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OpenClaw: Non-owner command-authorized sender can change the owner-only `/send` session delivery policy

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Mar 27, 2026 in openclaw/openclaw • Updated Apr 10, 2026

Package

npm openclaw (npm)

Affected versions

< 2026.3.24

Patched versions

2026.3.24

Description

Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.

Title
Non-owner command-authorized sender can change the owner-only /send session delivery policy

CWE
CWE-285 Improper Authorization

CVSS v3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Base score: 5.4 (Medium)

Severity Assessment
Medium. This is a real owner-only authorization bypass, but the demonstrated impact is limited to persistent mutation of the current session’s delivery policy rather than direct code execution, sandbox escape, or cross-host compromise.

Impact
A non-owner sender who is allowed to run commands can invoke /send on|off|inherit and persistently change the current session’s sendPolicy, even though OpenClaw documents /send as owner-only.

That lets a lower-trust participant:

  • disable reply delivery for the current session (/send off), suppressing future replies in that chat;
  • re-enable reply delivery (/send on) after the owner intentionally disabled it;
  • remove the session override (/send inherit).

Affected Component
Verified against the latest published GitHub release tag v2026.3.23 (ccfeecb6887cd97937e33a71877ad512741e82b2), published 2026-03-23T23:15:50Z.

Exact vulnerable path on the shipped tag:

  • src/auto-reply/reply/commands-session.ts:212-239
    • handleSendPolicyCommand(...) checks only params.command.isAuthorizedSender.
    • when true, it mutates params.sessionEntry.sendPolicy and persists the session entry.

Authorization behavior that makes this reachable:

  • src/auto-reply/command-auth.ts:401-407
    • senderIsOwner is computed separately from general command authorization.
  • src/auto-reply/command-auth.ts:420-429
    • command authorization can succeed even when senderIsOwner === false.
  • src/auto-reply/command-auth.owner-default.test.ts:10-47
    • existing coverage confirms a sender can be command-authorized while not treated as owner.

Documented owner-only contract:

  • docs/tools/slash-commands.md:112
    • /send on|off|inherit is documented as owner-only.
  • docs/concepts/session-tool.md:156
    • sendPolicy is documented as settable via sessions.patch or owner-only /send on|off|inherit.

Related privilege model:

  • src/gateway/method-scopes.ts:131-133
    • sessions.patch is admin-scoped, which reinforces that session-delivery-policy mutation is treated as privileged state.

Version history:

  • The vulnerable handler exists in release history going back at least to commit ea018a68ccb92dbc735bc1df9880d5c95c63ca35 (refactor(auto-reply): split reply pipeline).
  • Earliest released affected tag found: v2026.1.14-1
  • Latest released affected tag verified: v2026.3.23

Technical Reproduction

  1. Check out the shipped release tag v2026.3.23.
  2. Configure a channel where:
    • a non-owner sender is allowed to run commands, for example through commands.allowFrom;
    • the owner identity is distinct, for example via commands.ownerAllowFrom.
  3. Start or reuse a session with a live sessionEntry and sessionStore.
  4. Send /send off as the non-owner but command-authorized sender.
  5. Confirm the resolved command context has:
    • isAuthorizedSender === true
    • senderIsOwner === false
  6. Observe that the handler still accepts the command, mutates sessionEntry.sendPolicy, and persists the session entry.

Demonstrated Impact
The vulnerable handler performs a real persistent session-state change:

  • src/auto-reply/reply/commands-session.ts:232-238
    • /send inherit deletes sessionEntry.sendPolicy
    • other modes assign sessionEntry.sendPolicy = sendPolicyCommand.mode
    • the handler then calls persistSessionEntry(params)

The mutation is not gated by owner status, only by general command authorization.

That changes subsequent delivery behavior for the current session, which matches the documented meaning of sendPolicy.

Environment

  • Product: OpenClaw
  • Verified shipped tag: v2026.3.23
  • Shipped tag commit: ccfeecb6887cd97937e33a71877ad512741e82b2
  • Published GitHub release time: 2026-03-23T23:15:50Z
  • Verification date: 2026-03-24

Duplicate Check
Upon inspection there is no preexisting GHSA for /send.

This is distinct from:

  • GHSA-r7vr-gr74-94p8
    • that advisory covered owner-only authorization bypasses for /config and /debug, not /send.

This is the same authorization class, but a different privileged command surface that still lacks the owner check.

In Scope Check
This report is in scope under SECURITY.md because:

  • it does not rely on adversarial operators sharing one gateway host or config;
  • it does not rely on trusted local state tampering;
  • SECURITY.md:151-152 explicitly says non-owner sender status matters for owner-only tools and commands;
  • /send is explicitly documented as owner-only, so this is a direct owner-only authorization bypass, not a complaint about normal shared-agent steering.

This is therefore a concrete authorization flaw against a documented product boundary.

Remediation Advice

  1. Change /send to require owner status, not just command authorization.
  2. Reuse the same owner-only rejection pattern already used by privileged command surfaces such as /config, /debug, and owner-only /plugins writes.
  3. Add regression coverage for the exact case where:
    • a non-owner sender is command-authorized;
    • /send must still be rejected unless senderIsOwner === true.
  4. Verify that the owner can still use /send on|off|inherit normally.

References

@steipete steipete published to openclaw/openclaw Mar 27, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Mar 30, 2026
Reviewed Mar 30, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Apr 10, 2026
Last updated Apr 10, 2026

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements None
Privileges Required Low
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity Low
Availability Low
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(21st percentile)

Weaknesses

Improper Authorization

The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action. Learn more on MITRE.

Missing Authorization

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-35620

GHSA ID

GHSA-39mp-545q-w789

Source code

Credits

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