diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index dd2c683da7c422..c7fc83819273eb 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ release. -8.9.0
+8.9.1
+8.9.0
8.8.1
8.8.0
8.7.0
diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-elf-gas/bn/x86_64-mont5.s b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-elf-gas/bn/x86_64-mont5.s index 7eac91326f6dd5..963fa3efda5ea9 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-elf-gas/bn/x86_64-mont5.s +++ b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-elf-gas/bn/x86_64-mont5.s @@ -3075,11 +3075,19 @@ __bn_sqrx8x_internal: .align 32 .Lsqrx8x_break: - subq 16+8(%rsp),%r8 + xorq %rbp,%rbp + subq 16+8(%rsp),%rbx + adcxq %rbp,%r8 movq 24+8(%rsp),%rcx + adcxq %rbp,%r9 movq 0(%rsi),%rdx - xorl %ebp,%ebp + adcq $0,%r10 movq %r8,0(%rdi) + adcq $0,%r11 + adcq $0,%r12 + adcq $0,%r13 + adcq $0,%r14 + adcq $0,%r15 cmpq %rcx,%rdi je .Lsqrx8x_outer_loop diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-elf-gas/ec/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.s b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-elf-gas/ec/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.s index 23188cda6e935a..027be89d1e446d 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-elf-gas/ec/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.s +++ b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-elf-gas/ec/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.s @@ -1036,19 +1036,18 @@ __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx: adoxq %rbp,%r13 .byte 0x67,0x67 mulxq %rdx,%rcx,%rax - movq %r8,%rdx + movq .Lpoly+24(%rip),%rdx adoxq %rcx,%r14 shlxq %rsi,%r8,%rcx adoxq %rax,%r15 shrxq %rsi,%r8,%rax - movq .Lpoly+24(%rip),%rbp + movq %rdx,%rbp addq %rcx,%r9 adcq %rax,%r10 - mulxq %rbp,%rcx,%r8 - movq %r9,%rdx + mulxq %r8,%rcx,%r8 adcq %rcx,%r11 shlxq %rsi,%r9,%rcx adcq $0,%r8 @@ -1058,8 +1057,7 @@ __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx: addq %rcx,%r10 adcq %rax,%r11 - mulxq %rbp,%rcx,%r9 - movq %r10,%rdx + mulxq %r9,%rcx,%r9 adcq %rcx,%r8 shlxq %rsi,%r10,%rcx adcq $0,%r9 @@ -1069,8 +1067,7 @@ __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx: addq %rcx,%r11 adcq %rax,%r8 - mulxq %rbp,%rcx,%r10 - movq %r11,%rdx + mulxq %r10,%rcx,%r10 adcq %rcx,%r9 shlxq %rsi,%r11,%rcx adcq $0,%r10 @@ -1080,12 +1077,12 @@ __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx: addq %rcx,%r8 adcq %rax,%r9 - mulxq %rbp,%rcx,%r11 + mulxq %r11,%rcx,%r11 adcq %rcx,%r10 adcq $0,%r11 xorq %rdx,%rdx - adcq %r8,%r12 + addq %r8,%r12 movq .Lpoly+8(%rip),%rsi adcq %r9,%r13 movq %r12,%r8 @@ -1094,8 +1091,7 @@ __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx: movq %r13,%r9 adcq $0,%rdx - xorl %eax,%eax - sbbq $-1,%r12 + subq $-1,%r12 movq %r14,%r10 sbbq %rsi,%r13 sbbq $0,%r14 diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-elf-gas/x86_64cpuid.s b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-elf-gas/x86_64cpuid.s index 06d11dc9c8e95e..86c780b1c5f4b6 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-elf-gas/x86_64cpuid.s +++ b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-elf-gas/x86_64cpuid.s @@ -116,8 +116,19 @@ OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid: orl $0x40000000,%edx andb $15,%ah cmpb $15,%ah - jne .Lnotintel + jne .LnotP4 orl $0x00100000,%edx +.LnotP4: + cmpb $6,%ah + jne .Lnotintel + andl $0x0fff0ff0,%eax + cmpl $0x00050670,%eax + je .Lknights + cmpl $0x00080650,%eax + jne .Lnotintel +.Lknights: + andl $0xfbffffff,%ecx + .Lnotintel: btl $28,%edx jnc .Lgeneric @@ -142,6 +153,10 @@ OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid: movl $7,%eax xorl %ecx,%ecx cpuid + btl $26,%r9d + jc .Lnotknights + andl $0xfff7ffff,%ebx +.Lnotknights: movl %ebx,8(%rdi) .Lno_extended_info: diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-macosx-gas/bn/x86_64-mont5.s b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-macosx-gas/bn/x86_64-mont5.s index 21416b6f5d720c..0cdcd14f1a493c 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-macosx-gas/bn/x86_64-mont5.s +++ b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-macosx-gas/bn/x86_64-mont5.s @@ -3075,11 +3075,19 @@ L$sqrx8x_loop: .p2align 5 L$sqrx8x_break: - subq 16+8(%rsp),%r8 + xorq %rbp,%rbp + subq 16+8(%rsp),%rbx + adcxq %rbp,%r8 movq 24+8(%rsp),%rcx + adcxq %rbp,%r9 movq 0(%rsi),%rdx - xorl %ebp,%ebp + adcq $0,%r10 movq %r8,0(%rdi) + adcq $0,%r11 + adcq $0,%r12 + adcq $0,%r13 + adcq $0,%r14 + adcq $0,%r15 cmpq %rcx,%rdi je L$sqrx8x_outer_loop diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-macosx-gas/ec/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.s b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-macosx-gas/ec/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.s index 05b6d5be2c885b..19df69f08afeb9 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-macosx-gas/ec/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.s +++ b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-macosx-gas/ec/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.s @@ -1036,19 +1036,18 @@ __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx: adoxq %rbp,%r13 .byte 0x67,0x67 mulxq %rdx,%rcx,%rax - movq %r8,%rdx + movq L$poly+24(%rip),%rdx adoxq %rcx,%r14 shlxq %rsi,%r8,%rcx adoxq %rax,%r15 shrxq %rsi,%r8,%rax - movq L$poly+24(%rip),%rbp + movq %rdx,%rbp addq %rcx,%r9 adcq %rax,%r10 - mulxq %rbp,%rcx,%r8 - movq %r9,%rdx + mulxq %r8,%rcx,%r8 adcq %rcx,%r11 shlxq %rsi,%r9,%rcx adcq $0,%r8 @@ -1058,8 +1057,7 @@ __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx: addq %rcx,%r10 adcq %rax,%r11 - mulxq %rbp,%rcx,%r9 - movq %r10,%rdx + mulxq %r9,%rcx,%r9 adcq %rcx,%r8 shlxq %rsi,%r10,%rcx adcq $0,%r9 @@ -1069,8 +1067,7 @@ __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx: addq %rcx,%r11 adcq %rax,%r8 - mulxq %rbp,%rcx,%r10 - movq %r11,%rdx + mulxq %r10,%rcx,%r10 adcq %rcx,%r9 shlxq %rsi,%r11,%rcx adcq $0,%r10 @@ -1080,12 +1077,12 @@ __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx: addq %rcx,%r8 adcq %rax,%r9 - mulxq %rbp,%rcx,%r11 + mulxq %r11,%rcx,%r11 adcq %rcx,%r10 adcq $0,%r11 xorq %rdx,%rdx - adcq %r8,%r12 + addq %r8,%r12 movq L$poly+8(%rip),%rsi adcq %r9,%r13 movq %r12,%r8 @@ -1094,8 +1091,7 @@ __ecp_nistz256_sqr_montx: movq %r13,%r9 adcq $0,%rdx - xorl %eax,%eax - sbbq $-1,%r12 + subq $-1,%r12 movq %r14,%r10 sbbq %rsi,%r13 sbbq $0,%r14 diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-macosx-gas/x86_64cpuid.s b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-macosx-gas/x86_64cpuid.s index 909270ecae312b..7075cf80d3015b 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-macosx-gas/x86_64cpuid.s +++ b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-macosx-gas/x86_64cpuid.s @@ -117,8 +117,19 @@ L$nocacheinfo: orl $0x40000000,%edx andb $15,%ah cmpb $15,%ah - jne L$notintel + jne L$notP4 orl $0x00100000,%edx +L$notP4: + cmpb $6,%ah + jne L$notintel + andl $0x0fff0ff0,%eax + cmpl $0x00050670,%eax + je L$knights + cmpl $0x00080650,%eax + jne L$notintel +L$knights: + andl $0xfbffffff,%ecx + L$notintel: btl $28,%edx jnc L$generic @@ -143,6 +154,10 @@ L$generic: movl $7,%eax xorl %ecx,%ecx cpuid + btl $26,%r9d + jc L$notknights + andl $0xfff7ffff,%ebx +L$notknights: movl %ebx,8(%rdi) L$no_extended_info: diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-win32-masm/bn/x86_64-mont5.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-win32-masm/bn/x86_64-mont5.asm index 837b0bcedcd0c6..fb9aaaeabe2a90 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-win32-masm/bn/x86_64-mont5.asm +++ b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-win32-masm/bn/x86_64-mont5.asm @@ -3166,11 +3166,19 @@ DB 067h ALIGN 32 $L$sqrx8x_break:: - sub r8,QWORD PTR[((16+8))+rsp] + xor rbp,rbp + sub rbx,QWORD PTR[((16+8))+rsp] + adcx r8,rbp mov rcx,QWORD PTR[((24+8))+rsp] + adcx r9,rbp mov rdx,QWORD PTR[rsi] - xor ebp,ebp + adc r10,0 mov QWORD PTR[rdi],r8 + adc r11,0 + adc r12,0 + adc r13,0 + adc r14,0 + adc r15,0 cmp rdi,rcx je $L$sqrx8x_outer_loop diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-win32-masm/ec/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-win32-masm/ec/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.asm index 87338aa6f0edae..da36a1c048642e 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-win32-masm/ec/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.asm +++ b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-win32-masm/ec/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.asm @@ -1137,19 +1137,18 @@ DB 067h adox r13,rbp DB 067h,067h mulx rax,rcx,rdx - mov rdx,r8 + mov rdx,QWORD PTR[(($L$poly+24))] adox r14,rcx shlx rcx,r8,rsi adox r15,rax shrx rax,r8,rsi - mov rbp,QWORD PTR[(($L$poly+24))] + mov rbp,rdx add r9,rcx adc r10,rax - mulx r8,rcx,rbp - mov rdx,r9 + mulx r8,rcx,r8 adc r11,rcx shlx rcx,r9,rsi adc r8,0 @@ -1159,8 +1158,7 @@ DB 067h,067h add r10,rcx adc r11,rax - mulx r9,rcx,rbp - mov rdx,r10 + mulx r9,rcx,r9 adc r8,rcx shlx rcx,r10,rsi adc r9,0 @@ -1170,8 +1168,7 @@ DB 067h,067h add r11,rcx adc r8,rax - mulx r10,rcx,rbp - mov rdx,r11 + mulx r10,rcx,r10 adc r9,rcx shlx rcx,r11,rsi adc r10,0 @@ -1181,12 +1178,12 @@ DB 067h,067h add r8,rcx adc r9,rax - mulx r11,rcx,rbp + mulx r11,rcx,r11 adc r10,rcx adc r11,0 xor rdx,rdx - adc r12,r8 + add r12,r8 mov rsi,QWORD PTR[(($L$poly+8))] adc r13,r9 mov r8,r12 @@ -1195,8 +1192,7 @@ DB 067h,067h mov r9,r13 adc rdx,0 - xor eax,eax - sbb r12,-1 + sub r12,-1 mov r10,r14 sbb r13,rsi sbb r14,0 diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-win32-masm/x86_64cpuid.asm b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-win32-masm/x86_64cpuid.asm index 6cb8077b9da0a5..69532e09fbece5 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/asm/x64-win32-masm/x86_64cpuid.asm +++ b/deps/openssl/asm/x64-win32-masm/x86_64cpuid.asm @@ -127,8 +127,19 @@ $L$nocacheinfo:: or edx,040000000h and ah,15 cmp ah,15 - jne $L$notintel + jne $L$notP4 or edx,000100000h +$L$notP4:: + cmp ah,6 + jne $L$notintel + and eax,00fff0ff0h + cmp eax,000050670h + je $L$knights + cmp eax,000080650h + jne $L$notintel +$L$knights:: + and ecx,0fbffffffh + $L$notintel:: bt edx,28 jnc $L$generic @@ -153,6 +164,10 @@ $L$generic:: mov eax,7 xor ecx,ecx cpuid + bt r9d,26 + jc $L$notknights + and ebx,0fff7ffffh +$L$notknights:: mov DWORD PTR[8+rdi],ebx $L$no_extended_info:: diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm_obsolete/x64-elf-gas/x86_64cpuid.s b/deps/openssl/asm_obsolete/x64-elf-gas/x86_64cpuid.s index 06d11dc9c8e95e..86c780b1c5f4b6 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/asm_obsolete/x64-elf-gas/x86_64cpuid.s +++ b/deps/openssl/asm_obsolete/x64-elf-gas/x86_64cpuid.s @@ -116,8 +116,19 @@ OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid: orl $0x40000000,%edx andb $15,%ah cmpb $15,%ah - jne .Lnotintel + jne .LnotP4 orl $0x00100000,%edx +.LnotP4: + cmpb $6,%ah + jne .Lnotintel + andl $0x0fff0ff0,%eax + cmpl $0x00050670,%eax + je .Lknights + cmpl $0x00080650,%eax + jne .Lnotintel +.Lknights: + andl $0xfbffffff,%ecx + .Lnotintel: btl $28,%edx jnc .Lgeneric @@ -142,6 +153,10 @@ OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid: movl $7,%eax xorl %ecx,%ecx cpuid + btl $26,%r9d + jc .Lnotknights + andl $0xfff7ffff,%ebx +.Lnotknights: movl %ebx,8(%rdi) .Lno_extended_info: diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm_obsolete/x64-macosx-gas/x86_64cpuid.s b/deps/openssl/asm_obsolete/x64-macosx-gas/x86_64cpuid.s index 909270ecae312b..7075cf80d3015b 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/asm_obsolete/x64-macosx-gas/x86_64cpuid.s +++ b/deps/openssl/asm_obsolete/x64-macosx-gas/x86_64cpuid.s @@ -117,8 +117,19 @@ L$nocacheinfo: orl $0x40000000,%edx andb $15,%ah cmpb $15,%ah - jne L$notintel + jne L$notP4 orl $0x00100000,%edx +L$notP4: + cmpb $6,%ah + jne L$notintel + andl $0x0fff0ff0,%eax + cmpl $0x00050670,%eax + je L$knights + cmpl $0x00080650,%eax + jne L$notintel +L$knights: + andl $0xfbffffff,%ecx + L$notintel: btl $28,%edx jnc L$generic @@ -143,6 +154,10 @@ L$generic: movl $7,%eax xorl %ecx,%ecx cpuid + btl $26,%r9d + jc L$notknights + andl $0xfff7ffff,%ebx +L$notknights: movl %ebx,8(%rdi) L$no_extended_info: diff --git a/deps/openssl/asm_obsolete/x64-win32-masm/x86_64cpuid.asm b/deps/openssl/asm_obsolete/x64-win32-masm/x86_64cpuid.asm index 6cb8077b9da0a5..69532e09fbece5 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/asm_obsolete/x64-win32-masm/x86_64cpuid.asm +++ b/deps/openssl/asm_obsolete/x64-win32-masm/x86_64cpuid.asm @@ -127,8 +127,19 @@ $L$nocacheinfo:: or edx,040000000h and ah,15 cmp ah,15 - jne $L$notintel + jne $L$notP4 or edx,000100000h +$L$notP4:: + cmp ah,6 + jne $L$notintel + and eax,00fff0ff0h + cmp eax,000050670h + je $L$knights + cmp eax,000080650h + jne $L$notintel +$L$knights:: + and ecx,0fbffffffh + $L$notintel:: bt edx,28 jnc $L$generic @@ -153,6 +164,10 @@ $L$generic:: mov eax,7 xor ecx,ecx cpuid + bt r9d,26 + jc $L$notknights + and ebx,0fff7ffffh +$L$notknights:: mov DWORD PTR[8+rdi],ebx $L$no_extended_info:: diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/CHANGES b/deps/openssl/openssl/CHANGES index 307b2ed5e31287..e3d57b328c58e3 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/CHANGES +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/CHANGES @@ -2,6 +2,44 @@ OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ + This is a high-level summary of the most important changes. + For a full list of changes, see the git commit log; for example, + https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate + release branch. + + Changes between 1.0.2l and 1.0.2m [2 Nov 2017] + + *) bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64 + + There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring + procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks + against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to + perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just + feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to + deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount + of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and + likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would + additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target + private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private + key that is shared between multiple clients. + + This only affects processors that support the BMI1, BMI2 and ADX extensions + like Intel Broadwell (5th generation) and later or AMD Ryzen. + + This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project. + (CVE-2017-3736) + [Andy Polyakov] + + *) Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read + + If an X.509 certificate has a malformed IPAddressFamily extension, + OpenSSL could do a one-byte buffer overread. The most likely result + would be an erroneous display of the certificate in text format. + + This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project. + (CVE-2017-3735) + [Rich Salz] + Changes between 1.0.2k and 1.0.2l [25 May 2017] *) Have 'config' recognise 64-bit mingw and choose 'mingw64' as the target diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/INSTALL b/deps/openssl/openssl/INSTALL index aa7e35fa79fea0..fcdbfc0a6ee00b 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/INSTALL +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/INSTALL @@ -190,10 +190,8 @@ the failure that isn't a problem in OpenSSL itself (like a missing or malfunctioning bc). If it is a problem with OpenSSL itself, try removing any compiler optimization flags from the CFLAG line - in Makefile.ssl and run "make clean; make". Please send a bug - report to , including the output of - "make report" in order to be added to the request tracker at - http://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html. + in Makefile.ssl and run "make clean; make". To report a bug please open an + issue on GitHub, at https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues. 4. If everything tests ok, install OpenSSL with diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/Makefile b/deps/openssl/openssl/Makefile index a3d30318f9178d..484f2f45f77667 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/Makefile +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/Makefile @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ ## Makefile for OpenSSL ## -VERSION=1.0.2l +VERSION=1.0.2m MAJOR=1 MINOR=0.2 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0 diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/Makefile.bak b/deps/openssl/openssl/Makefile.bak index ea0d92e4d7db50..b545261eaeee19 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/Makefile.bak +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/Makefile.bak @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ ## Makefile for OpenSSL ## -VERSION=1.0.2l +VERSION=1.0.2m MAJOR=1 MINOR=0.2 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0 diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/NEWS b/deps/openssl/openssl/NEWS index fd49cedeba4c5c..1b72013ad18624 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/NEWS +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/NEWS @@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL release. For more details please read the CHANGES file. + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2l and OpenSSL 1.0.2m [2 Nov 2017] + + o bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3736) + o Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read (CVE-2017-3735) + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2k and OpenSSL 1.0.2l [25 May 2017] o config now recognises 64-bit mingw and chooses mingw64 instead of mingw diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/README b/deps/openssl/openssl/README index 4c357d9a836d08..b5aae6260ce889 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/README +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/README @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ - OpenSSL 1.0.2l 25 May 2017 + OpenSSL 1.0.2m 2 Nov 2017 Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/ca.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/ca.c index f90f033baed375..9a839969a204bb 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/ca.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/ca.c @@ -1985,10 +1985,6 @@ static int do_body(X509 **xret, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509, /* Lets add the extensions, if there are any */ if (ext_sect) { X509V3_CTX ctx; - if (ci->version == NULL) - if ((ci->version = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - ASN1_INTEGER_set(ci->version, 2); /* version 3 certificate */ /* * Free the current entries if any, there should not be any I believe @@ -2051,6 +2047,15 @@ static int do_body(X509 **xret, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509, goto err; } + { + STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts = ci->extensions; + + if (exts != NULL && sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts) > 0) + /* Make it an X509 v3 certificate. */ + if (!X509_set_version(ret, 2)) + goto err; + } + /* Set the right value for the noemailDN option */ if (email_dn == 0) { if (!X509_set_subject_name(ret, dn_subject)) diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/s_client.