Bring forward changes to withdrawability from phase 1#615
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* The `WITHDRAWABLE` flag is removed; instead, a validator's withdrawability is determined through the `withdrawable_epoch` field (renamed and re-purposed from `withdrawal_epoch` which was not used) * When a validator passes through the withdrawal queue, the `prepare_validator_for_withdrawal` function does not let them withdraw immediately; instead, they have to wait `MIN_VALIDATOR_WITHDRAWAL_EPOCHS`. This extra minimum delay serves no value in phase 0, but is crucial for phase 1 as the period between a validator passing through the queue and the validator being eligible to withdraw is where proof of custody challenges can come in; adding it in phase 0 is only half a line of code so easier to add it now. * If a validator is penalized, they are no longer subject to the exit queue; instead, their `withdrawable_epoch` is set `LATEST_PENALIZED_EXIT_LENGTH` into the future and this is used to determine when the validator can withdraw * Changes the eligibility condition for a transfer to use the `withdrawable_epoch`
| state.validator_balances[whistleblower_index] += whistleblower_reward | ||
| state.validator_balances[index] -= whistleblower_reward | ||
| validator.penalized_epoch = get_current_epoch(state) | ||
| validator.withdrawable_epoch = get_current_epoch(state) + LATEST_PENALIZED_EXIT_LENGTH |
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Do we need a condition that validators can only be penalized if they have not already entered the withdrawable state? I'm imagining someone exits, enters withdrawable, transfers some amount of funds, and then is found to be slashable. Although it would be nice to penalize them a bit, I think we should not allow this and other unexpected flows because it opens up unexpected state transitions (hard to test, potential attack vectors, etc)
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Do we need a condition that validators can only be penalized if they have not already entered the
withdrawablestate?
Automatic withdrawals in phase 2 effectively provide that. I'd support adding extra conditions (to be removed in phase 2) for consistency with phase 2.
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Added assert validator.withdrawable_epoch == FAR_FUTURE_EPOCH # [TO BE REMOVED IN PHASE 2] in penalize_validator.
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It needs to be possible to penalize validators that are in the "waiting for PoC challenges" stage. So I'd recommend the simple assert validator.withdrawable_epoch >= state.slot or assert validator.withdrawable_epoch > state.slot + ENTRY_EXIT_DELAY.
* Updated phase 1: branch challenges * Removed unnecessary line * Added early subkey reveal slashing * Revealing during the active period is still revealing early * Added.... * Machinery for publishing old subkeys * Inability to withdraw until you published all subkeys * After a validator exits the queue there's still a minimum 1-day delay before they can withdraw (in the future this delay will be used as an opportunity to start a PoC challenge game) * Update 1_shard-data-chains.md * formatting * minor edits * Added masking scheme for reveals Secure under the aggregate extraction infeasibility assumption described on pages 11-12 of https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs/papers/aggreg.pdf * Added rewards going to challengers * Add ToC and reorg the constant tables * Remove tags * fix constant formatting * normalize domain constants in phase 1 * Update 1_shard-data-chains.md * Update 1_shard-data-chains.md * Update 1_shard-data-chains.md * Added transition logic * Fix ToC * Fix ToC * Adjusted for #615 * Added more helpers * epoch -> slot * fix some type hints * clean up `get_attestation_merkle_depth`
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WITHDRAWABLEflag is removed; instead, a validator's withdrawability is determined through thewithdrawable_epochfield (renamed and re-purposed fromwithdrawal_epochwhich was not used)prepare_validator_for_withdrawalfunction does not let them withdraw immediately; instead, they have to waitMIN_VALIDATOR_WITHDRAWAL_EPOCHS. This extra minimum delay serves no value in phase 0, but is crucial for phase 1 as the period between a validator passing through the queue and the validator being eligible to withdraw is where proof of custody challenges can come in; adding it in phase 0 is only half a line of code so easier to add it now.withdrawable_epochis setLATEST_PENALIZED_EXIT_LENGTHinto the future and this is used to determine when the validator can withdrawwithdrawable_epoch