_config_put+0x3a/0x610 drivers/block/nbd.c:1423 nbd_release+0x94/0x15c drivers/block/nbd.c:1735 blkdev_put_whole+0xac/0xee block/bdev.c:721 bdev_release+0x3fe/0x600 block/bdev.c:1144 blkdev_release+0x1a/0x26 block/fops.c:684 __fput+0x382/0xa8c fs/file_table.c:465 ____fput+0x1c/0x26 fs/file_table.c:493 task_work_run+0x16a/0x25e kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x118/0x134 kernel/entry/common.c:114 exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:330 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:414 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:449 [inline] do_trap_ecall_u+0x3f0/0x530 arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c:355 handle_exception+0x146/0x152 arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S:197 Also it isn't necessary to require nbd->config_lock, because blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues() does grab tagset lock for sync everything. Fixes the issue by releasing ->config_lock & retry in case of concurrent updating nr_hw_queues. Fixes: 98e68f6 ("block: prevent adding/deleting disk during updating nr_hw_queues") Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <[email protected]> Cc: Nilay Shroff <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>

If "try_verify_in_tasklet" is set for dm-verity, DM_BUFIO_CLIENT_NO_SLEEP is enabled for dm-bufio. However, when bufio tries to evict buffers, there is a chance to trigger scheduling in spin_lock_bh, the following warning is hit: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at drivers/md/dm-bufio.c:2745 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 123, name: kworker/2:2 preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 4 locks held by kworker/2:2/123: #0: ffff88800a2d1548 ((wq_completion)dm_bufio_cache){....}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0xe46/0x1970 #1: ffffc90000d97d20 ((work_completion)(&dm_bufio_replacement_work)){....}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x763/0x1970 #2: ffffffff8555b528 (dm_bufio_clients_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: do_global_cleanup+0x1ce/0x710 #3: ffff88801d5820b8 (&c->spinlock){....}-{2:2}, at: do_global_cleanup+0x2a5/0x710 Preemption disabled at: [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 123 Comm: kworker/2:2 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3-g90548c634bd0 torvalds#305 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: dm_bufio_cache do_global_cleanup Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 __might_resched+0x360/0x4e0 do_global_cleanup+0x2f5/0x710 process_one_work+0x7db/0x1970 worker_thread+0x518/0xea0 kthread+0x359/0x690 ret_from_fork+0xf3/0x1b0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> That can be reproduced by: veritysetup format --data-block-size=4096 --hash-block-size=4096 /dev/vda /dev/vdb SIZE=$(blockdev --getsz /dev/vda) dmsetup create myverity -r --table "0 $SIZE verity 1 /dev/vda /dev/vdb 4096 4096 <data_blocks> 1 sha256 <root_hash> <salt> 1 try_verify_in_tasklet" mount /dev/dm-0 /mnt -o ro echo 102400 > /sys/module/dm_bufio/parameters/max_cache_size_bytes [read files in /mnt] Cc: [email protected] # v6.4+ Fixes: 450e8de ("dm bufio: improve concurrent IO performance") Signed-off-by: Wang Shuai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sheng Yong <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>