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/s_client.c index ffb8ffc5af20c7..19914a19dae818 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/s_client.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/s_client.c @@ -1683,6 +1683,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) if (strstr(mbuf, "/stream:features>")) goto shut; seen = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); + if (seen <= 0) + goto shut; mbuf[seen] = 0; } BIO_printf(sbio, diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/s_server.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/s_server.c index d75871386928f5..98ffc09314a302 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/s_server.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/s_server.c @@ -3017,7 +3017,7 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context) PEM_write_bio_X509(io, peer); } else BIO_puts(io, "no client certificate available\n"); - BIO_puts(io, "\r\n\r\n"); + BIO_puts(io, "\r\n\r\n"); break; } else if ((www == 2 || www == 3) && (strncmp("GET /", buf, 5) == 0)) { diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/speed.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/speed.c index 6cd1021525046c..5259c16f1218a3 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/speed.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/speed.c @@ -307,7 +307,8 @@ static SIGRETTYPE sig_done(int sig) # if !defined(SIGALRM) # define SIGALRM # endif -static unsigned int lapse, schlock; +static volatile unsigned int lapse; +static volatile unsigned int schlock; static void alarm_win32(unsigned int secs) { lapse = secs * 1000; @@ -725,6 +726,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) BIO_printf(bio_err, "no EVP given\n"); goto end; } + evp_md = NULL; evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(*argv); if (!evp_cipher) { evp_md = EVP_get_digestbyname(*argv); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/spkac.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/spkac.c index 7f5333fe832e99..4b4106d03b998c 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/spkac.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/spkac.c @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ * 1999. Based on an original idea by Massimiliano Pala (madwolf@openca.org). */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2017 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -185,20 +185,23 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) } e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0); - if (keyfile) { + if (keyfile != NULL) { pkey = load_key(bio_err, strcmp(keyfile, "-") ? keyfile : NULL, FORMAT_PEM, 1, passin, e, "private key"); - if (!pkey) { + if (pkey == NULL) goto end; - } spki = NETSCAPE_SPKI_new(); - if (challenge) + if (spki == NULL) + goto end; + if (challenge != NULL) ASN1_STRING_set(spki->spkac->challenge, challenge, (int)strlen(challenge)); NETSCAPE_SPKI_set_pubkey(spki, pkey); NETSCAPE_SPKI_sign(spki, pkey, EVP_md5()); spkstr = NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_encode(spki); + if (spkstr == NULL) + goto end; if (outfile) out = BIO_new_file(outfile, "w"); @@ -253,7 +256,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) spki = NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode(spkstr, -1); - if (!spki) { + if (spki == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading SPKAC\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; @@ -282,9 +285,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) pkey = NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey(spki); if (verify) { i = NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(spki, pkey); - if (i > 0) + if (i > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature OK\n"); - else { + } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature Failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/srp.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/srp.c index ce01a24f2a78c4..491445df60b00e 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/srp.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/srp.c @@ -123,13 +123,14 @@ static int get_index(CA_DB *db, char *id, char type) int i; if (id == NULL) return -1; - if (type == DB_SRP_INDEX) + if (type == DB_SRP_INDEX) { for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) { pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i); if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX && !strcmp(id, pp[DB_srpid])) return i; - } else + } + } else { for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++) { pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i); @@ -137,6 +138,7 @@ static int get_index(CA_DB *db, char *id, char type) && !strcmp(id, pp[DB_srpid])) return i; } + } return -1; } @@ -177,8 +179,8 @@ static int update_index(CA_DB *db, BIO *bio, char **row) char **irow; int i; - if ((irow = - (char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *) * (DB_NUMBER + 1))) == NULL) { + irow = (char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *) * (DB_NUMBER + 1)); + if (irow == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Memory allocation failure\n"); return 0; } @@ -205,30 +207,32 @@ static char *srp_verify_user(const char *user, const char *srp_verifier, char *srp_usersalt, const char *g, const char *N, const char *passin, BIO *bio, int verbose) { - char password[1024]; + char password[1025]; PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp; char *verifier = NULL; char *gNid = NULL; + int len; cb_tmp.prompt_info = user; cb_tmp.password = passin; - if (password_callback(password, 1024, 0, &cb_tmp) > 0) { + len = password_callback(password, sizeof(password)-1, 0, &cb_tmp); + if (len > 0) { + password[len] = 0; VERBOSE BIO_printf(bio, "Validating\n user=\"%s\"\n srp_verifier=\"%s\"\n srp_usersalt=\"%s\"\n g=\"%s\"\n N=\"%s\"\n", user, srp_verifier, srp_usersalt, g, N); - BIO_printf(bio, "Pass %s\n", password); + VVERBOSE BIO_printf(bio, "Pass %s\n", password); - if (! - (gNid = - SRP_create_verifier(user, password, &srp_usersalt, &verifier, N, - g))) { + if (!(gNid = SRP_create_verifier(user, password, &srp_usersalt, + &verifier, N, g))) { BIO_printf(bio, "Internal error validating SRP verifier\n"); } else { if (strcmp(verifier, srp_verifier)) gNid = NULL; OPENSSL_free(verifier); } + OPENSSL_cleanse(password, len); } return gNid; } @@ -237,24 +241,27 @@ static char *srp_create_user(char *user, char **srp_verifier, char **srp_usersalt, char *g, char *N, char *passout, BIO *bio, int verbose) { - char password[1024]; + char password[1025]; PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp; char *gNid = NULL; char *salt = NULL; + int len; cb_tmp.prompt_info = user; cb_tmp.password = passout; - if (password_callback(password, 1024, 1, &cb_tmp) > 0) { + len = password_callback(password, sizeof(password)-1, 1, &cb_tmp); + if (len > 0) { + password[len] = 0; VERBOSE BIO_printf(bio, "Creating\n user=\"%s\"\n g=\"%s\"\n N=\"%s\"\n", user, g, N); - if (! - (gNid = - SRP_create_verifier(user, password, &salt, srp_verifier, N, - g))) { + if (!(gNid = SRP_create_verifier(user, password, &salt, + srp_verifier, N, g))) { BIO_printf(bio, "Internal error creating SRP verifier\n"); - } else + } else { *srp_usersalt = salt; + } + OPENSSL_cleanse(password, len); VVERBOSE BIO_printf(bio, "gNid=%s salt =\"%s\"\n verifier =\"%s\"\n", gNid, salt, *srp_verifier); @@ -314,9 +321,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) argc--; argv++; while (argc >= 1 && badops == 0) { - if (strcmp(*argv, "-verbose") == 0) + if (strcmp(*argv, "-verbose") == 0) { verbose++; - else if (strcmp(*argv, "-config") == 0) { + } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-config") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; configfile = *(++argv); @@ -328,15 +335,15 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) if (--argc < 1) goto bad; dbfile = *(++argv); - } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-add") == 0) + } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-add") == 0) { add_user = 1; - else if (strcmp(*argv, "-delete") == 0) + } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-delete") == 0) { delete_user = 1; - else if (strcmp(*argv, "-modify") == 0) + } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-modify") == 0) { modify_user = 1; - else if (strcmp(*argv, "-list") == 0) + } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-list") == 0) { list_user = 1; - else if (strcmp(*argv, "-gn") == 0) { + } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-gn") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) goto bad; gN = *(++argv); @@ -366,8 +373,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv); badops = 1; break; - } else + } else { break; + } argc--; argv++; @@ -388,7 +396,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) "Need at least one user for options -add, -delete, -modify. \n"); badops = 1; } - if ((passin || passout) && argc != 1) { + if ((passargin || passargout) && argc != 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "-passin, -passout arguments only valid with one user.\n"); badops = 1; @@ -706,9 +714,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) doupdatedb = 1; } } - if (--argc > 0) + if (--argc > 0) { user = *(argv++); - else { + } else { user = NULL; list_user = 0; } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/tsget b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/tsget index 0d54e9fc9a76fd..0fca99f4385a79 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/tsget +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/apps/tsget @@ -193,4 +193,3 @@ REQUEST: foreach (@ARGV) { STDERR->printflush(", $output written.\n") if $options{v}; } $curl->cleanup(); -WWW::Curl::Easy::global_cleanup(); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/LPdir_win.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/LPdir_win.c index 07e63fb4244ee8..4961254d9a3192 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/LPdir_win.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/LPdir_win.c @@ -94,8 +94,23 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory) TCHAR *wdir = NULL; /* len_0 denotes string length *with* trailing 0 */ size_t index = 0, len_0 = strlen(extdir) + 1; - - wdir = (TCHAR *)calloc(len_0, sizeof(TCHAR)); + size_t amount; + + /* + * Size check + * The reasoning is that absolutely worst case, each byte in + * extdir will take up one TCHAR each, so the maximum size in + * bytes that we can tolerate is MAX_PATH TCHARs... not counting + * the ending NUL. + */ + if ((len_0 - 1) > MAX_PATH * sizeof(TCHAR)) { + free(*ctx); + *ctx = NULL; + errno = EINVAL; + return 0; + } + amount = len_0 * sizeof(TCHAR); + wdir = (TCHAR *)malloc(amount); if (wdir == NULL) { if (extdirbuf != NULL) { free(extdirbuf); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/Makefile b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/Makefile index 330fe81b740c55..fb3140c1d3024f 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/Makefile +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/Makefile @@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ tasn_fre.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h tasn_fre.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h tasn_fre.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h tasn_fre.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -tasn_fre.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h tasn_fre.c +tasn_fre.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h asn1_int.h tasn_fre.c tasn_new.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/asn1t.h tasn_new.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h tasn_new.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h @@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ tasn_new.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h tasn_new.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h tasn_new.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h tasn_new.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h -tasn_new.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h tasn_new.c +tasn_new.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h asn1_int.h tasn_new.c tasn_prn.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h tasn_prn.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1t.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h tasn_prn.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/conf.h diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c index c429342e03d42a..0c8bb144a099b4 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ +#include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include @@ -136,6 +137,11 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a, goto err; } + if (len > INT_MAX) { + i = ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG; + goto err; + } + if ((a == NULL) || ((*a) == NULL)) { if ((ret = M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL) return (NULL); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_int.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_int.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..c9fd8b12ae1731 --- /dev/null +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_int.h @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +/* asn1t.h */ +/* + * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project + * 2006. + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +/* Internal ASN1 template structures and functions: not for application use */ + +void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, + int combine); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c index aeea4eff7ab84e..0cf7510ff038f6 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c @@ -61,9 +61,7 @@ #include #include #include - -static void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, - int combine); +#include "asn1_int.h" /* Free up an ASN1 structure */ @@ -77,8 +75,7 @@ void ASN1_item_ex_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) asn1_item_combine_free(pval, it, 0); } -static void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, - int combine) +void asn1_item_combine_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int combine) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL, *seqtt; const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c index 54f459d1ed9cbf..6ba90260dab3b9 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include "asn1_int.h" static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int combine); @@ -199,7 +200,7 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, return 1; memerr2: - ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it); + asn1_item_combine_free(pval, it, combine); memerr: ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_COMBINE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); #ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG @@ -209,7 +210,7 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, return 0; auxerr2: - ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it); + asn1_item_combine_free(pval, it, combine); auxerr: ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_COMBINE_NEW, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR); #ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_name.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_name.c index 1fb7ad1cbf88af..aea0c2763c28fa 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_name.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_name.c @@ -523,19 +523,11 @@ static int i2d_name_canon(STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) * _intname, int X509_NAME_set(X509_NAME **xn, X509_NAME *name) { - X509_NAME *in; - - if (!xn || !name) - return (0); - - if (*xn != name) { - in = X509_NAME_dup(name); - if (in != NULL) { - X509_NAME_free(*xn); - *xn = in; - } - } - return (*xn != NULL); + if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(name)) == NULL) + return 0; + X509_NAME_free(*xn); + *xn = name; + return 1; } IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pkey.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pkey.c index 2da23e4756b4eb..59f85539284010 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pkey.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pkey.c @@ -106,10 +106,14 @@ X509_PKEY *X509_PKEY_new(void) X509_PKEY *ret = NULL; ASN1_CTX c; - M_ASN1_New_Malloc(ret, X509_PKEY); + ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PKEY)); + if (ret == NULL) { + c.line = __LINE__; + goto err; + } ret->version = 0; - M_ASN1_New(ret->enc_algor, X509_ALGOR_new); - M_ASN1_New(ret->enc_pkey, M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new); + ret->enc_algor = X509_ALGOR_new(); + ret->enc_pkey = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); ret->dec_pkey = NULL; ret->key_length = 0; ret->key_data = NULL; @@ -117,8 +121,15 @@ X509_PKEY *X509_PKEY_new(void) ret->cipher.cipher = NULL; memset(ret->cipher.iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); ret->references = 1; - return (ret); - M_ASN1_New_Error(ASN1_F_X509_PKEY_NEW); + if (ret->enc_algor == NULL || ret->enc_pkey == NULL) { + c.line = __LINE__; + goto err; + } + return ret; +err: + X509_PKEY_free(ret); + ASN1_MAC_H_err(ASN1_F_X509_PKEY_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, c.line); + return NULL; } void X509_PKEY_free(X509_PKEY *x) diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl index 3bb0cdf5bd391a..42178e455a981d 100755 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl @@ -3090,11 +3090,19 @@ .align 32 .Lsqrx8x_break: - sub 16+8(%rsp),%r8 # consume last carry + xor $zero,$zero + sub 16+8(%rsp),%rbx # mov 16(%rsp),%cf + adcx $zero,%r8 mov 24+8(%rsp),$carry # initial $tptr, borrow $carry + adcx $zero,%r9 mov 0*8($aptr),%rdx # a[8], modulo-scheduled - xor %ebp,%ebp # xor $zero,$zero + adc \$0,%r10 mov %r8,0*8($tptr) + adc \$0,%r11 + adc \$0,%r12 + adc \$0,%r13 + adc \$0,%r14 + adc \$0,%r15 cmp $carry,$tptr # cf=0, of=0 je .Lsqrx8x_outer_loop diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c index 195a7867a46bff..35facd213a253d 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c @@ -145,7 +145,8 @@ int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) int i, bits, ret = 0; BIGNUM *v, *rr; - if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { + if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 + || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return -1; @@ -245,7 +246,9 @@ int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, if (BN_is_odd(m)) { # ifdef MONT_EXP_WORD if (a->top == 1 && !a->neg - && (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0)) { + && (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0) + && (BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0) + && (BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0)) { BN_ULONG A = a->d[0]; ret = BN_mod_exp_mont_word(r, A, p, m, ctx, NULL); } else @@ -277,7 +280,9 @@ int BN_mod_exp_recp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE]; BN_RECP_CTX recp; - if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { + if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 + || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 + || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_RECP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return -1; @@ -411,7 +416,9 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE]; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; - if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { + if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 + || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 + || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { return BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(rr, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont); } @@ -1217,7 +1224,8 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p, #define BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont) \ (BN_set_word(r, (w)) && BN_to_montgomery(r, r, (mont), ctx)) - if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { + if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 + || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return -1; @@ -1348,7 +1356,9 @@ int BN_mod_exp_simple(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, /* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */ BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE]; - if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { + if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 + || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 + || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_SIMPLE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return -1; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c index 10b78f5126076f..f9c65f9f948a91 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c @@ -524,6 +524,9 @@ BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) memcpy(a->d, b->d, sizeof(b->d[0]) * b->top); #endif + if (BN_get_flags(b, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) + BN_set_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + a->top = b->top; a->neg = b->neg; bn_check_top(a); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c index be95bd55d02064..3af9db870bcbe6 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c @@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx) tmod.dmax = 2; tmod.neg = 0; + if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) + BN_set_flags(&tmod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + mont->ri = (BN_num_bits(mod) + (BN_BITS2 - 1)) / BN_BITS2 * BN_BITS2; # if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && (BN_BITS2<=32) diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c index 3c618dc3070890..6b455a755f714b 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c @@ -1032,46 +1032,6 @@ int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) rr->top = top; goto end; } -# if 0 - if (i == 1 && !BN_get_flags(b, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA)) { - BIGNUM *tmp_bn = (BIGNUM *)b; - if (bn_wexpand(tmp_bn, al) == NULL) - goto err; - tmp_bn->d[bl] = 0; - bl++; - i--; - } else if (i == -1 && !BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA)) { - BIGNUM *tmp_bn = (BIGNUM *)a; - if (bn_wexpand(tmp_bn, bl) == NULL) - goto err; - tmp_bn->d[al] = 0; - al++; - i++; - } - if (i == 0) { - /* symmetric and > 4 */ - /* 16 or larger */ - j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)al); - j = 1 << (j - 1); - k = j + j; - t = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - if (al == j) { /* exact multiple */ - if (bn_wexpand(t, k * 2) == NULL) - goto err; - if (bn_wexpand(rr, k * 2) == NULL) - goto err; - bn_mul_recursive(rr->d, a->d, b->d, al, t->d); - } else { - if (bn_wexpand(t, k * 4) == NULL) - goto err; - if (bn_wexpand(rr, k * 4) == NULL) - goto err; - bn_mul_part_recursive(rr->d, a->d, b->d, al - j, j, t->d); - } - rr->top = top; - goto end; - } -# endif } #endif /* BN_RECURSION */ if (bn_wexpand(rr, top) == NULL) diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c index efa48bdf87724a..f444af3feabd91 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c @@ -217,6 +217,8 @@ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx) BN_CTX_start(ctx); t = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (t == NULL) + goto err; for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { if (!BN_rand(Xq, nbits, 1, 0)) @@ -255,10 +257,12 @@ int BN_X931_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2, int ret = 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); - if (!Xp1) + if (Xp1 == NULL) Xp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - if (!Xp2) + if (Xp2 == NULL) Xp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (Xp1 == NULL || Xp2 == NULL) + goto error; if (!BN_rand(Xp1, 101, 0, 0)) goto error; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c index 1925428f5ec532..5fab45b2ec85be 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c @@ -469,11 +469,18 @@ void CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer(CRYPTO_THREADID *id, void *ptr) } } +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS +extern int FIPS_crypto_threadid_set_callback(void (*func) (CRYPTO_THREADID *)); +#endif + int CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback(void (*func) (CRYPTO_THREADID *)) { if (threadid_callback) return 0; threadid_callback = func; +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS + FIPS_crypto_threadid_set_callback(func); +#endif return 1; } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dh/Makefile b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dh/Makefile index 46fa5ac57b4747..cc366ec6fa38be 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dh/Makefile +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dh/Makefile @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ dh_gen.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h dh_gen.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h dh_gen.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h dh_gen.o: ../cryptlib.h dh_gen.c -dh_kdf.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h +dh_kdf.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h dh_kdf.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/cms.h dh_kdf.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/dh.h dh_kdf.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dh/dh.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dh/dh.h index a228c7a7a4c3a1..80b28fb39dc82d 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dh/dh.h +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dh/dh.h @@ -257,11 +257,13 @@ DH *DH_get_1024_160(void); DH *DH_get_2048_224(void); DH *DH_get_2048_256(void); +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS /* RFC2631 KDF */ int DH_KDF_X9_42(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, const unsigned char *Z, size_t Zlen, ASN1_OBJECT *key_oid, const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen, const EVP_MD *md); +# endif # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_paramgen_prime_len(ctx, len) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_DH, EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN, \ diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_kdf.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_kdf.c index a882cb286e0eae..8947a087315202 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_kdf.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_kdf.c @@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ * ==================================================================== */ +#include + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS #include #include #include @@ -185,3 +188,4 @@ int DH_KDF_X9_42(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); return rv; } +#endif diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c index b58e3fa86fad0c..6452482c87d2f9 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c @@ -207,7 +207,11 @@ static int pkey_dh_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DH_KDF_TYPE: if (p1 == -2) return dctx->kdf_type; +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CMS + if (p1 != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE) +#else if (p1 != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE && p1 != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42) +#endif return -2; dctx->kdf_type = p1; return 1; @@ -448,7 +452,9 @@ static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, return ret; *keylen = ret; return 1; - } else if (dctx->kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42) { + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS + else if (dctx->kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42) { unsigned char *Z = NULL; size_t Zlen = 0; if (!dctx->kdf_outlen || !dctx->kdf_oid) @@ -479,6 +485,7 @@ static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, } return ret; } +#endif return 1; } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c index c4fa105747feb7..aac253095141a3 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c @@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) goto dsaerr; } + BN_set_flags(dsa->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod_exp(dsa->pub_key, dsa->g, dsa->priv_key, dsa->p, ctx)) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_ERROR); goto dsaerr; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c index 1fce0f81c24242..21af2e159fb26a 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c @@ -482,6 +482,8 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N, } else { p = BN_CTX_get(ctx); q = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (q == NULL) + goto err; } if (!BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), L - 1)) diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c index 58013a4a13b57a..aa10dd12f6f8c5 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c @@ -224,7 +224,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, { BN_CTX *ctx; BIGNUM k, kq, *K, *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL; + BIGNUM l, m; int ret = 0; + int q_bits; if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); @@ -233,6 +235,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BN_init(&k); BN_init(&kq); + BN_init(&l); + BN_init(&m); if (ctx_in == NULL) { if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) @@ -243,6 +247,13 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) goto err; + /* Preallocate space */ + q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q); + if (!BN_set_bit(&k, q_bits) + || !BN_set_bit(&l, q_bits) + || !BN_set_bit(&m, q_bits)) + goto err; + /* Get random k */ do if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q)) @@ -263,24 +274,23 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */ if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) { - if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k)) - goto err; - - BN_set_flags(&kq, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - /* * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we - * compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length. (This - * is a kludge that we need because the BN_mod_exp_mont() does not - * let us specify the desired timing behaviour.) + * compute G^k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length. + * + * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a + * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is + * one bit longer than the modulus. + * + * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic + * conditional copy. */ - - if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q)) + if (!BN_add(&l, &k, dsa->q) + || !BN_add(&m, &l, dsa->q) + || !BN_copy(&kq, BN_num_bits(&l) > q_bits ? &l : &m)) goto err; - if (BN_num_bits(&kq) <= BN_num_bits(dsa->q)) { - if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q)) - goto err; - } + + BN_set_flags(&kq, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); K = &kq; } else { @@ -314,7 +324,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_clear_free(&k); BN_clear_free(&kq); - return (ret); + BN_clear_free(&l); + BN_clear_free(&m); + return ret; } static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl index 7948bf71b51e2c..35d2b6d146c1a1 100755 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl @@ -1178,19 +1178,18 @@ adox $t1, $acc5 .byte 0x67,0x67 mulx %rdx, $t0, $t4 - mov $acc0, %rdx + mov .Lpoly+8*3(%rip), %rdx adox $t0, $acc6 shlx $a_ptr, $acc0, $t0 adox $t4, $acc7 shrx $a_ptr, $acc0, $t4 - mov .Lpoly+8*3(%rip), $t1 + mov %rdx,$t1 # reduction step 1 add $t0, $acc1 adc $t4, $acc2 - mulx $t1, $t0, $acc0 - mov $acc1, %rdx + mulx $acc0, $t0, $acc0 adc $t0, $acc3 shlx $a_ptr, $acc1, $t0 adc \$0, $acc0 @@ -1200,8 +1199,7 @@ add $t0, $acc2 adc $t4, $acc3 - mulx $t1, $t0, $acc1 - mov $acc2, %rdx + mulx $acc1, $t0, $acc1 adc $t0, $acc0 shlx $a_ptr, $acc2, $t0 adc \$0, $acc1 @@ -1211,8 +1209,7 @@ add $t0, $acc3 adc $t4, $acc0 - mulx $t1, $t0, $acc2 - mov $acc3, %rdx + mulx $acc2, $t0, $acc2 adc $t0, $acc1 shlx $a_ptr, $acc3, $t0 adc \$0, $acc2 @@ -1222,12 +1219,12 @@ add $t0, $acc0 adc $t4, $acc1 - mulx $t1, $t0, $acc3 + mulx $acc3, $t0, $acc3 adc $t0, $acc2 adc \$0, $acc3 - xor $t3, $t3 # cf=0 - adc $acc0, $acc4 # accumulate upper half + xor $t3, $t3 + add $acc0, $acc4 # accumulate upper half mov .Lpoly+8*1(%rip), $a_ptr adc $acc1, $acc5 mov $acc4, $acc0 @@ -1236,8 +1233,7 @@ mov $acc5, $acc1 adc \$0, $t3 - xor %eax, %eax # cf=0 - sbb \$-1, $acc4 # .Lpoly[0] + sub \$-1, $acc4 # .Lpoly[0] mov $acc6, $acc2 sbb $a_ptr, $acc5 # .Lpoly[1] sbb \$0, $acc6 # .Lpoly[2] diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c index b2de7faea75e9d..43c4330cb0b7c8 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c @@ -247,6 +247,8 @@ int ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); if (mont != NULL) BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); + if (one != NULL) + BN_free(one); return ret; } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c index d81cc9ce6b1a0d..fcd754e448816d 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c @@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ static limb felem_is_zero(const felem in) return (zero | two224m96p1 | two225m97p2); } -static limb felem_is_zero_int(const felem in) +static int felem_is_zero_int(const void *in) { return (int)(felem_is_zero(in) & ((limb) 1)); } @@ -1391,7 +1391,6 @@ static void make_points_affine(size_t num, felem points[ /* num */ ][3], sizeof(felem), tmp_felems, (void (*)(void *))felem_one, - (int (*)(const void *)) felem_is_zero_int, (void (*)(void *, const void *)) felem_assign, diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c index 78d191aac7afbb..1272966fff84ca 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c @@ -977,7 +977,7 @@ static limb smallfelem_is_zero(const smallfelem small) return result; } -static int smallfelem_is_zero_int(const smallfelem small) +static int smallfelem_is_zero_int(const void *small) { return (int)(smallfelem_is_zero(small) & ((limb) 1)); } @@ -1979,7 +1979,6 @@ static void make_points_affine(size_t num, smallfelem points[][3], sizeof(smallfelem), tmp_smallfelems, (void (*)(void *))smallfelem_one, - (int (*)(const void *)) smallfelem_is_zero_int, (void (*)(void *, const void *)) smallfelem_assign, diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c index c53a61bbfb697d..a1dc9946fd17c8 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c @@ -871,7 +871,7 @@ static limb felem_is_zero(const felem in) return is_zero; } -static int felem_is_zero_int(const felem in) +static int felem_is_zero_int(const void *in) { return (int)(felem_is_zero(in) & ((limb) 1)); } @@ -1787,7 +1787,6 @@ static void make_points_affine(size_t num, felem points[][3], sizeof(felem), tmp_felems, (void (*)(void *))felem_one, - (int (*)(const void *)) felem_is_zero_int, (void (*)(void *, const void *)) felem_assign, diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ecdh/ech_lib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ecdh/ech_lib.c index cbc21d1a276ef4..9cc22582e4ad89 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ecdh/ech_lib.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ecdh/ech_lib.c @@ -225,9 +225,16 @@ ECDH_DATA *ecdh_check(EC_KEY *key) */ ecdh_data_free(ecdh_data); ecdh_data = (ECDH_DATA *)data; + } else if (EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(key, ecdh_data_dup, + ecdh_data_free, + ecdh_data_free) != ecdh_data) { + /* Or an out of memory error in EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data. */ + ecdh_data_free(ecdh_data); + return NULL; } - } else + } else { ecdh_data = (ECDH_DATA *)data; + } #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode() && !(ecdh_data->flags & ECDH_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD) && !(EC_KEY_get_flags(key) & EC_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) { diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c index 8dc1dda462598a..f1dd47231793dc 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c @@ -203,9 +203,16 @@ ECDSA_DATA *ecdsa_check(EC_KEY *key) */ ecdsa_data_free(ecdsa_data); ecdsa_data = (ECDSA_DATA *)data; + } else if (EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(key, ecdsa_data_dup, + ecdsa_data_free, + ecdsa_data_free) != ecdsa_data) { + /* Or an out of memory error in EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data. */ + ecdsa_data_free(ecdsa_data); + return NULL; } - } else + } else { ecdsa_data = (ECDSA_DATA *)data; + } #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode() && !(ecdsa_data->flags & ECDSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD) && !(EC_KEY_get_flags(key) & EC_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) { diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c index dd769609be4c08..16d4f59b9ba97c 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c @@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL; const EC_GROUP *group; int ret = 0; + int order_bits; if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) { ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); @@ -126,6 +127,13 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, goto err; } + /* Preallocate space */ + order_bits = BN_num_bits(order); + if (!BN_set_bit(k, order_bits) + || !BN_set_bit(r, order_bits) + || !BN_set_bit(X, order_bits)) + goto err; + do { /* get random k */ do @@ -139,13 +147,19 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, /* * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we * compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length. + * + * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a + * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is + * one bit longer than the order. This guarantees the code + * path used in the constant time implementations elsewhere. + * + * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic + * conditional copy. */ - - if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) + if (!BN_add(r, k, order) + || !BN_add(X, r, order) + || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(r) > order_bits ? r : X)) goto err; - if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order)) - if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) - goto err; /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */ if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) { diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/err/err.