Summary
A path traversal vulnerability exists in GuardDog's safe_extract() function that allows malicious PyPI packages to write arbitrary files outside the intended extraction directory, leading to Arbitrary File Overwrite and Remote Code Execution on systems running GuardDog.
CWE: CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory)
Details
Vulnerable Code
File: guarddog/utils/archives.py
elif zipfile.is_zipfile(source_archive):
with zipfile.ZipFile(source_archive, "r") as zip:
for file in zip.namelist():
# Note: zip.extract cleans up any malicious file name
# such as directory traversal attempts This is not the
# case of zipfile.extractall
zip.extract(file, path=os.path.join(target_directory, file)) # ❌ VULNERABLE
Root Cause
The comment about zip.extract() fooled me at first :) then I noticed the os.path.join() call.
The vulnerability stems from incorrect usage of Python's zipfile.ZipFile.extract() API:
- The
path parameter should be the target directory, not a full file path
extract() automatically appends the member name to the path
- By passing
os.path.join(target_directory, file), GuardDog causes the filename to be appended twice
- This breaks zipfile's built-in path traversal sanitization
Attack Vector
- Attacker creates malicious wheel with path traversal filenames
- Uploads to PyPI or distributes directly
- Package scan:
guarddog pypi scan malicious-pkg
- GuardDog downloads and extracts the package
- Malicious files written to arbitrary locations
- Code execution could be achieved
Impact
Impact depends on how GuardDog is running and under which environment.
Critical Scenarios
-
Immediate Code Execution
- Write to
~/.bashrc → executes on next shell
- Write to
~/.profile → executes on login
-
Persistent Backdoors
- Write to
~/.ssh/authorized_keys → SSH access
- Write to
/etc/cron.d/malicious → scheduled execution (if root)
- Write to systemd user services → persistent execution
and more...
Credits
Reported by: Charbel (dwbruijn)
References
Summary
A path traversal vulnerability exists in GuardDog's
safe_extract()function that allows malicious PyPI packages to write arbitrary files outside the intended extraction directory, leading to Arbitrary File Overwrite and Remote Code Execution on systems running GuardDog.CWE: CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory)
Details
Vulnerable Code
File:
guarddog/utils/archives.pyRoot Cause
The comment about
zip.extract()fooled me at first :) then I noticed theos.path.join()call.The vulnerability stems from incorrect usage of Python's
zipfile.ZipFile.extract()API:pathparameter should be the target directory, not a full file pathextract()automatically appends the member name to the pathos.path.join(target_directory, file), GuardDog causes the filename to be appended twiceAttack Vector
guarddog pypi scan malicious-pkgImpact
Impact depends on how GuardDog is running and under which environment.
Critical Scenarios
Immediate Code Execution
~/.bashrc→ executes on next shell~/.profile→ executes on loginPersistent Backdoors
~/.ssh/authorized_keys→ SSH access/etc/cron.d/malicious→ scheduled execution (if root)and more...
Credits
Reported by: Charbel (dwbruijn)
References