This reverts commit 7796c97. This patch broke Dragonboard 845c (sdm845). I see: Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1 Internal error: BRK handler: 00000000f20003e8 [#1] SMP pc : qcom_swrm_set_channel_map+0x7c/0x80 [soundwire_qcom] lr : snd_soc_dai_set_channel_map+0x34/0x78 Call trace: qcom_swrm_set_channel_map+0x7c/0x80 [soundwire_qcom] (P) sdm845_dai_init+0x18c/0x2e0 [snd_soc_sdm845] snd_soc_link_init+0x28/0x6c snd_soc_bind_card+0x5f4/0xb0c snd_soc_register_card+0x148/0x1a4 devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x50/0xb0 sdm845_snd_platform_probe+0x124/0x148 [snd_soc_sdm845] platform_probe+0x6c/0xd0 really_probe+0xc0/0x2a4 __driver_probe_device+0x7c/0x130 driver_probe_device+0x40/0x118 __device_attach_driver+0xc4/0x108 bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xf0 __device_attach+0xa4/0x198 device_initial_probe+0x18/0x28 bus_probe_device+0xb8/0xbc deferred_probe_work_func+0xac/0xfc process_one_work+0x244/0x658 worker_thread+0x1b4/0x360 kthread+0x148/0x228 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Kernel panic - not syncing: BRK handler: Fatal exception Dan has also reported following issues with the original patch https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Bug #1: The zeroeth element of ctrl->pconfig[] is supposed to be unused. We start counting at 1. However this code sets ctrl->pconfig[0].ch_mask = 128. Bug #2: There are SLIM_MAX_TX_PORTS (16) elements in tx_ch[] array but only QCOM_SDW_MAX_PORTS + 1 (15) in the ctrl->pconfig[] array so it corrupts memory like Yongqin Liu pointed out. Bug 3: Like Jie Gan pointed out, it erases all the tx information with the rx information. Cc: [email protected] # v6.15+ Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <[email protected]> Acked-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <[email protected]>

into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 6.16, take #2 - Disable vstimecmp before exiting to user-space - Move HGEI[E|P] CSR access to IMSIC virtualization

With KASAN enabled, it is possible to get a slab out of bounds during mount to ksmbd due to missing check in parse_server_interfaces() (see below): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881433dba98 by task mount/9827 CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 9827 Comm: mount Tainted: G OE 6.16.0-rc2-kasan #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision Tower 3620/0MWYPT, BIOS 2.13.1 06/14/2019 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x9f/0xf0 print_report+0xd1/0x670 __virt_addr_valid+0x22c/0x430 ? parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs] ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x2a/0x1f0 ? parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs] kasan_report+0xd6/0x110 parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs] __asan_report_load_n_noabort+0x13/0x20 parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs] ? __pfx_parse_server_interfaces+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x51/0x60 SMB3_request_interfaces+0x1ad/0x3f0 [cifs] ? __pfx_SMB3_request_interfaces+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? SMB2_tcon+0x23c/0x15d0 [cifs] smb3_qfs_tcon+0x173/0x2b0 [cifs] ? __pfx_smb3_qfs_tcon+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? cifs_get_tcon+0x105d/0x2120 [cifs] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x5d/0x200 ? cifs_get_tcon+0x105d/0x2120 [cifs] ? __pfx_smb3_qfs_tcon+0x10/0x10 [cifs] cifs_mount_get_tcon+0x369/0xb90 [cifs] ? dfs_cache_find+0xe7/0x150 [cifs] dfs_mount_share+0x985/0x2970 [cifs] ? check_path.constprop.0+0x28/0x50 ? save_trace+0x54/0x370 ? __pfx_dfs_mount_share+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? __lock_acquire+0xb82/0x2ba0 ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 cifs_mount+0xbc/0x9e0 [cifs] ? __pfx_cifs_mount+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x5d/0x200 ? cifs_setup_cifs_sb+0x29d/0x810 [cifs] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x263/0x1990 [cifs] Reported-by: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]> Tested-by: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>

