chore(deps): update dependency vite to v4.5.1 [security] (#53)

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This PR contains the following updates:

| Package | Change | Age | Adoption | Passing | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| [vite](https://vitejs.dev)
([source](https://togithub.com/vitejs/vite/tree/HEAD/packages/vite)) |
[`4.5.0` -> `4.5.1`](https://renovatebot.com/diffs/npm/vite/4.5.0/4.5.1)
|
[![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/npm/vite/4.5.1?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[![adoption](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/adoption/npm/vite/4.5.1?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[![passing](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/compatibility/npm/vite/4.5.0/4.5.1?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/npm/vite/4.5.0/4.5.1?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|

### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

####
[CVE-2023-49293](https://togithub.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-92r3-m2mg-pj97)

### Summary
When Vite's HTML transformation is invoked manually via
`server.transformIndexHtml`, the original request URL is passed in
unmodified, and the `html` being transformed contains inline module
scripts (`<script type="module">...</script>`), it is possible to inject
arbitrary HTML into the transformed output by supplying a malicious URL
query string to `server.transformIndexHtml`.

### Impact
Only apps using `appType: 'custom'` and using the default Vite HTML
middleware are affected. The HTML entry must also contain an inline
script. The attack requires a user to click on a malicious URL while
running the dev server. Restricted files aren't exposed to the attacker.

### Patches
Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

### Details
Suppose `index.html` contains an inline module script:

```html
<script type="module">
  // Inline script
</script>
```

This script is transformed into a proxy script like

```html
<script type="module" src="/index.html?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>
```

due to Vite's HTML plugin:


https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/7fd7c6cebfcad34ae7021ebee28f97b1f28ef3f3/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/html.ts#L429-L465

When `appType: 'spa' | 'mpa'`, Vite serves HTML itself, and
`htmlFallbackMiddleware` rewrites `req.url` to the canonical path of
`index.html`,


https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/73ef074b80fa7252e0c46a37a2c94ba8cba46504/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/htmlFallback.ts#L44-L47

so the `url` passed to `server.transformIndexHtml` is `/index.html`.

However, if `appType: 'custom'`, HTML is served manually, and if
`server.transformIndexHtml` is called with the unmodified request URL
(as the SSR docs suggest), then the path of the transformed `html-proxy`
script varies with the request URL. For example, a request with path `/`
produces

```html
<script type="module" src="/@&#8203;id/__x00__/index.html?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>
```

It is possible to abuse this behavior by crafting a request URL to
contain a malicious payload like

```
"></script><script>alert('boom')</script>
```

so a request to
http://localhost:5173/?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E
produces HTML output like

```html
<script type="module" src="/@&#8203;id/__x00__/?"></script><script>alert("boom")</script>?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>
```

which demonstrates XSS.

### PoC

- Example 1. Serving HTML from `vite dev` middleware with `appType:
'custom'`
- Go to
https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=dev-html
    - "Open in New Tab"
- Edit URL to set query string to
`?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E` and
navigate
    - Witness XSS:
-
![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/2456381/287434281-13757894-7a63-4a73-b1e9-d2b024c19d14.png)
- Example 2. Serving HTML from SSR-style Express server (Vite dev server
runs in middleware mode):
- Go to
https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=server
    - (Same steps as above)
- Example 3. Plain `vite dev` (this shows that vanilla `vite dev` is
_not_ vulnerable, provided `htmlFallbackMiddleware` is used)
- Go to
https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=dev
    - (Same steps as above)
    - You should _not_ see the alert box in this case

### Detailed Impact

This will probably predominantly affect [development-mode
SSR](https://vitejs.dev/guide/ssr#setting-up-the-dev-server), where
`vite.transformHtml` is called using the original `req.url`, per the
docs:


https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/7fd7c6cebfcad34ae7021ebee28f97b1f28ef3f3/docs/guide/ssr.md?plain=1#L114-L126

However, since this vulnerability affects `server.transformIndexHtml`,
the scope of impact may be higher to also include other ad-hoc calls to
`server.transformIndexHtml` from outside of Vite's own codebase.

My best guess at bisecting which versions are vulnerable involves the
following test script

```js
import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import * as vite from 'vite';

const html = `
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8" />
  </head>
  <body>
    <script type="module">
      // Inline script
    </script>
  </body>
</html>
`;
const server = await vite.createServer({ appType: 'custom' });
const transformed = await server.transformIndexHtml('/?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E', html);
console.log(transformed);
await server.close();
```

and using it I was able to narrow down to #&#8203;13581. If this is
correct, then vulnerable Vite versions are 4.4.0-beta.2 and higher
(which includes 4.4.0).

---

### Release Notes

<details>
<summary>vitejs/vite (vite)</summary>

### [`v4.5.1`](https://togithub.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v4.5.1)

[Compare
Source](https://togithub.com/vitejs/vite/compare/v4.5.0...v4.5.1)

Please refer to
[CHANGELOG.md](https://togithub.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v4.5.1/packages/vite/CHANGELOG.md)
for details.

</details>

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package.json

@@ -8,6 +8,6 @@
     "devDependencies": {
         "axios": "1.6.2",
         "laravel-vite-plugin": "0.8.1",
-        "vite": "4.5.0"
+        "vite": "4.5.1"
     }
 }