OpenAM Reflected XSS in the OAuth2/OIDC `wap` consent page
Moderate severity
GitHub Reviewed
Published
Jul 23, 2026
in
OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenAM
•
Updated Jul 24, 2026
Package
Affected versions
>= 13.0.0, <= 16.1.1
Patched versions
16.1.2
Description
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Jul 24, 2026
Reviewed
Jul 24, 2026
Last updated
Jul 24, 2026
Description
The OAuth2/OIDC consent page rendered for
display=wapauthorize requests reflected several request-derived values into the HTML response without escaping. An attacker who induces a user with an active OpenAM session to follow a crafted authorize link can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the OpenAM origin.This is the same vulnerability class as CVE-2026-44203; that fix did not cover this code path.
Impact
Arbitrary JavaScript execution in the OpenAM origin in the victim's authenticated context — enabling session/cookie theft, CSRF-token exfiltration, and actions on behalf of the victim, up to administrative takeover if the victim is an administrator. Reachable on any deployment with at least one registered OAuth2 client; no attacker-controlled client and no special configuration required.
Mitigation
display=wapauthorize links as untrusted.References