The commit under the Fixes tag added a netdev_assert_locked() in bnxt_free_ntp_fltrs(). The lock should be held during normal run-time but the assert will be triggered (see below) during bnxt_remove_one() which should not need the lock. The netdev is already unregistered by then. Fix it by calling netdev_assert_locked_or_invisible() which will not assert if the netdev is unregistered. WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 2241 at ./include/net/netdev_lock.h:17 bnxt_free_ntp_fltrs+0xf8/0x100 [bnxt_en] Modules linked in: rpcrdma rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm configfs ib_core bnxt_en(-) bridge stp llc x86_pkg_temp_thermal xfs tg3 [last unloaded: bnxt_re] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 2241 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G S W 6.16.0 #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [W]=WARN Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017 RIP: 0010:bnxt_free_ntp_fltrs+0xf8/0x100 [bnxt_en] Code: 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc 48 8b 47 60 be ff ff ff ff 48 8d b8 28 0c 00 00 e8 d0 cf 41 c3 85 c0 0f 85 2e ff ff ff <0f> 0b e9 27 ff ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 RSP: 0018:ffffa92082387da0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e5b593d8000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff83dc9a70 RDI: ffffffff83e1a1cf RBP: ffff9e5b593d8c80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff8373a2b3 R10: 000000008100009f R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffffffc01c4478 R14: dead000000000122 R15: dead000000000100 FS: 00007f3a8a52c740(0000) GS:ffff9e631ad1c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055bb289419c8 CR3: 000000011274e001 CR4: 00000000003706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> bnxt_remove_one+0x57/0x180 [bnxt_en] pci_device_remove+0x39/0xc0 device_release_driver_internal+0xa5/0x130 driver_detach+0x42/0x90 bus_remove_driver+0x61/0xc0 pci_unregister_driver+0x38/0x90 bnxt_exit+0xc/0x7d0 [bnxt_en] Fixes: 004b500 ("eth: bnxt: remove most dependencies on RTNL") Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Commit 3c7ac40 ("scsi: ufs: core: Delegate the interrupt service routine to a threaded IRQ handler") introduced an IRQ lock inversion issue. Fix this lock inversion by changing the spin_lock_irq() calls into spin_lock_irqsave() calls in code that can be called either from interrupt context or from thread context. This patch fixes the following lockdep complaint: WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected 6.12.30-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 Tainted: G W OE -------------------------------------------------------- kworker/u28:0/12 just changed the state of lock: ffffff881e29dd60 (&hba->clk_gating.lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110 but this lock took another, HARDIRQ-unsafe lock in the past: (shost->host_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. other info that might help us debug this: Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(shost->host_lock); local_irq_disable(); lock(&hba->clk_gating.lock); lock(shost->host_lock); <Interrupt> lock(&hba->clk_gating.lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by kworker/u28:0/12: #0: ffffff8800ac6158 ((wq_completion)async){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1bc/0x65c #1: ffffffc085c93d70 ((work_completion)(&entry->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1e4/0x65c #2: ffffff881e29c0e0 (&shost->scan_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __scsi_add_device+0x74/0x120 #3: ffffff881960ea00 (&hwq->cq_lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0x28/0x104 the shortest dependencies between 2nd lock and 1st lock: -> (shost->host_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x64 ufshcd_sl_intr+0x4c/0xa08 ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x70/0x12c irq_thread_fn+0x48/0xa8 irq_thread+0x130/0x1ec kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 SOFTIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x64 ufshcd_sl_intr+0x4c/0xa08 ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x70/0x12c irq_thread_fn+0x48/0xa8 irq_thread+0x130/0x1ec kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x64 ufshcd_sl_intr+0x4c/0xa08 ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x70/0x12c irq_thread_fn+0x48/0xa8 irq_thread+0x130/0x1ec kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 } ... key at: [<ffffffc085ba1a98>] scsi_host_alloc.__key+0x0/0x10 ... acquired at: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 __ufshcd_release+0x78/0x118 ufshcd_send_uic_cmd+0xe4/0x118 ufshcd_dme_set_attr+0x88/0x1c8 ufs_google_phy_initialization+0x68/0x418 [ufs] ufs_google_link_startup_notify+0x78/0x27c [ufs] ufshcd_link_startup+0x84/0x720 ufshcd_init+0xf3c/0x1330 ufshcd_pltfrm_init+0x728/0x7d8 ufs_google_probe+0x30/0x84 [ufs] platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0 really_probe+0x114/0x454 __driver_probe_device+0xa4/0x160 driver_probe_device+0x44/0x23c __driver_attach_async_helper+0x60/0xd4 async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c worker_thread+0x33c/0x498 kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> (&hba->clk_gating.lock){-...}-{2:2} { IN-HARDIRQ-W at: lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110 ufshcd_compl_one_cqe+0x2c0/0x3f4 ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xb0/0x104 ufs_google_mcq_intr+0x80/0xa0 [ufs] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x104/0x32c handle_irq_event+0x40/0x9c handle_fasteoi_irq+0x170/0x2e8 generic_handle_domain_irq+0x58/0x80 gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x104 call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x50 do_interrupt_handler+0x7c/0xd8 el1_interrupt+0x34/0x58 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24 el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x6c debug_object_assert_init+0x16c/0x21c __mod_timer+0x4c/0x48c schedule_timeout+0xd4/0x16c io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70 do_wait_for_common+0x100/0x194 wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x48/0x6c blk_execute_rq+0x124/0x17c scsi_execute_cmd+0x18c/0x3f8 scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x204/0xd74 __scsi_add_device+0xbc/0x120 ufshcd_async_scan+0x80/0x3c0 async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c worker_thread+0x33c/0x498 kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 ufshcd_hold+0x34/0x14c ufshcd_send_uic_cmd+0x28/0x118 ufshcd_dme_set_attr+0x88/0x1c8 ufs_google_phy_initialization+0x68/0x418 [ufs] ufs_google_link_startup_notify+0x78/0x27c [ufs] ufshcd_link_startup+0x84/0x720 ufshcd_init+0xf3c/0x1330 ufshcd_pltfrm_init+0x728/0x7d8 ufs_google_probe+0x30/0x84 [ufs] platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0 really_probe+0x114/0x454 __driver_probe_device+0xa4/0x160 driver_probe_device+0x44/0x23c __driver_attach_async_helper+0x60/0xd4 async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c worker_thread+0x33c/0x498 kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 } ... key at: [<ffffffc085ba6fe8>] ufshcd_init.__key+0x0/0x10 ... acquired at: mark_lock+0x1c4/0x224 __lock_acquire+0x438/0x2e1c lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110 ufshcd_compl_one_cqe+0x2c0/0x3f4 ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xb0/0x104 ufs_google_mcq_intr+0x80/0xa0 [ufs] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x104/0x32c handle_irq_event+0x40/0x9c handle_fasteoi_irq+0x170/0x2e8 generic_handle_domain_irq+0x58/0x80 gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x104 call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x50 do_interrupt_handler+0x7c/0xd8 el1_interrupt+0x34/0x58 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24 el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x6c debug_object_assert_init+0x16c/0x21c __mod_timer+0x4c/0x48c schedule_timeout+0xd4/0x16c io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70 do_wait_for_common+0x100/0x194 wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x48/0x6c blk_execute_rq+0x124/0x17c scsi_execute_cmd+0x18c/0x3f8 scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x204/0xd74 __scsi_add_device+0xbc/0x120 ufshcd_async_scan+0x80/0x3c0 async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c worker_thread+0x33c/0x498 kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 stack backtrace: CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u28:0 Tainted: G W OE 6.12.30-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 ccd4020fe444bdf629efc3b86df6be920b8df7d0 Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: Spacecraft board based on MALIBU (DT) Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x17c show_stack+0x18/0x28 dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xa0 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 print_irq_inversion_bug+0x2fc/0x304 mark_lock_irq+0x388/0x4fc mark_lock+0x1c4/0x224 __lock_acquire+0x438/0x2e1c lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110 ufshcd_compl_one_cqe+0x2c0/0x3f4 ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xb0/0x104 ufs_google_mcq_intr+0x80/0xa0 [ufs dd6f385554e109da094ab91d5f7be18625a2222a] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x104/0x32c handle_irq_event+0x40/0x9c handle_fasteoi_irq+0x170/0x2e8 generic_handle_domain_irq+0x58/0x80 gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x104 call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x50 do_interrupt_handler+0x7c/0xd8 el1_interrupt+0x34/0x58 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24 el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x6c debug_object_assert_init+0x16c/0x21c __mod_timer+0x4c/0x48c schedule_timeout+0xd4/0x16c io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70 do_wait_for_common+0x100/0x194 wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x48/0x6c blk_execute_rq+0x124/0x17c scsi_execute_cmd+0x18c/0x3f8 scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x204/0xd74 __scsi_add_device+0xbc/0x120 ufshcd_async_scan+0x80/0x3c0 async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c worker_thread+0x33c/0x498 kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Cc: Neil Armstrong <[email protected]> Cc: André Draszik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Peter Wang <[email protected]> Fixes: 3c7ac40 ("scsi: ufs: core: Delegate the interrupt service routine to a threaded IRQ handler") Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>

