Impact
Anyone with read/write access to the backup storage location (e.g. an S3 bucket) can manipulate backup manifest files so that arbitrary code is later executed when that backup is restored. This can be used to provide that attacker with unintended/unauthorized access to the production deployment environment — allowing them to access information available in that environment as well as run any additional arbitrary commands there.
Patches
v23.0.3 and v22.0.4
Workarounds
If you intended to use an external decompressor then you can always specify that decompressor command in the --external-decompressor flag value for vttablet and vtbackup. That then overrides any value specified in the manifest file.
If you did not intend to use an external decompressor, nor an internal one, then you can specify a value such as cat or tee in the --external-decompressor flag value for vttablet and vtbackup to ensure that a harmless command is always used.
References
You can read more about the issue here: #19459
Impact
Anyone with read/write access to the backup storage location (e.g. an S3 bucket) can manipulate backup manifest files so that arbitrary code is later executed when that backup is restored. This can be used to provide that attacker with unintended/unauthorized access to the production deployment environment — allowing them to access information available in that environment as well as run any additional arbitrary commands there.
Patches
v23.0.3 and v22.0.4
Workarounds
If you intended to use an external decompressor then you can always specify that decompressor command in the
--external-decompressorflag value forvttabletandvtbackup. That then overrides any value specified in the manifest file.If you did not intend to use an external decompressor, nor an internal one, then you can specify a value such as
catorteein the--external-decompressorflag value forvttabletandvtbackupto ensure that a harmless command is always used.References
You can read more about the issue here: #19459