Provide support for symmetric key verification via JwtDecoder

[sirianni]

JWT signature verification for id_token fails in OidcAuthorizationCodeAuthenticationProvider for OIDC providers like Ping Federate that have alternate signature verification rules.

From Ping Identity Developers Guide:

Note: Signature validation is only required for tokens not received directly from the token endpoint (i.e. for the Implicit Client Profile). In other cases where the id_token is received directly by the client from the token endpoint over HTTPS, transport layer security should be sufficient to vouch for the integrity of the token.

And

These rules are valid according to the OpenID Connect specification:

If the ID Token is received via direct communication between the Client and the Token Endpoint (which it is in this flow), the TLS server validation MAY be used to validate the issuer in place of checking the token signature. The Client MUST validate the signature of all other ID Tokens according to JWS [JWS] using the algorithm specified in the JWT alg Header Parameter. The Client MUST use the keys provided by the Issuer.

There is a method within OidcAuthorizationCodeAuthenticationProvider to dynamically lookup a JwtDecoder for a given ClientRegistration:

private JwtDecoder getJwtDecoder(ClientRegistration clientRegistration) {

A few challenges here:

1. That method is private
2. There is no way to plug in sublcasses or alternate mappings in the .oauth2Login() configuration DSL

As such, there need to be changes to the core classes to enable such pluggability.

[rwinch]

Thanks for the report @sirianni! I think being able to customize the implementation is important, but I think the first step is to fix the default implementation so it works with Ping.

[sirianni]

OK. What approach would you suggest for that? I may be able to work on a PR.

[sirianni]

If you don't view the Ping approach of reusing the client secret as a symmetric JWT signing key as a special case, a configuration-only approach might suffice. You could be to add another field to ProviderDetails. Something like idTokenSigningKeySource with the values:

• jwks - resolve the public key using JWKS URL (current behavior)
• clientSecret- use the client secret as a symmetric key
• none - trust the id_token without signature verification since it was served directly over TLS

[sirianni]

Looks like Auth0 allows a symmetric key to be used also:

However, they don't reuse the client_secret. It's a separately configured value (if I'm reading the docs correctly).
So you could make the config parameter an object with a type and a value. Something like

provider.auth0.idTokenSignature.strategy=sharedSecret
provider.auth0.idTokenSignature.secret=mySecretKey
provider.microsoft.idTokenSignature.strategy=jwks
provider.ping.idTokenSignature.straegy=trust

[jgrandja]

@sirianni Can you please provide more details around the issue you are having.

JWT signature verification for id_token fails in OidcAuthorizationCodeAuthenticationProvider for OIDC providers like Ping Federate that have alternate signature verification rules.

Specifically, what is the alg in the JWS header that Ping is signing with? Can you also provide a stacktrace of the exception?

I agree with @rwinch, let's ensure we have things working out-of-the-box for Ping before we expose configuration points that allow for customization.

[sirianni]

As an aside, I will say that it seems the Spring OAuth2 coding style has deviated from the standard Spring practice of coding for extensibility that has made Spring so popular. The code uses some fairly paranoid practices like marking classes as final and using private constructors and methods vs. protected ones.

let's ensure we have things working out-of-the-box for Ping

Right, I get it. I hope you can see from the comments above that I'm trying to help you assess the ability to have a generic "out of the box" solution that works for Ping.

Specifically, what is the alg in the JWS header that Ping is signing with

As I mentioned in my comment above (with screenshot of Ping docs), Ping is signing with HS256.

Right off the bat you can see that NimbusJwtDecoderJwkSupport has hardcoded the RS256 JwsAlgorithm.

	public NimbusJwtDecoderJwkSupport(String jwkSetUrl) {
		this(jwkSetUrl, JwsAlgorithms.RS256);
	}