…dlock When a user creates a dualpi2 qdisc it automatically sets a timer. This timer will run constantly and update the qdisc's probability field. The issue is that the timer acquires the qdisc root lock and runs in hardirq. The qdisc root lock is also acquired in dev.c whenever a packet arrives for this qdisc. Since the dualpi2 timer callback runs in hardirq, it may interrupt the packet processing running in softirq. If that happens and it runs on the same CPU, it will acquire the same lock and cause a deadlock. The following splat shows up when running a kernel compiled with lock debugging: [ +0.000224] WARNING: inconsistent lock state [ +0.000224] 6.16.0+ #10 Not tainted [ +0.000169] -------------------------------- [ +0.000029] inconsistent {IN-HARDIRQ-W} -> {HARDIRQ-ON-W} usage. [ +0.000000] ping/156 [HC0[0]:SC0[2]:HE1:SE0] takes: [ +0.000000] ffff897841242110 (&sch->root_lock_key){?.-.}-{3:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x86d/0x1140 [ +0.000000] {IN-HARDIRQ-W} state was registered at: [ +0.000000] lock_acquire.part.0+0xb6/0x220 [ +0.000000] _raw_spin_lock+0x31/0x80 [ +0.000000] dualpi2_timer+0x6f/0x270 [ +0.000000] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1c5/0x360 [ +0.000000] hrtimer_interrupt+0x115/0x260 [ +0.000000] __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x1a0 [ +0.000000] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x80 [ +0.000000] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 [ +0.000000] pv_native_safe_halt+0xf/0x20 [ +0.000000] default_idle+0x9/0x10 [ +0.000000] default_idle_call+0x7e/0x1e0 [ +0.000000] do_idle+0x1e8/0x250 [ +0.000000] cpu_startup_entry+0x29/0x30 [ +0.000000] rest_init+0x151/0x160 [ +0.000000] start_kernel+0x6f3/0x700 [ +0.000000] x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x30 [ +0.000000] x86_64_start_kernel+0xc8/0xd0 [ +0.000000] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x148 [ +0.000000] irq event stamp: 6884 [ +0.000000] hardirqs last enabled at (6883): [<ffffffffa75700b3>] neigh_resolve_output+0x223/0x270 [ +0.000000] hardirqs last disabled at (6882): [<ffffffffa7570078>] neigh_resolve_output+0x1e8/0x270 [ +0.000000] softirqs last enabled at (6880): [<ffffffffa757006b>] neigh_resolve_output+0x1db/0x270 [ +0.000000] softirqs last disabled at (6884): [<ffffffffa755b533>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x73/0x1140 [ +0.000000] other info that might help us debug this: [ +0.000000] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ +0.000000] CPU0 [ +0.000000] ---- [ +0.000000] lock(&sch->root_lock_key); [ +0.000000] <Interrupt> [ +0.000000] lock(&sch->root_lock_key); [ +0.000000] *** DEADLOCK *** [ +0.000000] 4 locks held by ping/156: [ +0.000000] #0: ffff897842332e08 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: raw_sendmsg+0x41e/0xf40 [ +0.000000] #1: ffffffffa816f880 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: ip_output+0x2c/0x190 [ +0.000000] #2: ffffffffa816f880 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: ip_finish_output2+0xad/0x950 [ +0.000000] #3: ffffffffa816f840 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x73/0x1140 I am able to reproduce it consistently when running the following: tc qdisc add dev lo handle 1: root dualpi2 ping -f 127.0.0.1 To fix it, make the timer run in softirq. Fixes: 320d031 ("sched: Struct definition and parsing of dualpi2 qdisc") Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Victor Nogueira <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

