Impact
Type: Exposure of sensitive information / insufficiently protected credentials
leading to privilege escalation and full node compromise.
Wings exposes its entire daemon configuration to the egg configuration-file
templating engine. When Wings renders a server's configuration files, any
{{config.<path>}} placeholder in a replacement value is resolved against the
full marshalled daemon configuration, with no restriction on which paths may be
read.
Because the Panel substitutes user-controlled egg variable values into these
replacements before sending them to Wings, a low-privileged user can smuggle a
{{config.*}} placeholder through a variable value. The placeholder is then
resolved by Wings and written into a file inside the user's own server, where it
can be read via the file manager or SFTP.
This allows reading, among other values:
{{config.token}} - the node's daemon token, which is both the API bearer for
the Panel⇆Wings channel and the HMAC signing key for every JWT the node
issues;{{config.token_id}};{{config.docker.registries}} - configured container-registry credentials.
Who is impacted: Any deployment where a user who is not fully trusted can set
an egg variable value (e.g. a server owner or a subuser with the startup.update
permission) and the server's egg renders a user-editable variable into a
configuration file via {{server.build.env.*}}. This pattern is common across
stock and community eggs, so most multi-tenant / shared-hosting deployments are
affected.
Resulting impact: Disclosure of the node daemon token lets the attacker forge
authentication tokens and act against every server on that node, a full-node compromise reachable from a low-privileged
account.
Patches
Yes. Fixed in Wings v1.12.3 (Panel is unaffected; the fix is Wings-only).
Wings no longer exposes its full configuration to the templating engine only an
explicit, non-secret subset (the Docker network interface) can be resolved by
{{config.*}} placeholders.
Users should upgrade Wings to v1.12.3 or later.
After upgrading, rotate the affected nodes' daemon tokens, since a previously
exfiltrated token remains valid until rotated (Admin → Nodes → Configuration →
reset the token, then re-deploy config.yml to the node).
Workarounds
For operators who cannot upgrade immediately:
- Audit your eggs and ensure no user-editable variable is rendered into a
configuration file, or mark such variables non-editable.
These reduce exposure but are not a complete fix; upgrading Wings is the
recommended action.
References
robertdrakedennis Finder
Impact
Type: Exposure of sensitive information / insufficiently protected credentials
leading to privilege escalation and full node compromise.
Wings exposes its entire daemon configuration to the egg configuration-file
templating engine. When Wings renders a server's configuration files, any
{{config.<path>}}placeholder in a replacement value is resolved against thefull marshalled daemon configuration, with no restriction on which paths may be
read.
Because the Panel substitutes user-controlled egg variable values into these
replacements before sending them to Wings, a low-privileged user can smuggle a
{{config.*}}placeholder through a variable value. The placeholder is thenresolved by Wings and written into a file inside the user's own server, where it
can be read via the file manager or SFTP.
This allows reading, among other values:
{{config.token}}- the node's daemon token, which is both the API bearer forthe Panel⇆Wings channel and the HMAC signing key for every JWT the node
issues;
{{config.token_id}};{{config.docker.registries}}- configured container-registry credentials.Who is impacted: Any deployment where a user who is not fully trusted can set
an egg variable value (e.g. a server owner or a subuser with the
startup.updatepermission) and the server's egg renders a user-editable variable into a
configuration file via
{{server.build.env.*}}. This pattern is common acrossstock and community eggs, so most multi-tenant / shared-hosting deployments are
affected.
Resulting impact: Disclosure of the node daemon token lets the attacker forge
authentication tokens and act against every server on that node, a full-node compromise reachable from a low-privileged
account.
Patches
Yes. Fixed in Wings
v1.12.3(Panel is unaffected; the fix is Wings-only).Wings no longer exposes its full configuration to the templating engine only an
explicit, non-secret subset (the Docker network interface) can be resolved by
{{config.*}}placeholders.Users should upgrade Wings to
v1.12.3or later.After upgrading, rotate the affected nodes' daemon tokens, since a previously
exfiltrated token remains valid until rotated (Admin → Nodes → Configuration →
reset the token, then re-deploy
config.ymlto the node).Workarounds
For operators who cannot upgrade immediately:
configuration file, or mark such variables non-editable.
These reduce exposure but are not a complete fix; upgrading Wings is the
recommended action.
References