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/err/err.c index 0b1fcfc1f1a5de..cfe0e8083f39ba 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/err/err.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/err/err.c @@ -725,6 +725,8 @@ void ERR_put_error(int lib, int func, int reason, const char *file, int line) } #endif es = ERR_get_state(); + if (es == NULL) + return; es->top = (es->top + 1) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS; if (es->top == es->bottom) @@ -742,6 +744,8 @@ void ERR_clear_error(void) ERR_STATE *es; es = ERR_get_state(); + if (es == NULL) + return; for (i = 0; i < ERR_NUM_ERRORS; i++) { err_clear(es, i); @@ -806,6 +810,8 @@ static unsigned long get_error_values(int inc, int top, const char **file, unsigned long ret; es = ERR_get_state(); + if (es == NULL) + return 0; if (inc && top) { if (file) @@ -1016,7 +1022,6 @@ void ERR_remove_state(unsigned long pid) ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void) { - static ERR_STATE fallback; ERR_STATE *ret, tmp, *tmpp = NULL; int i; CRYPTO_THREADID tid; @@ -1030,7 +1035,7 @@ ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void) if (ret == NULL) { ret = (ERR_STATE *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ERR_STATE)); if (ret == NULL) - return (&fallback); + return NULL; CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&ret->tid, &tid); ret->top = 0; ret->bottom = 0; @@ -1042,7 +1047,7 @@ ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void) /* To check if insertion failed, do a get. */ if (ERRFN(thread_get_item) (ret) != ret) { ERR_STATE_free(ret); /* could not insert it */ - return (&fallback); + return NULL; } /* * If a race occured in this function and we came second, tmpp is the @@ -1066,10 +1071,10 @@ void ERR_set_error_data(char *data, int flags) int i; es = ERR_get_state(); + if (es == NULL) + return; i = es->top; - if (i == 0) - i = ERR_NUM_ERRORS - 1; err_clear_data(es, i); es->err_data[i] = data; @@ -1121,6 +1126,8 @@ int ERR_set_mark(void) ERR_STATE *es; es = ERR_get_state(); + if (es == NULL) + return 0; if (es->bottom == es->top) return 0; @@ -1133,6 +1140,8 @@ int ERR_pop_to_mark(void) ERR_STATE *es; es = ERR_get_state(); + if (es == NULL) + return 0; while (es->bottom != es->top && (es->err_flags[es->top] & ERR_FLAG_MARK) == 0) { diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c index d114710e98ec4e..b25fc6d541d420 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c @@ -579,12 +579,17 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, maxpad |= (255 - maxpad) >> (sizeof(maxpad) * 8 - 8); maxpad &= 255; - ret &= constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad); + mask = constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad); + ret &= mask; + /* + * If pad is invalid then we will fail the above test but we must + * continue anyway because we are in constant time code. However, + * we'll use the maxpad value instead of the supplied pad to make + * sure we perform well defined pointer arithmetic. + */ + pad = constant_time_select(mask, pad, maxpad); inp_len = len - (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + pad + 1); - mask = (0 - ((inp_len - len) >> (sizeof(inp_len) * 8 - 1))); - inp_len &= mask; - ret &= (int)mask; key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 2] = inp_len >> 8; key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 1] = inp_len; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c index 917ae0751dee3f..9a8a2ad7787ca3 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c @@ -507,10 +507,12 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, * to identify it and avoid stitch invocation. So that after we * establish that current CPU supports AVX, we even see if it's * either even XOP-capable Bulldozer-based or GenuineIntel one. + * But SHAEXT-capable go ahead... */ - if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (60 - 32)) && /* AVX? */ - ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (43 - 32))) /* XOP? */ - | (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1<<30))) && /* "Intel CPU"? */ + if (((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 29)) || /* SHAEXT? */ + ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (60 - 32))) && /* AVX? */ + ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (43 - 32))) /* XOP? */ + | (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 30))))) && /* "Intel CPU"? */ plen > (sha_off + iv) && (blocks = (plen - (sha_off + iv)) / SHA256_CBLOCK)) { SHA256_Update(&key->md, in + iv, sha_off); @@ -590,12 +592,17 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, maxpad |= (255 - maxpad) >> (sizeof(maxpad) * 8 - 8); maxpad &= 255; - ret &= constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad); + mask = constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad); + ret &= mask; + /* + * If pad is invalid then we will fail the above test but we must + * continue anyway because we are in constant time code. However, + * we'll use the maxpad value instead of the supplied pad to make + * sure we perform well defined pointer arithmetic. + */ + pad = constant_time_select(mask, pad, maxpad); inp_len = len - (SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + pad + 1); - mask = (0 - ((inp_len - len) >> (sizeof(inp_len) * 8 - 1))); - inp_len &= mask; - ret &= (int)mask; key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 2] = inp_len >> 8; key->aux.tls_aad[plen - 1] = inp_len; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp.h index d258ef870a3604..cf1de15e6d03ce 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp.h +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp.h @@ -1363,6 +1363,98 @@ void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, const char *type, const char *value)); +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_init(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pinit) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)); + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pcopy) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, + EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)); + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + void (**pcleanup) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)); + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pparamgen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**pparamgen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + EVP_PKEY *pkey)); + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_keygen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pkeygen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**pkeygen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + EVP_PKEY *pkey)); + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_sign(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**psign_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**psign) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, + const unsigned char *tbs, + size_t tbslen)); + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pverify_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**pverify) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *sig, + size_t siglen, + const unsigned char *tbs, + size_t tbslen)); + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pverify_recover_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX + *ctx), + int (**pverify_recover) (EVP_PKEY_CTX + *ctx, + unsigned char + *sig, + size_t *siglen, + const unsigned + char *tbs, + size_t tbslen)); + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_signctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**psignctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx), + int (**psignctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *sig, + size_t *siglen, + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)); + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verifyctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pverifyctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx), + int (**pverifyctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *sig, + int siglen, + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)); + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pencrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**pencryptfn) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *out, + size_t *outlen, + const unsigned char *in, + size_t inlen)); + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pdecrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**pdecrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *out, + size_t *outlen, + const unsigned char *in, + size_t inlen)); + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_derive(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pderive_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**pderive) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *key, + size_t *keylen)); + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pctrl) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, + void *p2), + int (**pctrl_str) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + const char *type, + const char *value)); + void EVP_add_alg_module(void); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_key.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_key.c index 5be9e336f9e717..cdffe1c8c428e8 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_key.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_key.c @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int EVP_read_pw_string(char *buf, int len, const char *prompt, int verify) int EVP_read_pw_string_min(char *buf, int min, int len, const char *prompt, int verify) { - int ret; + int ret = -1; char buff[BUFSIZ]; UI *ui; @@ -105,16 +105,18 @@ int EVP_read_pw_string_min(char *buf, int min, int len, const char *prompt, prompt = prompt_string; ui = UI_new(); if (ui == NULL) - return -1; - UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, 0, buf, min, - (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len); - if (verify) - UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, 0, - buff, min, (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len, - buf); + return ret; + if (UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, 0, buf, min, + (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len) < 0 + || (verify + && UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, 0, buff, min, + (len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len, + buf) < 0)) + goto end; ret = UI_process(ui); - UI_free(ui); OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, BUFSIZ); + end: + UI_free(ui); return ret; } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c index b7b7bdcd0290e6..e50826b568d884 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c @@ -589,3 +589,170 @@ void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, pmeth->ctrl = ctrl; pmeth->ctrl_str = ctrl_str; } + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_init(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pinit) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)) +{ + *pinit = pmeth->init; +} + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pcopy) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, + EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)) +{ + *pcopy = pmeth->copy; +} + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + void (**pcleanup) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)) +{ + *pcleanup = pmeth->cleanup; +} + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pparamgen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**pparamgen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + EVP_PKEY *pkey)) +{ + if (pparamgen_init) + *pparamgen_init = pmeth->paramgen_init; + if (pparamgen) + *pparamgen = pmeth->paramgen; +} + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_keygen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pkeygen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**pkeygen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + EVP_PKEY *pkey)) +{ + if (pkeygen_init) + *pkeygen_init = pmeth->keygen_init; + if (pkeygen) + *pkeygen = pmeth->keygen; +} + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_sign(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**psign_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**psign) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, + const unsigned char *tbs, + size_t tbslen)) +{ + if (psign_init) + *psign_init = pmeth->sign_init; + if (psign) + *psign = pmeth->sign; +} + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pverify_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**pverify) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *sig, + size_t siglen, + const unsigned char *tbs, + size_t tbslen)) +{ + if (pverify_init) + *pverify_init = pmeth->verify_init; + if (pverify) + *pverify = pmeth->verify; +} + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pverify_recover_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX + *ctx), + int (**pverify_recover) (EVP_PKEY_CTX + *ctx, + unsigned char + *sig, + size_t *siglen, + const unsigned + char *tbs, + size_t tbslen)) +{ + if (pverify_recover_init) + *pverify_recover_init = pmeth->verify_recover_init; + if (pverify_recover) + *pverify_recover = pmeth->verify_recover; +} + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_signctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**psignctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx), + int (**psignctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *sig, + size_t *siglen, + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)) +{ + if (psignctx_init) + *psignctx_init = pmeth->signctx_init; + if (psignctx) + *psignctx = pmeth->signctx; +} + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verifyctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pverifyctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx), + int (**pverifyctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *sig, + int siglen, + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)) +{ + if (pverifyctx_init) + *pverifyctx_init = pmeth->verifyctx_init; + if (pverifyctx) + *pverifyctx = pmeth->verifyctx; +} + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pencrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**pencryptfn) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *out, + size_t *outlen, + const unsigned char *in, + size_t inlen)) +{ + if (pencrypt_init) + *pencrypt_init = pmeth->encrypt_init; + if (pencryptfn) + *pencryptfn = pmeth->encrypt; +} + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pdecrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**pdecrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *out, + size_t *outlen, + const unsigned char *in, + size_t inlen)) +{ + if (pdecrypt_init) + *pdecrypt_init = pmeth->decrypt_init; + if (pdecrypt) + *pdecrypt = pmeth->decrypt; +} + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_derive(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pderive_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**pderive) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *key, + size_t *keylen)) +{ + if (pderive_init) + *pderive_init = pmeth->derive_init; + if (pderive) + *pderive = pmeth->derive; +} + +void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pctrl) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, + void *p2), + int (**pctrl_str) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + const char *type, + const char *value)) +{ + if (pctrl) + *pctrl = pmeth->ctrl; + if (pctrl_str) + *pctrl_str = pmeth->ctrl_str; +} diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ex_data.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ex_data.c index 108a1959eacfc2..723b21b3d28181 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ex_data.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ex_data.c @@ -473,7 +473,14 @@ static int int_dup_ex_data(int class_index, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, if (j < mx) mx = j; if (mx > 0) { - if (!CRYPTO_set_ex_data(to, mx - 1, NULL)) + /* + * Make sure the ex_data stack is at least |mx| elements long to avoid + * issues in the for loop that follows; so go get the |mx|'th element + * (if it does not exist CRYPTO_get_ex_data() returns NULL), and assign + * to itself. This is normally a no-op; but ensures the stack is the + * proper size + */ + if (!CRYPTO_set_ex_data(to, mx - 1, CRYPTO_get_ex_data(to, mx - 1))) goto skip; storage = OPENSSL_malloc(mx * sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *)); if (!storage) diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h deleted file mode 100644 index 34bd8b78b4f90f..00000000000000 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,28 +0,0 @@ -/* WARNING: do not edit! */ -/* Generated by Makefile from crypto/include/internal/bn_conf.h.in */ -/* - * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. - * - * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use - * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy - * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at - * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html - */ - -#ifndef HEADER_BN_CONF_H -# define HEADER_BN_CONF_H - -/* - * The contents of this file are not used in the UEFI build, as - * both 32-bit and 64-bit builds are supported from a single run - * of the Configure script. - */ - -/* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */ - -/* Only one for the following should be defined */ -#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG -#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT -#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT - -#endif diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h deleted file mode 100644 index 7a52dd1f1a1159..00000000000000 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,16 +0,0 @@ -/* WARNING: do not edit! */ -/* Generated by Makefile from crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h.in */ -/* - * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. - * - * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use - * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy - * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at - * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html - */ - -#ifndef HEADER_DSO_CONF_H -# define HEADER_DSO_CONF_H - -# define DSO_EXTENSION ".so" -#endif diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/lhash/lhash.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/lhash/lhash.c index f20353aea33f4f..f3798872598a44 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/lhash/lhash.