These iterations require the read lock, otherwise RCU lockdep will splat: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.17.0-rc3-00014-g31419c045d64 #6 Tainted: G O ----------------------------- drivers/base/power/main.c:1333 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 5 locks held by rtcwake/547: #0: 00000000643ab418 (sb_writers#6){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: file_start_write+0x2b/0x3a #1: 0000000067a0ca88 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x181/0x24b #2: 00000000631eac40 (kn->active#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x191/0x24b #3: 00000000609a1308 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: pm_suspend+0xaf/0x30b #4: 0000000060c0fdb0 (device_links_srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: device_links_read_lock+0x75/0x98 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 547 Comm: rtcwake Tainted: G O 6.17.0-rc3-00014-g31419c045d64 #6 VOLUNTARY Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE Stack: 223721b3a80 6089eac6 00000001 00000001 ffffff00 6089eac6 00000535 6086e528 721b3ac0 6003c294 00000000 60031fc0 Call Trace: [<600407ed>] show_stack+0x10e/0x127 [<6003c294>] dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xc6 [<6003c2fd>] dump_stack+0x1a/0x20 [<600bc2f8>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x116/0x13e [<603d8ea1>] dpm_async_suspend_superior+0x117/0x17e [<603d980f>] device_suspend+0x528/0x541 [<603da24b>] dpm_suspend+0x1a2/0x267 [<603da837>] dpm_suspend_start+0x5d/0x72 [<600ca0c9>] suspend_devices_and_enter+0xab/0x736 [...] Add the fourth argument to the iteration to annotate this and avoid the splat. Fixes: 0679963 ("PM: sleep: Make async suspend handle suppliers like parents") Fixes: ed18738 ("PM: sleep: Make async resume handle consumers like children") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250826134348.aba79f6e6299.I9ecf55da46ccf33778f2c018a82e1819d815b348@changeid Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>

With CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_TIMERS unloading hfcpci module leads to the following splat: [ 250.215892] ODEBUG: assert_init not available (active state 0) object: ffffffffc01a3dc0 object type: timer_list hint: 0x0 [ 250.217520] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 233 at lib/debugobjects.c:612 debug_print_object+0x1b6/0x2c0 [ 250.218775] Modules linked in: hfcpci(-) mISDN_core [ 250.219537] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 233 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-g6f713187ac98 #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 250.220940] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 250.222377] RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x1b6/0x2c0 [ 250.223131] Code: fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 75 4f 41 56 48 8b 14 dd a0 4e 01 9f 48 89 ee 48 c7 c7 20 46 01 9f e8 cb 84d [ 250.225805] RSP: 0018:ffff888015ea7c08 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 250.226608] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: ffffffff9be93a95 [ 250.227708] RDX: 1ffff1100d945138 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88806ca289c0 [ 250.228993] RBP: ffffffff9f014a00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1002bd4f39 [ 250.230043] R10: ffff888015ea79cf R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 250.231185] R13: ffffffff9eea0520 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888015ea7cc8 [ 250.232454] FS: 00007f3208f01540(0000) GS:ffff8880caf5a000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 250.233851] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 250.234856] CR2: 00007f32090a7421 CR3: 0000000004d63000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 250.236117] Call Trace: [ 250.236599] <TASK> [ 250.236967] ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0xd4/0x130 [ 250.237920] debug_object_assert_init+0x1f6/0x310 [ 250.238762] ? __pfx_debug_object_assert_init+0x10/0x10 [ 250.239658] ? __lock_acquire+0xdea/0x1c70 [ 250.240369] __try_to_del_timer_sync+0x69/0x140 [ 250.241172] ? __pfx___try_to_del_timer_sync+0x10/0x10 [ 250.242058] ? __timer_delete_sync+0xc6/0x120 [ 250.242842] ? lock_acquire+0x30/0x80 [ 250.243474] ? __timer_delete_sync+0xc6/0x120 [ 250.244262] __timer_delete_sync+0x98/0x120 [ 250.245015] HFC_cleanup+0x10/0x20 [hfcpci] [ 250.245704] __do_sys_delete_module+0x348/0x510 [ 250.246461] ? __pfx___do_sys_delete_module+0x10/0x10 [ 250.247338] do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x360 [ 250.247924] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fix this by initializing hfc_tl timer with DEFINE_TIMER macro. Also, use mod_timer instead of manual timeout update. Fixes: 87c5fa1 ("mISDN: Add different different timer settings for hfc-pci") Fixes: 175302f ("mISDN: hfcpci: Fix use-after-free bug in hfcpci_softirq") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aKiy2D_LiWpQ5kXq@vova-pc Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

