Add TLSMirror looks like TLS censorship resistant transport protocol as a developer preview transport

[xiaokangwang]

This pull request adds an incomplete implementation of TLSMirror transport protocol to V2Ray that is designed to help user creating traffic that is difficult to distinguish with a SNI proxy (or port forwarding to another TLS port).

This implementation is currently incomplete and is designed for developer preview only, and we discourage users to try it unless you know what you are doing.

example configuration:
https://gist.github.com/xiaokangwang/46e8ca7aa579f11404573fb8e1d4891a

By design, this protocol is post-handshake record length analysis resistant(to both tls implementation fingerprinting and http protocol fingerprinting) and not vulnerable to attack described in net4people/bbs#481 if correctly configured and implemented. This means no attack vector specific workarounds are necessary as protocol are designed to automatically resistant to those fingerprinting methods as the original TLS traffic between client and server are bit-identical until dangerous period passed and the connection is ready for carrying payload traffic.

This protocol will subject to multiple revision as there are missing features or incorrect implementation that create protocol fingerprints in certain configurations. Zero stability for both configuration and wire protocol should be expected.

[asiaqa]

This pull request adds an incomplete implementation of TLSMirror transport protocol to V2Ray that is designed to help user creating traffic that is difficult to distinguish with a SNI proxy (or port forwarding to another TLS port).

This implementation is currently incomplete and is designed for developer preview only, and we discourage users to try it unless you know what you are doing.

example configuration: https://gist.github.com/xiaokangwang/46e8ca7aa579f11404573fb8e1d4891a

By design, this protocol is post-handshake record length analysis resistant(to both tls implementation fingerprinting and http protocol fingerprinting) and not vulnerable to attack described in net4people/bbs#481 if correctly configured and implemented. This means no attack vector specific workarounds are necessary as protocol are designed to automatically resistant to those fingerprinting methods as the original TLS traffic between client and server are bit-identical until dangerous period passed and the connection is ready for carrying payload traffic.

This protocol will subject to multiple revision as there are missing features or incorrect implementation that create protocol fingerprints in certain configurations. Zero stability for both configuration and wire protocol should be expected.