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/lhash/lhash.c @@ -101,6 +101,24 @@ #include #include +/* + * A hashing implementation that appears to be based on the linear hashing + * alogrithm: + * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_hashing + * + * Litwin, Witold (1980), "Linear hashing: A new tool for file and table + * addressing", Proc. 6th Conference on Very Large Databases: 212–223 + * http://hackthology.com/pdfs/Litwin-1980-Linear_Hashing.pdf + * + * From the wikipedia article "Linear hashing is used in the BDB Berkeley + * database system, which in turn is used by many software systems such as + * OpenLDAP, using a C implementation derived from the CACM article and first + * published on the Usenet in 1988 by Esmond Pitt." + * + * The CACM paper is available here: + * https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ff4d/1c5deca6269cc316bfd952172284dbf610ee.pdf + */ + const char lh_version[] = "lhash" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; #undef MIN_NODES @@ -108,7 +126,7 @@ const char lh_version[] = "lhash" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; #define UP_LOAD (2*LH_LOAD_MULT) /* load times 256 (default 2) */ #define DOWN_LOAD (LH_LOAD_MULT) /* load times 256 (default 1) */ -static void expand(_LHASH *lh); +static int expand(_LHASH *lh); static void contract(_LHASH *lh); static LHASH_NODE **getrn(_LHASH *lh, const void *data, unsigned long *rhash); @@ -182,8 +200,9 @@ void *lh_insert(_LHASH *lh, void *data) void *ret; lh->error = 0; - if (lh->up_load <= (lh->num_items * LH_LOAD_MULT / lh->num_nodes)) - expand(lh); + if (lh->up_load <= (lh->num_items * LH_LOAD_MULT / lh->num_nodes) + && !expand(lh)) + return NULL; rn = getrn(lh, data, &hash); @@ -300,19 +319,37 @@ void lh_doall_arg(_LHASH *lh, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN_TYPE func, void *arg) doall_util_fn(lh, 1, (LHASH_DOALL_FN_TYPE)0, func, arg); } -static void expand(_LHASH *lh) +static int expand(_LHASH *lh) { LHASH_NODE **n, **n1, **n2, *np; - unsigned int p, i, j; - unsigned long hash, nni; + unsigned int p, pmax, nni, j; + unsigned long hash; + + nni = lh->num_alloc_nodes; + p = lh->p; + pmax = lh->pmax; + if (p + 1 >= pmax) { + j = nni * 2; + n = OPENSSL_realloc(lh->b, (int)(sizeof(LHASH_NODE *) * j)); + if (n == NULL) { + lh->error++; + return 0; + } + lh->b = n; + memset(n + nni, 0, sizeof(*n) * (j - nni)); + lh->pmax = nni; + lh->num_alloc_nodes = j; + lh->num_expand_reallocs++; + lh->p = 0; + } else { + lh->p++; + } lh->num_nodes++; lh->num_expands++; - p = (int)lh->p++; n1 = &(lh->b[p]); - n2 = &(lh->b[p + (int)lh->pmax]); - *n2 = NULL; /* 27/07/92 - eay - undefined pointer bug */ - nni = lh->num_alloc_nodes; + n2 = &(lh->b[p + pmax]); + *n2 = NULL; for (np = *n1; np != NULL;) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HASH_COMP @@ -330,25 +367,7 @@ static void expand(_LHASH *lh) np = *n1; } - if ((lh->p) >= lh->pmax) { - j = (int)lh->num_alloc_nodes * 2; - n = (LHASH_NODE **)OPENSSL_realloc(lh->b, - (int)(sizeof(LHASH_NODE *) * j)); - if (n == NULL) { - lh->error++; - lh->num_nodes--; - lh->p = 0; - return; - } - /* else */ - for (i = (int)lh->num_alloc_nodes; i < j; i++) /* 26/02/92 eay */ - n[i] = NULL; /* 02/03/92 eay */ - lh->pmax = lh->num_alloc_nodes; - lh->num_alloc_nodes = j; - lh->num_expand_reallocs++; - lh->p = 0; - lh->b = n; - } + return 1; } static void contract(_LHASH *lh) diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c index d4a257c33bb593..7a7d06094edfe4 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c @@ -118,6 +118,8 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, goto end; } } + } else if (certs != NULL) { + untrusted = certs; } else { untrusted = bs->certs; } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h index 825a330abc8825..c944d562dae0a9 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h @@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" { * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for * major minor fix final patch/beta) */ -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x100020cfL +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x100020dfL # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2l-fips 25 May 2017" +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2m-fips 2 Nov 2017" # else -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2l 25 May 2017" +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2m 2 Nov 2017" # endif # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c index c82b3c0ae263d0..865976bf8cce9a 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c @@ -536,7 +536,8 @@ int PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(char *header, EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher) ((c >= '0') && (c <= '9')))) break; #else - if (!(isupper(c) || (c == '-') || isdigit(c))) + if (!(isupper((unsigned char)c) || (c == '-') + || isdigit((unsigned char)c))) break; #endif header++; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c index 5747c7366e3d0a..daf210fde0f946 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c @@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, } p8inf = PKCS8_decrypt(p8, psbuf, klen); X509_SIG_free(p8); + OPENSSL_cleanse(psbuf, klen); if (!p8inf) return NULL; ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c index 04d6319a225be0..e8b3a1b92c8d51 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c @@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, } p8inf = PKCS8_decrypt(p8, psbuf, klen); X509_SIG_free(p8); + OPENSSL_cleanse(psbuf, klen); if (!p8inf) goto p8err; ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c index 9aa3c90c4e5726..1841f78f691500 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c @@ -84,6 +84,12 @@ int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, { STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts = NULL; X509 *x = NULL; + + if (pkey) + *pkey = NULL; + if (cert) + *cert = NULL; + /* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */ if (!p12) { @@ -92,11 +98,6 @@ int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, return 0; } - if (pkey) - *pkey = NULL; - if (cert) - *cert = NULL; - /* Check the mac */ /* @@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, if (!ocerts) { PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; + goto err; } if (!parse_pk12(p12, pass, -1, pkey, ocerts)) { @@ -163,10 +164,14 @@ int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, err: - if (pkey && *pkey) + if (pkey) { EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey); - if (cert && *cert) + *pkey = NULL; + } + if (cert) { X509_free(*cert); + *cert = NULL; + } if (x) X509_free(x); if (ocerts) diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c index 06670ae017ad84..b4be3097e9fabd 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_win.c @@ -196,6 +196,8 @@ typedef NET_API_STATUS(NET_API_FUNCTION *NETFREE) (LPBYTE); # endif /* 1 */ # endif /* !OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE */ +#define NOTTOOLONG(start) ((GetTickCount() - (start)) < MAXDELAY) + int RAND_poll(void) { MEMORYSTATUS m; @@ -466,9 +468,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void) do RAND_add(&hentry, hentry.dwSize, 5); while (heap_next(&hentry) - && (!good - || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < - MAXDELAY) + && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime)) && --entrycnt > 0); } } @@ -480,8 +480,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void) ex_cnt_limit--; } } while (heaplist_next(handle, &hlist) - && (!good - || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY) + && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime)) && ex_cnt_limit > 0); } # else @@ -496,11 +495,11 @@ int RAND_poll(void) do RAND_add(&hentry, hentry.dwSize, 5); while (heap_next(&hentry) + && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime)) && --entrycnt > 0); } } while (heaplist_next(handle, &hlist) - && (!good - || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY)); + && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime))); } # endif @@ -518,8 +517,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void) do RAND_add(&p, p.dwSize, 9); while (process_next(handle, &p) - && (!good - || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY)); + && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime))); /* thread walking */ /* @@ -533,8 +531,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void) do RAND_add(&t, t.dwSize, 6); while (thread_next(handle, &t) - && (!good - || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY)); + && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime))); /* module walking */ /* @@ -548,8 +545,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void) do RAND_add(&m, m.dwSize, 9); while (module_next(handle, &m) - && (!good - || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY)); + && (!good || NOTTOOLONG(starttime))); if (close_snap) close_snap(handle); else @@ -708,14 +704,13 @@ static void readscreen(void) hBitmap = CreateCompatibleBitmap(hScrDC, w, n); /* Get bitmap properties */ - GetObject(hBitmap, sizeof(BITMAP), (LPSTR) & bm); - size = (unsigned int)bm.bmWidthBytes * bm.bmHeight * bm.bmPlanes; - - bi.biSize = sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER); + GetObject(hBitmap, sizeof(bm), (LPSTR)&bm); + size = (unsigned int)4 * bm.bmHeight * bm.bmWidth; + bi.biSize = sizeof(bi); bi.biWidth = bm.bmWidth; bi.biHeight = bm.bmHeight; - bi.biPlanes = bm.bmPlanes; - bi.biBitCount = bm.bmBitsPixel; + bi.biPlanes = 1; + bi.biBitCount = 32; bi.biCompression = BI_RGB; bi.biSizeImage = 0; bi.biXPelsPerMeter = 0; @@ -731,7 +726,7 @@ static void readscreen(void) /* Copy the bits of the current line range into the buffer */ GetDIBits(hScrDC, hBitmap, y, n, - bmbits, (BITMAPINFO *) & bi, DIB_RGB_COLORS); + bmbits, (LPBITMAPINFO)&bi, DIB_RGB_COLORS); /* Get the hash of the bitmap */ MD(bmbits, size, md); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c index 951e1d5ca32b98..ddead3d7445570 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c @@ -768,6 +768,7 @@ static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn, return 2; } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS static RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *rsa_oaep_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg, X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash) { @@ -791,7 +792,6 @@ static RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *rsa_oaep_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg, return pss; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c index 19d28c6f0e6012..9a01b4afc11fb4 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c @@ -237,10 +237,14 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR); cleanup: - if (db != NULL) + if (db != NULL) { + OPENSSL_cleanse(db, dblen); OPENSSL_free(db); - if (em != NULL) + } + if (em != NULL) { + OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num); OPENSSL_free(em); + } return mlen; } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c index efa1fd3e993f02..50397c335a5a56 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c @@ -255,8 +255,6 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, * We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result * and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing * information at the API boundary. - * TODO(emilia): this could be addressed at the call site, - * see BoringSSL commit 0aa0767340baf925bda4804882aab0cb974b2d26. */ if (!good) { mlen = -1; @@ -266,8 +264,10 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, memcpy(to, em + msg_index, mlen); err: - if (em != NULL) + if (em != NULL) { + OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num); OPENSSL_free(em); + } if (mlen == -1) RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c index 8896e2e977149b..00e730ffa95887 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c @@ -180,27 +180,25 @@ static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) * FIPS mode. */ -static int pkey_fips_check_ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) +static int pkey_fips_check_rsa(const RSA *rsa, const EVP_MD **pmd, + const EVP_MD **pmgf1md) { - RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; - RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa; int rv = -1; + if (!FIPS_mode()) return 0; if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW) rv = 0; if (!(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD) && rv) return -1; - if (rctx->md) { - const EVP_MD *fmd; - fmd = FIPS_get_digestbynid(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md)); - if (!fmd || !(fmd->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS)) + if (*pmd != NULL) { + *pmd = FIPS_get_digestbynid(EVP_MD_type(*pmd)); + if (*pmd == NULL || !((*pmd)->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS)) return rv; } - if (rctx->mgf1md && !(rctx->mgf1md->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS)) { - const EVP_MD *fmd; - fmd = FIPS_get_digestbynid(EVP_MD_type(rctx->mgf1md)); - if (!fmd || !(fmd->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS)) + if (*pmgf1md != NULL) { + *pmgf1md = FIPS_get_digestbynid(EVP_MD_type(*pmgf1md)); + if (*pmgf1md == NULL || !((*pmgf1md)->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS)) return rv; } return 1; @@ -214,27 +212,27 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, int ret; RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa; + const EVP_MD *md = rctx->md; + const EVP_MD *mgf1md = rctx->mgf1md; #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS - ret = pkey_fips_check_ctx(ctx); + ret = pkey_fips_check_rsa(rsa, &md, &mgf1md); if (ret < 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); return -1; } #endif - if (rctx->md) { - if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) { + if (md != NULL) { + if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(md)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); return -1; } #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (ret > 0) { unsigned int slen; - ret = FIPS_rsa_sign_digest(rsa, tbs, tbslen, rctx->md, - rctx->pad_mode, - rctx->saltlen, - rctx->mgf1md, sig, &slen); + ret = FIPS_rsa_sign_digest(rsa, tbs, tbslen, md, rctx->pad_mode, + rctx->saltlen, mgf1md, sig, &slen); if (ret > 0) *siglen = slen; else @@ -243,12 +241,12 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, } #endif - if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2) { + if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_mdc2) { unsigned int sltmp; if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) return -1; - ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NID_mdc2, - tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa); + ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NID_mdc2, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, + rsa); if (ret <= 0) return ret; @@ -263,23 +261,20 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, return -1; } memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen); - rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md)); + rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(md)); ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf, sig, rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING); } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { unsigned int sltmp; - ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), - tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa); + ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(md), tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa); if (ret <= 0) return ret; ret = sltmp; } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) return -1; - if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, - rctx->tbuf, tbs, - rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, - rctx->saltlen)) + if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, rctx->tbuf, tbs, + md, mgf1md, rctx->saltlen)) return -1; ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf, sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); @@ -348,32 +343,31 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, { RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa; + const EVP_MD *md = rctx->md; + const EVP_MD *mgf1md = rctx->mgf1md; size_t rslen; + #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS - int rv; - rv = pkey_fips_check_ctx(ctx); + int rv = pkey_fips_check_rsa(rsa, &md, &mgf1md); + if (rv < 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); return -1; } #endif - if (rctx->md) { + if (md != NULL) { #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (rv > 0) { - return FIPS_rsa_verify_digest(rsa, - tbs, tbslen, - rctx->md, - rctx->pad_mode, - rctx->saltlen, - rctx->mgf1md, sig, siglen); + return FIPS_rsa_verify_digest(rsa, tbs, tbslen, md, rctx->pad_mode, + rctx->saltlen, mgf1md, sig, siglen); } #endif if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) - return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, + return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(md), tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, rsa); - if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) { + if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(md)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); return -1; } @@ -388,8 +382,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); if (ret <= 0) return 0; - ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs, - rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, + ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs, md, mgf1md, rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen); if (ret <= 0) return 0; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c index 643ae593439aeb..03ef981cf91224 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ui/ui_lib.c @@ -520,6 +520,7 @@ int UI_process(UI *ui) } } } + err: if (ui->meth->ui_close_session != NULL && ui->meth->ui_close_session(ui) <= 0) diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c index 807d1c49b2d3b7..96d042f5859e94 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ void WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c, const void *_inp, size_t bits) goto reconsider; } else #endif - if (bits >= 8) { + if (bits > 8) { b = ((inp[0] << inpgap) | (inp[1] >> (8 - inpgap))); b &= 0xff; if (bitrem) @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ void WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c, const void *_inp, size_t bits) } if (bitrem) c->data[byteoff] = b << (8 - bitrem); - } else { /* remaining less than 8 bits */ + } else { /* remaining less than or equal to 8 bits */ b = (inp[0] << inpgap) & 0xff; if (bitrem) diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c index bbc3189381e55e..6f0209a275ef33 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509/by_dir.c @@ -402,6 +402,7 @@ static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, int type, X509_NAME *name, if (!hent) { hent = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BY_DIR_HASH)); if (hent == NULL) { + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); X509err(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto finish; } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509/by_file.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509/by_file.c index 43a073003d8bf6..82ce4e8d87c31d 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509/by_file.