If preparing a write bio fails then blk_zone_wplug_bio_work() calls bio_endio() with zwplug->lock held. If a device mapper driver is stacked on top of the zoned block device then this results in nested locking of zwplug->lock. The resulting lockdep complaint is a false positive because this is nested locking and not recursive locking. Suppress this false positive by calling blk_zone_wplug_bio_io_error() without holding zwplug->lock. This is safe because no code in blk_zone_wplug_bio_io_error() depends on zwplug->lock being held. This patch suppresses the following lockdep complaint: WARNING: possible recursive locking detected -------------------------------------------- kworker/3:0H/46 is trying to acquire lock: ffffff882968b830 (&zwplug->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: blk_zone_write_plug_bio_endio+0x64/0x1f0 but task is already holding lock: ffffff88315bc230 (&zwplug->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x8c/0x48c other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&zwplug->lock); lock(&zwplug->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by kworker/3:0H/46: #0: ffffff8809486758 ((wq_completion)sdd_zwplugs){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1bc/0x65c #1: ffffffc085de3d70 ((work_completion)(&zwplug->bio_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1e4/0x65c #2: ffffff88315bc230 (&zwplug->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x8c/0x48c stack backtrace: CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 46 Comm: kworker/3:0H Tainted: G W OE 6.12.38-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 8b362b6f76e3645a58cd27d86982bce10d150025 Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: Spacecraft board based on MALIBU (DT) Workqueue: sdd_zwplugs blk_zone_wplug_bio_work Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x17c show_stack+0x18/0x28 dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xa0 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 print_deadlock_bug+0x38c/0x398 __lock_acquire+0x13e8/0x2e1c lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 blk_zone_write_plug_bio_endio+0x64/0x1f0 bio_endio+0x9c/0x240 __dm_io_complete+0x214/0x260 clone_endio+0xe8/0x214 bio_endio+0x218/0x240 blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x204/0x48c process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c worker_thread+0x33c/0x498 kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Cc: [email protected] Cc: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Fixes: dd291d7 ("block: Introduce zone write plugging") Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>

…ux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 changes for 6.17, take #2 - Correctly handle 'invariant' system registers for protected VMs - Improved handling of VNCR data aborts, including external aborts - Fixes for handling of FEAT_RAS for NV guests, providing a sane fault context during SEA injection and preventing the use of RASv1p1 fault injection hardware - Ensure that page table destruction when a VM is destroyed gives an opportunity to reschedule - Large fix to KVM's infrastructure for managing guest context loaded on the CPU, addressing issues where the output of AT emulation doesn't get reflected to the guest - Fix AT S12 emulation to actually perform stage-2 translation when necessary - Avoid attempting vLPI irqbypass when GICv4 has been explicitly disabled for a VM - Minor KVM + selftest fixes

kprasadvnsi added 2 commits August 21, 2022 14:30

arm64: dts: qcom: xiaomi-sweet: Add gpio-reserved-ranges

bc2b8b7

arm64: dts: qcom: sm7150-xiaomi-sweet: Enable USB

1e46d06

Configure and enable the nodes for USB.

kprasadvnsi closed this Aug 21, 2022

kprasadvnsi deleted the sm7150-sweet-usb branch August 21, 2022 09:44

JIaxyga pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 29, 2022

Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-6.0-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/…

b4ac28a

…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.0, take #2 - Fix kmemleak usage in Protected KVM (again)

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USB support for sm7150-xiaomi-sweet #2

USB support for sm7150-xiaomi-sweet #2

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kprasadvnsi commented Aug 21, 2022

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USB support for sm7150-xiaomi-sweet #2

USB support for sm7150-xiaomi-sweet #2

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kprasadvnsi commented Aug 21, 2022

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