Stacktrace:

org.springframework.security.oauth2.jwt.JwtException: An error occurred while attempting to decode the Jwt: Signed JWT rejected: Another algorithm expected, or no matching key(s) found
	at org.springframework.security.oauth2.jwt.NimbusJwtDecoderJwkSupport.decode(NimbusJwtDecoderJwkSupport.java:123) ~[spring-security-oauth2-jose-5.0.6.RELEASE.jar:5.0.6.RELEASE]
	at org.springframework.security.oauth2.client.oidc.authentication.OidcAuthorizationCodeAuthenticationProvider.authenticate(OidcAuthorizationCodeAuthenticationProvider.java:153) ~[spring-security-oauth2-client-5.0.7.BUILD-SNAPSHOT.jar:5.0.7.BUILD-SNAPSHOT]
	at org.springframework.security.authentication.ProviderManager.authenticate(ProviderManager.java:174) ~[spring-security-core-5.0.6.RELEASE.jar:5.0.6.RELEASE]
	at org.springframework.security.oauth2.client.web.OAuth2LoginAuthenticationFilter.attemptAuthentication(OAuth2LoginAuthenticationFilter.java:164) ~[spring-security-oauth2-client-5.0.7.BUILD-SNAPSHOT.jar:5.0.7.BUILD-SNAPSHOT]
	at org.springframework.security.web.authentication.AbstractAuthenticationProcessingFilter.doFilter(AbstractAuthenticationProcessingFilter.java:212) ~[spring-security-web-5.0.6.RELEASE.jar:5.0.6.RELEASE]
	at org.springframework.security.web.FilterChainProxy$VirtualFilterChain.doFilter(FilterChainProxy.java:334) ~[spring-security-web-5.0.6.RELEASE.jar:5.0.6.RELEASE]
	at org.springframework.security.oauth2.client.web.OAuth2AuthorizationRequestRedirectFilter.doFilterInternal(OAuth2AuthorizationRequestRedirectFilter.java:128) ~[spring-security-oauth2-client-5.0.7.BUILD-SNAPSHOT.jar:5.0.7.BUILD-SNAPSHOT]

[sirianni]

Note that Nimbus' native IDTokenValidator handles this case properly:

/**
 * Validator of ID tokens issued by an OpenID Provider (OP).
 *
 * <p>Supports processing of ID tokens with the following protection:
 *
 * <ul>
 *     <li>ID tokens signed (JWS) with the OP's RSA or EC key, require the
 *         OP public JWK set (provided by value or URL) to verify them.
 *     <li>ID tokens authenticated with a JWS HMAC, require the client's secret
 *         to verify them.
 *     <li>Unsecured (plain) ID tokens received at the token endpoint.
 * </ul>
 *
 * <p>Convenience static methods for creating an ID token validator from OpenID
 * Provider metadata or issuer URL, and the registered Relying Party
 * information:
 *
 * <ul>
 *     <li>{@link #create(OIDCProviderMetadata, OIDCClientInformation)}
 *     <li>{@link #create(Issuer, OIDCClientInformation)}
 * </ul>
 *
 * <p>Related specifications:
 *
 * <ul>
 *     <li>OpenID Connect Core 1.0, sections 3.1.3.7, 3.2.2.11 and 3.3.2.12.
 * </ul>
 */
@ThreadSafe
public class IDTokenValidator extends AbstractJWTValidator implements ClockSkewAware {

[rwinch]

@sirianni Thank you for all your feedback!

As an aside, I will say that it seems the Spring OAuth2 coding style has deviated from the standard Spring practice of coding for extensibility that has made Spring so popular.

This is very true and quite intentional in the short term. We are adding lots of new functionality at a fast pace and so we are starting out quite cautious. As we get reasonable enhancement requests, we will be able to spend time to improve the flexibility that users are use to. If you find places you need to customize that are not easy to do so, please let us know and we will work with you to update the code.

I want to emphasize that we agree that customization of the signature verification is desirable. However, we want to prioritize fixing this to work out of the box first. It may seem very easy to expose a new API, but as a framework every API we create and expose limits our ability to refactor the code later. I hope this helps alleviate any concerns you might have.

Thanks again for working with us to make Spring Security better!

[jgrandja]

@sirianni

Right off the bat you can see that NimbusJwtDecoderJwkSupport has hardcoded the RS256 JwsAlgorithm

This was intentional to support RS256 only in the initial release of 5.0, as it was quite easy to integrate with the JWK Set endpoint.

Symmetric key verification on the other hand is going to be more involved.

Note that Nimbus' native IDTokenValidator handles this case properly

Yes it does but this is a lot more involved. The IDTokenValidator relies on Provider metadata (OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0) and Client metadata (OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0) in order to achieve symmetric key verification in a dynamic way.

There is a lot more work that needs to be done to have full support for OAuth/OIDC and related extension specs. We will get there but it will take some more time.

We'll prioritize symmetric key verification support so please stay tuned.

Thanks again for the feedback.