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509/by_file.c @@ -92,12 +92,12 @@ static int by_file_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp, long argl, char **ret) { int ok = 0; - char *file; + const char *file; switch (cmd) { case X509_L_FILE_LOAD: if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT) { - file = (char *)getenv(X509_get_default_cert_file_env()); + file = getenv(X509_get_default_cert_file_env()); if (file) ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_file(ctx, file, X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0); @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int X509_load_cert_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type) if (type == X509_FILETYPE_PEM) { for (;;) { - x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); + x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, NULL, ""); if (x == NULL) { if ((ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) && (count > 0)) { @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ int X509_load_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type) if (type == X509_FILETYPE_PEM) { for (;;) { - x = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); + x = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in, NULL, NULL, ""); if (x == NULL) { if ((ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) && (count > 0)) { @@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ int X509_load_cert_crl_file(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *file, int type) X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); return 0; } - inf = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); + inf = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, ""); BIO_free(in); if (!inf) { X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE, ERR_R_PEM_LIB); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c index 09b8691c8694e1..03c9533bcca90e 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c @@ -732,6 +732,7 @@ int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy, STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags) { int ret; + int calc_ret; X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL; *ptree = NULL; @@ -800,17 +801,20 @@ int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy, /* Tree is not empty: continue */ - ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes); + calc_ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes); - if (!ret) + if (!calc_ret) goto error; - if (!tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes)) - goto error; + ret = tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes); - if (ret == 2) + if (calc_ret == 2) sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes); + if (!ret) + goto error; + + if (tree) *ptree = tree; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c index 1290dec9bb8c0c..af080a04f2ba20 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c @@ -130,10 +130,12 @@ static int length_from_afi(const unsigned afi) */ unsigned int v3_addr_get_afi(const IPAddressFamily *f) { - return ((f != NULL && - f->addressFamily != NULL && f->addressFamily->data != NULL) - ? ((f->addressFamily->data[0] << 8) | (f->addressFamily->data[1])) - : 0); + if (f == NULL + || f->addressFamily == NULL + || f->addressFamily->data == NULL + || f->addressFamily->length < 2) + return 0; + return (f->addressFamily->data[0] << 8) | f->addressFamily->data[1]; } /* diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c index 7f40bfabe0507a..9bb01ee38e6304 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c @@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ int GENERAL_NAME_set0_othername(GENERAL_NAME *gen, oth = OTHERNAME_new(); if (!oth) return 0; + ASN1_TYPE_free(oth->value); oth->type_id = oid; oth->value = value; GENERAL_NAME_set0_value(gen, GEN_OTHERNAME, oth); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c index 2855269668bee8..1184091ccf30dd 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c @@ -107,6 +107,47 @@ ASN1_SEQUENCE(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) = { IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_SUBTREE) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) +/* + * We cannot use strncasecmp here because that applies locale specific rules. + * For example in Turkish 'I' is not the uppercase character for 'i'. We need to + * do a simple ASCII case comparison ignoring the locale (that is why we use + * numeric constants below). + */ +static int ia5ncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n) +{ + for (; n > 0; n--, s1++, s2++) { + if (*s1 != *s2) { + unsigned char c1 = (unsigned char)*s1, c2 = (unsigned char)*s2; + + /* Convert to lower case */ + if (c1 >= 0x41 /* A */ && c1 <= 0x5A /* Z */) + c1 += 0x20; + if (c2 >= 0x41 /* A */ && c2 <= 0x5A /* Z */) + c2 += 0x20; + + if (c1 == c2) + continue; + + if (c1 < c2) + return -1; + + /* c1 > c2 */ + return 1; + } else if (*s1 == 0) { + /* If we get here we know that *s2 == 0 too */ + return 0; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static int ia5casecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2) +{ + /* No portable definition of SIZE_MAX, so we use (size_t)(-1) instead */ + return ia5ncasecmp(s1, s2, (size_t)(-1)); +} + static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval) { @@ -384,7 +425,7 @@ static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *dns, ASN1_IA5STRING *base) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; } - if (strcasecmp(baseptr, dnsptr)) + if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, dnsptr)) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; return X509_V_OK; @@ -404,7 +445,7 @@ static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *eml, ASN1_IA5STRING *base) if (!baseat && (*baseptr == '.')) { if (eml->length > base->length) { emlptr += eml->length - base->length; - if (!strcasecmp(baseptr, emlptr)) + if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, emlptr) == 0) return X509_V_OK; } return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; @@ -425,7 +466,7 @@ static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *eml, ASN1_IA5STRING *base) } emlptr = emlat + 1; /* Just have hostname left to match: case insensitive */ - if (strcasecmp(baseptr, emlptr)) + if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, emlptr)) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; return X509_V_OK; @@ -464,14 +505,14 @@ static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base) if (*baseptr == '.') { if (hostlen > base->length) { p = hostptr + hostlen - base->length; - if (!strncasecmp(p, baseptr, base->length)) + if (ia5ncasecmp(p, baseptr, base->length) == 0) return X509_V_OK; } return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; } if ((base->length != (int)hostlen) - || strncasecmp(hostptr, baseptr, hostlen)) + || ia5ncasecmp(hostptr, baseptr, hostlen)) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; return X509_V_OK; diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x86_64cpuid.pl b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x86_64cpuid.pl index a3d6f438f91e7b..ef3608b13495e0 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x86_64cpuid.pl +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/x86_64cpuid.pl @@ -136,8 +136,19 @@ or \$0x40000000,%edx # set reserved bit#30 on Intel CPUs and \$15,%ah cmp \$15,%ah # examine Family ID - jne .Lnotintel + jne .LnotP4 or \$0x00100000,%edx # set reserved bit#20 to engage RC4_CHAR +.LnotP4: + cmp \$6,%ah + jne .Lnotintel + and \$0x0fff0ff0,%eax + cmp \$0x00050670,%eax # Knights Landing + je .Lknights + cmp \$0x00080650,%eax # Knights Mill (according to sde) + jne .Lnotintel +.Lknights: + and \$0xfbffffff,%ecx # clear XSAVE flag to mimic Silvermont + .Lnotintel: bt \$28,%edx # test hyper-threading bit jnc .Lgeneric @@ -162,6 +173,10 @@ mov \$7,%eax xor %ecx,%ecx cpuid + bt \$26,%r9d # check XSAVE bit, cleared on Knights + jc .Lnotknights + and \$0xfff7ffff,%ebx # clear ADCX/ADOX flag +.Lnotknights: mov %ebx,8(%rdi) # save extended feature flags .Lno_extended_info: @@ -175,7 +190,7 @@ .Lclear_avx: mov \$0xefffe7ff,%eax # ~(1<<28|1<<12|1<<11) and %eax,%r9d # clear AVX, FMA and AMD XOP bits - andl \$0xffffffdf,8(%rdi) # cleax AVX2, ~(1<<5) + andl \$0xffffffdf,8(%rdi) # clear AVX2, ~(1<<5) .Ldone: shl \$32,%r9 mov %r10d,%eax diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc-nits b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc-nits deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb2d1d6..00000000000000 diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/asn1parse.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/asn1parse.pod index 76a765daf95b81..a84dbc37dc893e 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/asn1parse.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/asn1parse.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-asn1parse, asn1parse - ASN.1 parsing tool =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ca.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ca.pod index c90e6482e584cd..cc26bf48a3a74f 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ca.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ca.pod @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-ca, ca - sample minimal CA application =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod index 35d40bbf27aeff..fa16124d08b87d 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ciphers.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-ciphers, ciphers - SSL cipher display and cipher list tool. =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/cms.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/cms.pod index ac69804228ccda..4a7783d47a4ea1 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/cms.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/cms.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-cms, cms - CMS utility =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/crl.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/crl.pod index 044a9da91545ae..cdced1c742c02c 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/crl.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/crl.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-crl, crl - CRL utility =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/crl2pkcs7.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/crl2pkcs7.pod index 3797bc0df4ef33..18654c5afa0e66 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/crl2pkcs7.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/crl2pkcs7.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-crl2pkcs7, crl2pkcs7 - Create a PKCS#7 structure from a CRL and certificates. =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dgst.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dgst.pod index b27bb946b1b2e3..72d6c87fabca5e 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dgst.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dgst.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-dgst, dgst, sha, sha1, mdc2, ripemd160, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, md2, md4, md5, dss1 - message digests =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dhparam.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dhparam.pod index 1cd4c76663c5b3..018d9935085a3e 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dhparam.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dhparam.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-dhparam, dhparam - DH parameter manipulation and generation =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dsa.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dsa.pod index 8bf6cc9dcad63b..77d66089beacd0 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dsa.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dsa.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-dsa, dsa - DSA key processing =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dsaparam.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dsaparam.pod index ba5ec4d72cdf8e..446903491357e2 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dsaparam.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/dsaparam.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-dsaparam, dsaparam - DSA parameter manipulation and generation =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ec.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ec.pod index 5c7b45d4e75ee8..658eac5d509f16 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ec.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ec.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-ec, ec - EC key processing =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ecparam.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ecparam.pod index 88e9d1e83d02b4..ba2f3b9ae274f5 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ecparam.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ecparam.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-ecparam, ecparam - EC parameter manipulation and generation =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/enc.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/enc.pod index 41791ad6713c4b..aceafcd4d557a1 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/enc.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/enc.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-enc, enc - symmetric cipher routines =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/errstr.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/errstr.pod index b3c6ccfc9cbd70..0dee51c844ef30 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/errstr.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/errstr.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-errstr, errstr - lookup error codes =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/gendsa.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/gendsa.pod index d9f56be890f883..2c8e5c86f208c1 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/gendsa.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/gendsa.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-gendsa, gendsa - generate a DSA private key from a set of parameters =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/genpkey.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/genpkey.pod index 929edcd26ff00f..4d09fc0937c577 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/genpkey.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/genpkey.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-genpkey, genpkey - generate a private key =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/genrsa.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/genrsa.pod index f4ed9593ae2695..8be06834f5079f 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/genrsa.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/genrsa.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-genrsa, genrsa - generate an RSA private key =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/nseq.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/nseq.pod index 989c3108fb8364..de441fa87a4d40 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/nseq.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/nseq.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-nseq, nseq - create or examine a netscape certificate sequence =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod index 1bb7958d20e5a6..9e2716f00820b0 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ocsp.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-ocsp, ocsp - Online Certificate Status Protocol utility =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/passwd.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/passwd.pod index f44982549bf1a2..7f74ce016d92c6 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/passwd.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/passwd.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-passwd, passwd - compute password hashes =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod index 744984838dc7c2..debc9ea27a27a5 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-pkcs12, pkcs12 - PKCS#12 file utility =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs7.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs7.pod index acfb8100f0786f..651e9371c10587 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs7.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs7.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-pkcs7, pkcs7 - PKCS#7 utility =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs8.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs8.pod index 6901f1f3f2112e..f741741e5ad2c9 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs8.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkcs8.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-pkcs8, pkcs8 - PKCS#8 format private key conversion tool =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkey.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkey.pod index 4851223f3fcdc3..6db8a623839332 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkey.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkey.pod @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-pkey, pkey - public or private key processing tool =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkeyparam.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkeyparam.pod index 154f6721af4ab1..27c10a6a745c58 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkeyparam.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkeyparam.pod @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-pkeyparam, pkeyparam - public key algorithm parameter processing tool =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkeyutl.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkeyutl.pod index 5da347c97d327c..78b3b02a7d9662 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkeyutl.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/pkeyutl.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-pkeyutl, pkeyutl - public key algorithm utility =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/rand.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/rand.pod index d1d213ef43cbd0..94df10d939e00c 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/rand.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/rand.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-rand, rand - generate pseudo-random bytes =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/req.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/req.pod index 1682ba5143dd02..20b2f39e90f2bd 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/req.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/req.pod @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-req, req - PKCS#10 certificate request and certificate generating utility. =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/rsa.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/rsa.pod index 21cbf8ee009b05..7e43e0f3d062ec 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/rsa.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/rsa.pod @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-rsa, rsa - RSA key processing tool =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/rsautl.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/rsautl.pod index 1a498c2f62e0e5..e16ce29cf6099f 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/rsautl.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/rsautl.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-rsautl, rsautl - RSA utility =head1 SYNOPSIS @@ -105,7 +106,7 @@ Recover the signed data Examine the raw signed data: - openssl rsautl -verify -in file -inkey key.pem -raw -hexdump + openssl rsautl -verify -in sig -inkey key.pem -raw -hexdump 0000 - 00 01 ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................ 0010 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................ diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod index b45acbc5e3e42f..d9413a0cf211e5 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-s_client, s_client - SSL/TLS client program =head1 SYNOPSIS @@ -197,12 +198,14 @@ Can be used to override the implicit B<-ign_eof> after B<-quiet>. =item B<-psk_identity identity> Use the PSK identity B when using a PSK cipher suite. +The default value is "Client_identity" (without the quotes). =item B<-psk key> Use the PSK key B when using a PSK cipher suite. The key is given as a hexadecimal number without leading 0x, for example -psk 1a2b3c4d. +This option must be provided in order to use a PSK cipher. =item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-tls1_1>, B<-tls1_2>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2> diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod index 1fe93ddfbebb0b..9916fc3ef6a311 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-s_server, s_server - SSL/TLS server program =head1 SYNOPSIS @@ -219,6 +220,7 @@ Use the PSK identity hint B when using a PSK cipher suite. Use the PSK key B when using a PSK cipher suite. The key is given as a hexadecimal number without leading 0x, for example -psk 1a2b3c4d. +This option must be provided in order to use a PSK cipher. =item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-tls1_1>, B<-tls1_2>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2> @@ -403,10 +405,6 @@ a web browser the command: can be used for example. -Most web browsers (in particular Netscape and MSIE) only support RSA cipher -suites, so they cannot connect to servers which don't use a certificate -carrying an RSA key or a version of OpenSSL with RSA disabled. - Although specifying an empty list of CAs when requesting a client certificate is strictly speaking a protocol violation, some SSL clients interpret this to mean any CA is acceptable. This is useful for debugging purposes. diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/s_time.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/s_time.pod index 9082d876feeb0e..1fa02800a4192c 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/s_time.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/s_time.pod @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-s_time, s_time - SSL/TLS performance timing program =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/sess_id.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/sess_id.pod index 9988d2cd3d5d05..0771baef117369 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/sess_id.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/sess_id.pod @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-sess_id, sess_id - SSL/TLS session handling utility =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/smime.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/smime.pod index 04a83ca8e427ba..fbf60da27faf36 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/smime.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/smime.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-smime, smime - S/MIME utility =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/speed.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/speed.pod index 1cd1998d16759b..2bfe91e371cbb2 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/speed.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/speed.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-speed, speed - test library performance =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/spkac.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/spkac.pod index 97fb80e4016b8a..b8a5477a063eb1 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/spkac.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/spkac.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-spkac, spkac - SPKAC printing and generating utility =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ts.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ts.pod index d6aa47d3144d27..5da019b2eb2f27 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ts.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/ts.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-ts, ts - Time Stamping Authority tool (client/server) =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/tsget.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/tsget.pod index 56db985c4bb175..4856c850d8e100 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/tsget.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/tsget.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-tsget, tsget - Time Stamping HTTP/HTTPS client =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod index b3767325ae075a..321d5ac7e126f4 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-verify, verify - Utility to verify certificates. =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/version.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/version.pod index 58f543bc3e6456..675b0f84d6a7ca 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/version.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/version.pod @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-version, version - print OpenSSL version information =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/x509.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/x509.pod index 1479a749571677..d50625862ac3a0 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/x509.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/x509.pod @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ =head1 NAME +openssl-x509, x509 - Certificate display and signing utility =head1 SYNOPSIS diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_bn2bin.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_bn2bin.pod index 3bed47f8f1d553..f6bb484f902ff8 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_bn2bin.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_bn2bin.pod @@ -70,8 +70,9 @@ BN_bn2bin() returns the length of the big-endian number placed at B. BN_bin2bn() returns the B, NULL on error. BN_bn2hex() and BN_bn2dec() return a null-terminated string, or NULL -on error. BN_hex2bn() and BN_dec2bn() return the number's length in -hexadecimal or decimal digits, and 0 on error. +on error. BN_hex2bn() and BN_dec2bn() return the number of characters +used in parsing, or 0 on error, in which +case no new B will be created. BN_print_fp() and BN_print() return 1 on success, 0 on write errors. diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_new.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_new.pod index ab7a105e3ad7e9..d446603191af41 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_new.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_new.pod @@ -30,10 +30,12 @@ to the value 0. BN_free() frees the components of the B, and if it was created by BN_new(), also the structure itself. BN_clear_free() additionally overwrites the data before the memory is returned to the system. +If B is NULL, nothing is done. =head1 RETURN VALUES -BN_new() returns a pointer to the B. If the allocation fails, +BN_new() returns a pointer to the B initialised to the value 0. +If the allocation fails, it returns B and sets an error code that can be obtained by L. diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod index 0c0a30c1ffa048..dc9a2d76c5f60c 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod @@ -395,8 +395,7 @@ processed (e.g. after an EVP_EncryptFinal() call). EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, taglen, tag); Sets the expected tag to B bytes from B. This call is only legal -when decrypting data and must be made B any data is processed (e.g. -before any EVP_DecryptUpdate() call). +when decrypting data. =head1 CCM Mode diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_meth_new.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_meth_new.pod new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..041492a8f0fbf1 --- /dev/null +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_meth_new.pod @@ -0,0 +1,376 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +EVP_PKEY_meth_new, EVP_PKEY_meth_free, EVP_PKEY_meth_copy, EVP_PKEY_meth_find, +EVP_PKEY_meth_add0, EVP_PKEY_METHOD, +EVP_PKEY_meth_set_init, EVP_PKEY_meth_set_copy, EVP_PKEY_meth_set_cleanup, +EVP_PKEY_meth_set_paramgen, EVP_PKEY_meth_set_keygen, EVP_PKEY_meth_set_sign, +EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify, EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify_recover, EVP_PKEY_meth_set_signctx, +EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verifyctx, EVP_PKEY_meth_set_encrypt, EVP_PKEY_meth_set_decrypt, +EVP_PKEY_meth_set_derive, EVP_PKEY_meth_set_ctrl, +EVP_PKEY_meth_get_init, EVP_PKEY_meth_get_copy, EVP_PKEY_meth_get_cleanup, +EVP_PKEY_meth_get_paramgen, EVP_PKEY_meth_get_keygen, EVP_PKEY_meth_get_sign, +EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify, EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify_recover, EVP_PKEY_meth_get_signctx, +EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verifyctx, EVP_PKEY_meth_get_encrypt, EVP_PKEY_meth_get_decrypt, +EVP_PKEY_meth_get_derive, EVP_PKEY_meth_get_ctrl +- manipulating EVP_PKEY_METHOD structure + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include + + typedef struct evp_pkey_method_st EVP_PKEY_METHOD; + + EVP_PKEY_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_meth_new(int id, int flags); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_free(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *dst, const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *src); + const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_meth_find(int type); + int EVP_PKEY_meth_add0(const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth); + + void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_init(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (*init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (*copy) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, + EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + void (*cleanup) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (*paramgen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (*paramgen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + EVP_PKEY *pkey)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_keygen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (*keygen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (*keygen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + EVP_PKEY *pkey)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_sign(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (*sign_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (*sign) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, + const unsigned char *tbs, + size_t tbslen)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (*verify_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (*verify) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *sig, + size_t siglen, + const unsigned char *tbs, + size_t tbslen)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (*verify_recover_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX + *ctx), + int (*verify_recover) (EVP_PKEY_CTX + *ctx, + unsigned char + *sig, + size_t *siglen, + const unsigned + char *tbs, + size_t tbslen)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_signctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (*signctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx), + int (*signctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *sig, + size_t *siglen, + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verifyctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (*verifyctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx), + int (*verifyctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *sig, + int siglen, + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (*encrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (*encryptfn) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *out, + size_t *outlen, + const unsigned char *in, + size_t inlen)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (*decrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (*decrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *out, + size_t *outlen, + const unsigned char *in, + size_t inlen)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_derive(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (*derive_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (*derive) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *key, + size_t *keylen)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (*ctrl) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, + void *p2), + int (*ctrl_str) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + const char *type, + const char *value)); + + void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_init(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pinit) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_copy(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pcopy) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, + EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + void (**pcleanup) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pparamgen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**pparamgen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + EVP_PKEY *pkey)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_keygen(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pkeygen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**pkeygen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + EVP_PKEY *pkey)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_sign(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**psign_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**psign) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, + const unsigned char *tbs, + size_t tbslen)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pverify_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**pverify) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *sig, + size_t siglen, + const unsigned char *tbs, + size_t tbslen)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pverify_recover_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX + *ctx), + int (**pverify_recover) (EVP_PKEY_CTX + *ctx, + unsigned char + *sig, + size_t *siglen, + const unsigned + char *tbs, + size_t tbslen)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_signctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**psignctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx), + int (**psignctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *sig, + size_t *siglen, + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verifyctx(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pverifyctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx), + int (**pverifyctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *sig, + int siglen, + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pencrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**pencryptfn) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *out, + size_t *outlen, + const unsigned char *in, + size_t inlen)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pdecrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**pdecrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *out, + size_t *outlen, + const unsigned char *in, + size_t inlen)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_derive(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pderive_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx), + int (**pderive) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *key, + size_t *keylen)); + void EVP_PKEY_meth_get_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth, + int (**pctrl) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, + void *p2), + int (**pctrl_str) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + const char *type, + const char *value)); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +B is a structure which holds a set of methods for a +specific public key cryptographic algorithm. Those methods are usually +used to perform different jobs, such as generating a key, signing or +verifying, encrypting or decrypting, etc. + +There are two places where the B objects are stored: one +is a built-in static array representing the standard methods for different +algorithms, and the other one is a stack of user-defined application-specific +methods, which can be manipulated by using L. + +The B objects are usually referenced by B +objects. + +=head2 Methods + +The methods are the underlying implementations of a particular public key +algorithm present by the B object. + + int (*init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); + int (*copy) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src); + void (*cleanup) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); + +The init() method is called to initialize algorithm-specific data when a new +B is created. As opposed to init(), the cleanup() method is called +when an B is freed. The copy() method is called when an B +is being duplicated. Refer to L, L, +L and L. + + int (*paramgen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); + int (*paramgen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey); + +The paramgen_init() and paramgen() methods deal with key parameter generation. +They are called by L and L to +handle the parameter generation process. + + int (*keygen_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); + int (*keygen) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey); + +The keygen_init() and keygen() methods are used to generate the actual key for +the specified algorithm. They are called by L and +L. + + int (*sign_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); + int (*sign) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, + const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); + +The sign_init() and sign() methods are used to generate the signature of a +piece of data using a private key. They are called by L +and L. + + int (*verify_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); + int (*verify) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, + const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); + +The verify_init() and verify() methods are used to verify whether a signature is +valid. They are called by L and L. + + int (*verify_recover_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); + int (*verify_recover) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen); + +The verify_recover_init() and verify_recover() methods are used to verify a +signature and then recover the digest from the signature (for instance, a +signature that was generated by RSA signing algorithm). They are called by +L and L. + + int (*signctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx); + int (*signctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx); + +The signctx_init() and signctx() methods are used to sign a digest present by +a B object. They are called by the EVP_DigestSign functions. See +L for detail. + + int (*verifyctx_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx); + int (*verifyctx) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, int siglen, + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx); + +The verifyctx_init() and verifyctx() methods are used to verify a signature +against the data in a B object. They are called by the various +EVP_DigestVerify functions. See L for detail. + + int (*encrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); + int (*encrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, + const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen); + +The encrypt_init() and encrypt() methods are used to encrypt a piece of data. +They are called by L and L. + + int (*decrypt_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); + int (*decrypt) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, + const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen); + +The decrypt_init() and decrypt() methods are used to decrypt a piece of data. +They are called by L and L. + + int (*derive_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); + int (*derive) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen); + +The derive_init() and derive() methods are used to derive the shared secret +from a public key algorithm (for instance, the DH algorithm). They are called by +L and L. + + int (*ctrl) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2); + int (*ctrl_str) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value); + +The ctrl() and ctrl_str() methods are used to adjust algorithm-specific +settings. See L and related functions for detail. + + int (*digestsign) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, + const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); + int (*digestverify) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, + size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, + size_t tbslen); + +The digestsign() and digestverify() methods are used to generate or verify +a signature in a one-shot mode. They could be called by L +and L. + +=head2 Functions + +EVP_PKEY_meth_new() creates and returns a new B object, +and associates the given B and B. The following flags are +supported: + + EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN + EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM + +If an B is set with the B flag, the +maximum size of the output buffer will be automatically calculated or checked +in corresponding EVP methods by the EVP framework. Thus the implementations of +these methods don't need to care about handling the case of returning output +buffer size by themselves. For details on the output buffer size, refer to +L. + +The B is used to indicate the signctx() method +of an B is always called by the EVP framework while doing a +digest signing operation by calling L. + +EVP_PKEY_meth_free() frees an existing B pointed by +B. + +EVP_PKEY_meth_copy() copies an B object from B +to B. + +EVP_PKEY_meth_find() finds an B object with the B. +This function first searches through the user-defined method objects and +then the built-in objects. + +EVP_PKEY_meth_add0() adds B to the user defined stack of methods. + +The EVP_PKEY_meth_set functions set the corresponding fields of +B structure with the arguments passed. + +The EVP_PKEY_meth_get functions get the corresponding fields of +B structure to the arguments provided. + +=head1 RETURN VALUES + +EVP_PKEY_meth_new() returns a pointer to a new B +object or returns NULL on error. + +EVP_PKEY_meth_free() and EVP_PKEY_meth_copy() do not return values. + +EVP_PKEY_meth_find() returns a pointer to the found B +object or returns NULL if not found. + +EVP_PKEY_meth_add0() returns 1 if method is added successfully or 0 +if an error occurred. + +All EVP_PKEY_meth_set and EVP_PKEY_meth_get functions have no return +values. For the 'get' functions, function pointers are returned by +arguments. + +=head1 COPYRIGHT + +Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + +Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use +this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy +in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at +L. + +=cut diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod index b8f678fe729d71..f20f815d478642 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod @@ -104,6 +104,13 @@ The RSA_padding_check_xxx() functions return the length of the recovered data, -1 on error. Error codes can be obtained by calling L. +=head1 WARNING + +The RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() padding check leaks timing +information which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher +padding oracle attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 +v1.5 padding design. Prefer PKCS1_OAEP padding. + =head1 SEE ALSO L, diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/RSA_public_encrypt.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/RSA_public_encrypt.pod index 0541f348b3e20c..4d7c1f2cac7a27 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/RSA_public_encrypt.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/RSA_public_encrypt.pod @@ -67,6 +67,13 @@ recovered plaintext. On error, -1 is returned; the error codes can be obtained by L. +=head1 WARNING + +Decryption failures in the RSA_PKCS1_PADDING mode leak information +which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher padding oracle +attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 v1.5 padding +design. Prefer RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING. + =head1 CONFORMING TO SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0 diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_check_private_key.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_check_private_key.pod new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..a1fb07b1097e50 --- /dev/null +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_check_private_key.pod @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +X509_check_private_key, X509_REQ_check_private_key - check the consistency +of a private key with the public key in an X509 certificate or certificate +request + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include + + int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k); + + int X509_REQ_check_private_key(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *k); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +X509_check_private_key() function checks the consistency of private +key B with the public key in B. + +X509_REQ_check_private_key() is equivalent to X509_check_private_key() +except that B represents a certificate request of structure B. + +=head1 RETURN VALUE + +X509_check_private_key() and X509_REQ_check_private_key() return 1 if +the keys match each other, and 0 if not. + +If the key is invalid or an error occurred, the reason code can be +obtained using L. + +=head1 BUGS + +The B functions don't check if B itself is indeed +a private key or not. It merely compares the public materials (e.g. exponent +and modulus of an RSA key) and/or key parameters (e.g. EC params of an EC key) +of a key pair. So if you pass a public key to these functions in B, it will +return success. + +=head1 SEE ALSO + +L + +=head1 COPYRIGHT + +Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + +Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use +this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy +in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at +L. + +=cut diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/hmac.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/hmac.pod index 2c8f20a2018869..ca9798af62c3fc 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/hmac.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/hmac.pod @@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ B bytes long. It places the result in B (which must have space for the output of the hash function, which is no more than B bytes). If B is NULL, the digest is placed in a static array. The size of -the output is placed in B, unless it is B. +the output is placed in B, unless it is B. Note: passing a NULL +value for B to use the static array is not thread safe. B can be EVP_sha1(), EVP_ripemd160() etc. diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback.pod similarity index 100% rename from deps/openssl/openssl/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback.pod rename to deps/openssl/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback.pod diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_export_keying_material.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_export_keying_material.pod new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..ccb99ec9a8e0b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_export_keying_material.pod @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +=pod + +=head1 NAME + +SSL_export_keying_material - obtain keying material for application use + +=head1 SYNOPSIS + + #include + + int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, + const char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *context, + size_t contextlen, int use_context); + +=head1 DESCRIPTION + +During the creation of a TLS or DTLS connection shared keying material is +established between the two endpoints. The function SSL_export_keying_material() +enables an application to use some of this keying material for its own purposes +in accordance with RFC5705. + +An application may need to securely establish the context within which this +keying material will be used. For example this may include identifiers for the +application session, application algorithms or parameters, or the lifetime of +the context. The context value is left to the application but must be the same +on both sides of the communication. + +For a given SSL connection B, B bytes of data will be written to +B. The application specific context should be supplied in the location +pointed to by B and should be B bytes long. Provision of +a context is optional. If the context should be omitted entirely then +B should be set to 0. Otherwise it should be any other value. If +B is 0 then the values of B and B are ignored. +Note that a zero length context is treated differently to no context at all, and +will result in different keying material being returned. + +An application specific label should be provided in the location pointed to by +B8.9.1
8.9.0
@@ -43,6 +44,32 @@ [Node.js Long Term Support Plan](https://github.com/nodejs/LTS) and will be supported actively until April 2019 and maintained until December 2019. + +## 2017-11-07, Version 8.9.1 'Carbon' (LTS), @gibfahn + +### Notable Changes + +- **openssl**: + - upgrade openssl sources to 1.0.2m (Shigeki Ohtsu) [#16691](https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/16691) +- ***Revert*** "**https**: + - refactor to use http internals" (Myles Borins) [#16660](https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/16660) + +### Commits + +* [[`6a7e5ceaa9`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/6a7e5ceaa9)] - **deps**: V8: cherry-pick 32141e9 from upstream (Ali Ijaz Sheikh) [#16704](https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/16704) +* [[`a815e1b6a2`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/a815e1b6a2)] - **deps**: cherry-pick e7f4e9e from upstream libuv (Bartosz Sosnowski) [#16724](https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/16724) +* [[`7f86e8190c`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/7f86e8190c)] - **deps**: update openssl asm and asm_obsolete files (Shigeki Ohtsu) [#16691](https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/16691) +* [[`1af2244020`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/1af2244020)] - **deps**: add -no_rand_screen to openssl s_client (Shigeki Ohtsu) [nodejs/io.js#1836](https://github.com/nodejs/io.js/pull/1836) +* [[`9d98dcc395`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/9d98dcc395)] - **deps**: fix asm build error of openssl in x86_win32 (Shigeki Ohtsu) [iojs/io.js#1389](https://github.com/iojs/io.js/pull/1389) +* [[`99319efc45`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/99319efc45)] - **deps**: fix openssl assembly error on ia32 win32 (Fedor Indutny) [iojs/io.js#1389](https://github.com/iojs/io.js/pull/1389) +* [[`151a8da4b7`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/151a8da4b7)] - **deps**: copy all openssl header files to include dir (Shigeki Ohtsu) [#16691](https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/16691) +* [[`d68e53452c`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/d68e53452c)] - **deps**: upgrade openssl sources to 1.0.2m (Shigeki Ohtsu) [#16691](https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/16691) +* [[`a3be5bc560`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/a3be5bc560)] - **doc**: add 9.x to version picker and mark 8.x as LTS (Chris Young) [#16672](https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/16672) +* [[`08b75c1591`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/08b75c1591)] - ***Revert*** "**https**: refactor to use http internals" (Myles Borins) [#16660](https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/16660) +* [[`d334a95834`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/d334a95834)] - **openssl**: fix keypress requirement in apps on win32 (Shigeki Ohtsu) [iojs/io.js#1389](https://github.com/iojs/io.js/pull/1389) +* [[`bf26b96fd6`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/bf26b96fd6)] - **src**: add 'dynamic' process.release.lts property (Rod Vagg) [#16656](https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/16656) +* [[`dfac6cc0bb`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/dfac6cc0bb)] - **test**: update process-release for Node 8 Carbon (Jeremiah Senkpiel) [#16656](https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/16656) + ## 2017-10-31, Version 8.9.0 'Carbon' (LTS), @gibfahn diff --git a/lib/https.js b/lib/https.js index 56dd67088b7bb3..6fcd9f65ce7858 100644 --- a/lib/https.js +++ b/lib/https.js @@ -25,13 +25,8 @@ require('internal/util').assertCrypto(); const tls = require('tls'); const url = require('url'); +const http = require('http'); const util = require('util'); -const { Agent: HttpAgent } = require('_http_agent'); -const { - Server: HttpServer, - _connectionListener -} = require('_http_server'); -const { ClientRequest } = require('_http_client'); const { inherits } = util; const debug = util.debuglog('https'); const { urlToOptions, searchParamsSymbol } = require('internal/url'); @@ -56,7 +51,7 @@ function Server(opts, requestListener) { opts.ALPNProtocols = ['http/1.1']; } - tls.Server.call(this, opts, _connectionListener); + tls.Server.call(this, opts, http._connectionListener); this.httpAllowHalfOpen = false; @@ -73,12 +68,13 @@ function Server(opts, requestListener) { this.keepAliveTimeout = 5000; } inherits(Server, tls.Server); +exports.Server = Server; -Server.prototype.setTimeout = HttpServer.prototype.setTimeout; +Server.prototype.setTimeout = http.Server.prototype.setTimeout; -function createServer(opts, requestListener) { +exports.createServer = function createServer(opts, requestListener) { return new Server(opts, requestListener); -} +}; // HTTPS agents. @@ -133,7 +129,7 @@ function Agent(options) { if (!(this instanceof Agent)) return new Agent(options); - HttpAgent.call(this, options); + http.Agent.call(this, options); this.defaultPort = 443; this.protocol = 'https:'; this.maxCachedSessions = this.options.maxCachedSessions; @@ -145,11 +141,11 @@ function Agent(options) { list: [] }; } -inherits(Agent, HttpAgent); +inherits(Agent, http.Agent); Agent.prototype.createConnection = createConnection; Agent.prototype.getName = function getName(options) { - var name = HttpAgent.prototype.getName.call(this, options); + var name = http.Agent.prototype.getName.call(this, options); name += ':'; if (options.ca) @@ -223,7 +219,10 @@ Agent.prototype._evictSession = function _evictSession(key) { const globalAgent = new Agent(); -function request(options, cb) { +exports.globalAgent = globalAgent; +exports.Agent = Agent; + +exports.request = function request(options, cb) { if (typeof options === 'string') { options = url.parse(options); if (!options.hostname) { @@ -237,20 +236,11 @@ function request(options, cb) { options = util._extend({}, options); } options._defaultAgent = globalAgent; - return new ClientRequest(options, cb); -} + return http.request(options, cb); +}; -function get(options, cb) { - const req = request(options, cb); +exports.get = function get(options, cb) { + var req = exports.request(options, cb); req.end(); return req; -} - -module.exports = { - Agent, - globalAgent, - Server, - createServer, - get, - request }; diff --git a/src/node.cc b/src/node.cc index 7a7db9140f88a4..e6e3e02c98e5db 100644 --- a/src/node.cc +++ b/src/node.cc @@ -3458,6 +3458,11 @@ void SetupProcessObject(Environment* env, READONLY_PROPERTY(release, "name", OneByteString(env->isolate(), NODE_RELEASE)); +#if NODE_VERSION_IS_LTS + READONLY_PROPERTY(release, "lts", + OneByteString(env->isolate(), NODE_VERSION_LTS_CODENAME)); +#endif + // if this is a release build and no explicit base has been set // substitute the standard release download URL #ifndef NODE_RELEASE_URLBASE diff --git a/src/node_version.h b/src/node_version.h index d4cece6444272e..3a8831b7a202ba 100644 --- a/src/node_version.h +++ b/src/node_version.h @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ #define NODE_MAJOR_VERSION 8 #define NODE_MINOR_VERSION 9 -#define NODE_PATCH_VERSION 1 +#define NODE_PATCH_VERSION 2 #define NODE_VERSION_IS_LTS 1 #define NODE_VERSION_LTS_CODENAME "Carbon" diff --git a/test/parallel/test-process-release.js b/test/parallel/test-process-release.js new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..8b6bca9141beed --- /dev/null +++ b/test/parallel/test-process-release.js @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +'use strict'; + +require('../common'); + +const assert = require('assert'); +const versionParts = process.versions.node.split('.'); + +assert.strictEqual(process.release.name, 'node'); + +// it's expected that future LTS release lines will have additional +// branches in here +if (versionParts[0] === '4' && versionParts[1] >= 2) { + assert.strictEqual(process.release.lts, 'Argon'); +} else if (versionParts[0] === '6' && versionParts[1] >= 9) { + assert.strictEqual(process.release.lts, 'Boron'); +} else if (versionParts[0] === '8' && versionParts[1] >= 9) { + assert.strictEqual(process.release.lts, 'Carbon'); +} else { + assert.strictEqual(process.release.lts, undefined); +} diff --git a/tools/doc/html.js b/tools/doc/html.js index 22a793c3394bd1..b6e8866c247d55 100644 --- a/tools/doc/html.js +++ b/tools/doc/html.js @@ -211,7 +211,8 @@ function altDocs(filename) { } const versions = [ - { num: '8.x' }, + { num: '9.x' }, + { num: '8.x', lts: true }, { num: '7.x' }, { num: '6.x', lts: true }, { num: '5.x' },